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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
The recent financial crisis, which originated in the US, has spread to the rest of the world. 
The impact of the financial crisis on economic activity varies widely across countries, 
reflecting differences in exposure and vulnerability to financial crises, and heterogeneity 
in macroeconomic structures, and differences in policy responses (Berkmen et al., 2009). 
Although several reasons have been put forward to explain cross-country differences in 
the impact of the crisis, so far the potential role of labor market flexibility has been 
neglected.  
Another issue that has attracted a lot of attention is the interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policy during the crisis and its implications for central bank 
independence. Many central banks over the past years have engaged in policies that have 
clear fiscal dimensions, including credit provision to the private sector, bailouts of 
financial institutions, and quantitative easing involving the purchase of risky mortgage 
backed securities and long-term treasury securities. In addition, some anecdotal evidence 
suggests that financial crises may threaten central bank independence. For instance, the 
central bank governor in Argentina was dismissed in 2010, because he refused to use 
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currency reserves to pay off foreign debt. Similarly, Mexico’s president appointed a new 
governor for the Bank of Mexico in 2009, after he clashed with the bank’s former 
governor who was reluctant to cut interest rate after the country was hit by the crisis.  
Up to now, there is hardly any research examining the relationship between 
financial crises and central bank independence. Since the independence of central banks 
increased both in industrial and emerging countries during the last two decades, in almost 
all discussions of central bank independence it was taken for granted that a suitably 
independent central bank could achieve its inflation targets. An influential study of 
Rogoff (1985) suggests that central banks should be independent to deal with the 
inflationary bias due to the time inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
However,  Sargent and Wallace (1981) show that when fiscal policy fails to set the 
present discounted value of primary fiscal surpluses right, it will force a central bank to 
generate the seigniorage necessary to balance the budget. Hence, price stability may be 
threatened if fiscal policy is not sustainable.  
Several recent theoretical papers, like Davig et al. (2011) and Davig and Leeper 
(2011), suggest that even if a central bank is operationally independent from government, 
in an economy facing a debt crisis and reaching its ‘fiscal limit’, i.e. a point beyond 
which tax collections can no longer rise and government expenditures cannot be further 
reduced, the central bank will be forced to sacrifice its inflation target to stabilize 
government debt by money creation. Walsh (2011) also suggests that there is a need for 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy during financial crises, as central banks 
risk political exposure.  
 This dissertation aims to examine the impact of financial crises on central bank 
independence, output, and inflation. Firstly, we discuss the measurement of central bank 
independence. Most studies on central bank independence (CBI) use either an indicator 
based on the central bank law in place, or an indicator based on the so-called turnover 
rate of central governors. The most widely employed legal CBI index is from Cukierman 
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992), although alternative measures have been developed 
Introduction  
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(see Arnon et al. 2006). However, CBI indicators based on the central bank law in place 
tend to be static and cannot capture institutional and economic factors that affect the 
actual independence of the central bank (Cukierman, 2007). Hence, in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, we construct both a legal and an actual index of CBI for the central bank of 
Indonesia, Bank Indonesia (BI), since its creation in 1953 until 2009. The first research 
question we deal with is how the legal and actual independence of BI has developed since 
its creation? We also examine the relationship between CBI and inflation in Indonesia.  
 Secondly, we examine the impact of the current financial crisis on output and 
unemployment by considering the role of labor market flexibility. Forteza and Rama 
(2006) report that countries with relatively rigid labor markets experienced deeper 
recessions and slower recoveries. However, theoretically, the relationship between output 
loss and labor market flexibility is not clear. On the one hand, Keynesians argues that a 
flexible labor market is “bad” because it increases output drops when shocks occur. On 
the other hand, according to the neo-classical view a flexible labor market increases the 
speed of output adjustment. Therefore, the second research question is: what is the 
relationship between labor market flexibility and the impact of the current financial crisis 
on output and unemployment?  
 Thirdly, the main theme of this dissertation is the effect of financial crises on 
central bank independence. As already mentioned, the current financial crisis threatens 
the independence of central banks. Besides the engagement of monetary policy in fiscal 
operations, the dismissal of central bank governors in the current financial crisis in some 
countries has also indicated that central banks risk political exposure. We examine 
whether financial crises affect the probability that a central bank governor will be 
replaced. The study that comes closest studies to ours is Dreher et al. (2010) who, among 
other things, examine whether currency devaluations affect the likelihood of a central 
bank governor replacement. In our study, we use both regular and irregular replacements 
of central bank governors as indicator of central bank independence. Financial crises are 
decomposed into currency crises, banking crises, and debt crises. Following Vuletin and 
Zhu (2011), we also consider the nature of a central bank governor’s replacement, i.e. 
whether the new central bank governor comes from the executive branch of the 
Chapter 1 
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government (government ally) or not (non-government ally). Hence, the main questions 
addressed in this part are: what is the effect of financial crises on the replacement of a 
central bank governor?;  and is a new central bank governor more likely to come from the 
ranks of the executive branch of the government (government ally) or not (non-
government ally)?  
 Finally, we examine an issue that has led several observers to worry about during 
the current financial crisis: “do fiscal deficits and debt crises cause inflation?” Many 
studies have examined the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation. A study by Catão and 
Terrones (2005) finds that fiscal deficits lead to higher inflation, notably so in high-
inflation countries. However, less attention has been given to the effect of debt crises on 
inflation. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) document that since World War II, inflation and 
debt default have gone hand-in-hand. In addition, theoretically Davig et al. (2011) and 
Davig and Leeper (2011) explain that if the economy faces a ‘fiscal limit’ an 
unsustainable debt path will lead to inflation. Hence, the last chapter of this dissertation 
explores the effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation in developing countries 
taking dynamics and parameter heterogeneity into account.  
 To summarize, the research questions that will be addressed in this dissertation 
are: first, how have the legal and actual independence of Bank Indonesia (BI) developed 
since its creation to the present time; second, what role does labor market flexibility play 
when it comes to the impact of the most recent financial crisis on output and 
unemployment?; third, what is the effect of financial crises on the replacement of a 
central bank governor?; fourth, do fiscal deficits and debt crises cause inflation in 
developing countries? The next section will explain the methods employed and the main 
findings of this dissertation.  
Introduction  
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1.2 Methodology and Main Findings  
1.2.1 Legal and Actual Independence of Bank Indonesia (BI) 
In order to measure the independence of Bank Indonesia, we extend both the legal CBI 
index constructed by Cukierman (1992) and the actual CBI index introduced by 
Cukierman (2007). The index of Cukierman (1992) covers 4 main aspects of CBI: 
independence of the chief executive officer (CEO), independence in policy formulation, 
preference for low inflation, and absence of forced lending to the government. We add 
financial independence to the Cukierman legal index.  
Financial independence is defined as the ability of the central bank to attain its 
objective(s) efficiently without financial assistance from the government (Stella, 2005). 
The three components of financial independence included are: determination of the 
central bank’s budget, decision-making on the allocation of central bank profits, and the 
responsibility of the central bank to bear losses. In practice, financial independence is 
represented by a strong income position that provides necessary means to obtain its 
objective(s) (Jacome and Vazquez, 2008). When the level of central bank capital is 
negative or below some critical threshold, politicians may influence the central bank as it 
depends on additional government capital, thereby limiting the independence of the bank 
(Cukierman, 2008). Financial independence is important, notably during financial crises 
when the central bank often has to support ailing financial institutions, but it is generally 
neglected by studies measuring CBI. Most studies assume that central banks have an 
unlimited ability to meet their obligations by creating money. In fact, central banks 
cannot both obtain their target and be forced to create money at the same time (Stella, 
2005).  
 For actual independence, we consider institutional and economic aspects that 
possibly affect each item of the legal CBI index of Cukierman (1992). Furthermore, we 
also examine the implementation of the central bank laws in practice. The economic and 
institutional aspects that are considered include financial market development, the size of 
government deficits, the type of exchange rate regime, and the function of the central 
Chapter 1 
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bank as a development bank. The detailed components of actual independence are 
presented in Chapter 2.  
 We find that before 1999, the legal and actual independence of Bank Indonesia 
diverged substantially. The actual independence of Bank Indonesia is much higher than 
its legal independence during that period. After Bank Indonesia was mandated as a 
legally independent institution by a new central bank law, its legal independence 
increased and converged to actual independence. Furthermore, we find that the actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia is negatively and significantly related to inflation.  
 
1.2.2 Labor Market Flexibility and the Impact of the Financial Crisis 
In Chapter 3, we apply factor analysis on the indicators of labor market flexibility 
provided by Gwartney et al. (2009). Labor market flexibility is measured by using six 
indicators: minimum wage, mandated cost of hiring, mandated cost of worker dismissal, 
hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, and conscription. Based 
on the factor analysis, we identify 3 factors: labor market regulation, dismissal cost, and 
hiring cost. 
 The impact of the global financial crisis on output is measured as the percentage 
decrease of real GDP from peak to through during the first quarter of 2007 until the first 
quarter of 2010. Meanwhile, the impact of the crisis on unemployment is measured by the 
change of the unemployment rate from peak to through during the first quarter of 2007 
until the first quarter of 2010.  
 By employing cross-country regressions and including control variables like trade 
and capital market integration, fiscal balance, financial vulnerability, and institutional 
differences, we find that lower hiring cost reduce the output loss, notably so in high-
income countries. However, the duration of the crisis is longer in case of low dismissal 
cost, notably so in low-income countries. Meanwhile, in industrial countries lower hiring 
Introduction  
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cost is related to a lower employment loss due to the financial crisis, but the size of the 
effect is rather small. 
 
1.2.3 Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors 
A conditional fixed effects logit model is employed in Chapter 4 to examine the effect of 
financial crises on the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced. 
Information on central bank governor turnovers and their legal term in office is taken 
from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (Dreher et al., 2010). We consider both regular 
and irregular turnovers of central bank governors. Moreover, financial crises data come 
from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Financial crises are divided into 3 categories: banking, 
currency and debt crises.  
We follow Dreher et al. (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2010), but extend their 
work in different directions. First, we examine the effect of financial crises on the 
likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Second, we examine whether 
central bank independence and an inflation-targeting monetary policy strategy mediate 
the effect of financial crises on the probability of a central bank governor turnover. Third, 
we employ conditional logit models with clustered standard errors given the inertial 
nature of the variables involved. Finally, following Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we also 
investigate whether the new governor who is appointed after the occurrence of a financial 
crisis is an ally of the government or not. 
Using a sample covering 101 countries during the period 1970-2007, we find that 
financial crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. 
When we decompose crises into banking, currency, and debt crises we find that banking 
crises and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood that a central bank governor 
will be replaced. Our results also suggest that financial crises increase the probability that 
a non-government ally will be appointed as new central bank governor.  
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1.2.4 The Effect of Fiscal Deficits and Debt Crises on Inflation in Developing 
Countries 
The relationship between fiscal deficits, debt crises and inflation is dynamic. Moreover, it 
is likely that there is parameter heterogeneity across countries. Neglecting parameter 
heterogeneity may lead to inconsistent estimates and potentially misleading inference 
even for panels with large N and T (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999). 
Hence, to cover the dynamic and parameter heterogeneity aspects, two approaches can be 
applied, which are: the mean group (MG) estimation and the pool mean group (PMG) 
estimation.  
The mean group (MG) assumes that the intercepts, slope coefficients, and error 
variance differ across countries. Moreover, the MG assumes that the short-run and the 
long-run effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation are heterogenous across 
countries. On the other hand, the PMG estimation allows the intercept, short-run 
coefficients, and error variances to differ across countries, while the long-run coefficients 
are constrained to be the same across individual countries.  
The results of Chapter 5 show that fiscal deficits and debt crises have a significant 
positive effect on inflation in the long run. These effects are homogenous across 
countries. The results are robust when we include either fiscal balance as share of GDP or 
as share of M1 as an explanatory variable. We also find that the long-run effects of fiscal 
deficits and debt crises on inflation are conditional on the level of inflation and (for debt 
crises) on political instability. The higher the rate of inflation, the larger will be the effect 
of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation. Likewise, the effect of a debt crisis on 
inflation becomes stronger when political instability increases.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Legal and Actual Central Bank Independence:  
A Case Study of Bank Indonesia 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the last two decades, many countries changed their central bank laws to grant 
their monetary authorities greater independence. Also the central bank of Indonesia 
(Bank Indonesia, BI) became more independent in 1999. It is widely believed that 
without sufficient independence, central banks will give in to pressure from politicians 
who may be motivated by short-run electoral considerations or may value short-run 
economic expansions highly while discounting the longer-run inflationary consequences 
of expansionary policies (Walsh, 2005).1 If the ability of politicians to distort monetary 
policy results in excessive inflation, countries with an independent central bank should 
experience lower rates of inflation. There is indeed strong evidence for a negative 
                                                          
1
 One theory underlying this view is the time inconsistency approach to monetary policy-making. The basic 
message of this theory is that government suffers from an inflationary bias and that, as a result, inflation is 
sub-optimal. Rogoff (1985) has shown that when monetary policy is delegated to an independent and 
‘conservative’ central banker this inflationary bias will be reduced. Conservative means that the central 
banker is more averse to inflation than the government, in the sense that he places a greater weight on price 
stability than the government does.  
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relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation, as shown in the 
meta-analysis of Klomp and De Haan (2010). 
This paper assesses the independence of Bank Indonesia since its creation in 1953 
until 2009 by constructing and comparing two measures of independence: a legal 
independence indicator and an actual independence indicator. The legal indicator follows 
Cukierman (1992) and is based on the central bank law in place. Following Cukierman 
(2007), the actual independence indicator takes several economic and institutional aspects 
into account that could affect the independence of the central bank, such as financial 
market development, the size of government deficits, the exchange rate regime, and the 
function of the central bank as a development bank.  
Our main finding is that actual independence of Bank Indonesia diverged from 
legal independence before the bank became legally independent in 1999. During this 
period, actual independence of Bank Indonesia was higher than its legal independence. 
After the central bank law was changed in 1999, legal independence increased 
significantly and converged to actual independence. Our findings also suggest that actual 
independence of BI is negatively related to inflation, confirming the results of several 
previous studies (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996; Klomp and De Haan, 2010).  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the methodology applied 
to construct indicators of legal and actual CBI. Section 2.3 constructs the legal index of 
Cukierman (1992) for Bank Indonesia and compares it with legal indexes of other 
studies. This section also compares the legal independence of Bank Indonesia and central 
banks in other developing countries. Section 2.4 presents the extended index for legal 
independence of Bank Indonesia, while section 2.5 constructs the index of actual 
independence for Bank Indonesia. Section 2.6 compares the indicators of legal and actual 
CBI for Bank Indonesia. Section 2.7 provides the estimation results of the relationship 
between inflation and the indicators of actual and legal CBI. The final section offers the 
conclusions.  
Legal and Actual Central Bank Independence:  
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2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 General Approach  
Most empirical studies on central bank independence (CBI) use either an indicator based 
on central bank laws in place, or an indicator based on the so-called turnover rate of 
central bank governors. The most widely employed legal CBI index is from Cukierman 
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992)2, although alternative measures have been developed 
(see Arnone et al. 2006 for an extensive comparison of the various CBI indicators). A 
serious drawback of CBI indicators based on the central bank laws in place is that the 
interpretation of these laws is subjective because many central bank laws are incomplete 
and leave room for different interpretations (Berger et al., 2001). In addition, legal 
independence measures tend to be static and cannot capture institutional and economic 
factors that affect the actual independence of the central bank. Legal measures of CBI 
may therefore not reflect the true relationship between the central bank and the 
government. Especially in countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in 
the political culture, there can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional 
arrangements and their practical impact (Walsh, 2005). 
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) argue that the actual average term in 
office of the central bank governor may therefore be a better proxy for CBI than measures 
based on central bank laws. The turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is based on 
the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a higher turnover of central bank 
governors indicates a lower level of independence. However, a low TOR does not 
necessarily imply that the central bank is independent. It could reflect the presence of a 
subservient governor who tends to stay in office longer. Furthermore, also the TOR may 
not fully capture the institutional and economic changes, which affect central bank 
independence in practice. Cukierman (2007) therefore constructed an index of actual CBI 
by considering various economic and institutional aspects, such as financial market 
development, the size of government deficits, the type of exchange rate regime, and the 
function of the central bank as a development bank.  
                                                          
2
 The only difference between the indicators of Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) is the 
procedure employed to aggregate the various dimensions of CBI into one measure.  
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We extend both the legal CBI index constructed by Cukierman (1992) and the 
actual CBI index introduced by Cukierman (2007) in order to assess the independence of 
Bank Indonesia. In constructing the legal index we will add financial independence to the 
Cukierman legal index. Financial independence is defined as the ability of the central 
bank to attain its objective(s) efficiently without financial assistance from the government 
(Stella, 2005). In practice, financial independence is represented by a strong income 
position that provides the central bank with necessary means to obtain its objective(s) 
(Jacome and Vazquez, 2008). When the level of central bank capital is negative or below 
some threshold, politicians may influence the central bank as it depends on additional 
government capital, thereby limiting the independence of the bank (Cukierman, 2008). 
The central bank’s financial position is generally neglected in studies on the institutional 
aspects of central banking since central banks are assumed to have an unlimited ability to 
meet their obligations by creating money. However, this assumption is not realistic as 
central banks cannot both obtain their target and be forced to create money at the same 
time (Stella, 2005). Therefore, financial independence should be taken into account when 
measuring central bank independence.  
Apart from adding financial independence, our legal index for Bank Indonesia 
follows Cukierman (1992). However, our legal index for BI differs from that of 
Cukierman due to differences in the interpretation of the various central bank laws in 
place. To minimize subjectivity and to check our interpretation of the laws in place, we 
interviewed staff of Bank Indonesia.3 Moreover, we compared our index with those of 
other studies that employ Cukierman’s (1992) methodology, like Polillo and Guillén 
(2005).  
As legal CBI indexes tend to be static and cannot capture the institutional and 
economic factors that affect the actual independence of a central bank, we construct an 
index of actual independence for Bank Indonesia following a similar approach as 
Cukierman (2007).  
                                                          
3
 The interviews were held in March 2009 in Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. We discussed the score of 
each component of our legal index with Bank Indonesia’s legal department.  
Legal and Actual Central Bank Independence:  
A Case Study of Bank Indonesia 
13 
2.2.2 The Extended Cukierman Index of Legal CBI 
The index of Cukierman (1992) includes 16 components - each coded on a scale of 0 
(lowest level of independence) to 1 (highest level of independence) - covering 4 main 
aspects of CBI: independence of the chief executive officer (CEO), independence in 
policy formulation, preference for low inflation, and absence of forced lending to the 
government. As outlined before, we add financial independence to the Cukierman legal 
index. We consider three components of financial independence: determination of the 
central bank’s budget, decision-making on the allocation of central bank profits, and the 
responsibility of the central bank to bear its losses.  
A central bank that has authority to determine its budget and profit allocation is 
considered to be financially independent and assigned the highest score (1). On the other 
hand, if government or parliament intervene, for instance because they have to approve 
the budget and profit allocation, the central bank is not financially independent and is 
assigned the lowest score (0). With respect to losses, the highest score is given to central 
banks that are responsible for their own losses without any assistance from the 
government. The lowest score is assigned to central banks requiring government’s 
assistance to recapitalize. When the level of central bank capital is negative or below 
some threshold, the government has to recapitalize the central bank, limiting its 
independence (Cukierman, 2008). 
Since we add three components of financial independence to the Cukierman 
(1992) index, the total number of components is 19. This implies that the weight of 
financial independence is 0.16 (3 items covering financial independence divided by 19). 
The weights of the other four main aspects of legal CBI are: independence of the CEO: 
0.21; independence in policy formulation: 0.16; preference for low inflation: 0.05; and 
absence of forced lending to the government: 0.42. The overall index is computed by 
firstly aggregating the 19 components into five subgroups; the weighted means of these 
five subgroups gives the legal CBI index. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a detailed 
comparison of our legal index and the Cukierman (1992) index. 
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2.2.3 A New Index Measuring Actual Independence 
We extend Cukierman’s (2007) approach to come up with an index of actual CBI by 
considering institutional and economic aspects that possibly affect each item of the legal 
CBI index of Cukierman (1992). Furthermore, we examine the implementation of central 
bank law in practice. Figure 2.1 shows the information used to construct the actual index. 
The index also consists of 19 components covering the same five dimensions of CBI as 
the legal index discussed in the previous section. 
The first dimension, independence of the CEO, is affected by the tenure of the 
CEO, the background of the CEO, the frequency of and grounds for dismissal, and other 
positions of the CEO. The item on the tenure of the CEO examines whether central bank 
governor turnover overlaps with executive change. It is closely related to the political 
vulnerability of central banks introduced by Cukierman and Webb (1995). When the 
central bank governor is replaced within 1 month after the change of the executive, the 
central bank is not independent from political intervention. Regarding the background of 
CEO, we consider five possibilities: independent expert (highest score), central bank 
staff, central bank/government staff, government staff, and politician (lowest score). If 
the CEO keeps his position until the end of his legal term in office, the central bank is 
considered independent from political pressure. If the central bank governor is replaced 
frequently without clear reasons, the central bank is not independent. In between, we 
consider other reasons for dismissal (running from a high to a low score): resignation; 
poor performance; crime and corruption; reasons related to policy; and political 
participation. If the CEO of the central bank holds other positions, this may affect the 
independence of the central bank. For instance, if the CEO also has a position in 
government he will not be independent from political interests.  
The second aspect of CBI is policy formulation. In practice, independence in 
formulating monetary policy is affected by institutional arrangements, such as the 
exchange rate regime in place and capital mobility, whether the bank is responsible for 
banking supervision, and its role as lender of last resort. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime and perfect capital mobility, the central bank tries to maintain the exchange rate 
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constant. In such a situation the central bank will be shielded from political pressure, as 
any deviation from the objective to keep the exchange rate fixed will be highly visible. In 
contrast, under a flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility, the exchange rate is 
fully determined by the markets and this may give politicians an incentive to intervene in 
monetary policymaking.4   
Moreover, independence in formulating monetary policy is affected if the central 
bank is responsible for banking supervision and has a role as lender of last resort 
(Cukierman, 2007). If the central bank is responsible for banking supervision, it faces a 
trade-off in the short run between attaining financial market stability and price stability 
(Noia and Giorgio, 1999; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). For instance, a surprise 
increase in interest rates will squeeze private banks’ profits and may lead to defaults 
(Cukierman, 1992). As lender of last resort, the central bank may need to inject liquidity 
at the risk of sacrificing price stability. Therefore, a central bank with responsibility for 
banking supervision and with a role as lender of last resort is not independent in 
formulating monetary policy. The final variable that may affect CBI is the role of the 
central bank in deciding on the assumptions underlying the government budget plans. If 
the central bank has no role to play, it is arguably not independent in formulating its 
monetary targets. 
                                                          
4
 Empirical results for the relationship between exchange rate regimes and independence of monetary 
policy are mixed. Whereas Frankel et al. (2004) find that pegged exchange rate regimes increase the 
autonomy of central banks Shambaugh (2004) reports that countries with a fixed exchange rate have less 
independent monetary policy.  
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Figure 2.1 Legal and Actual Aspects of Central Bank Independence 
LEGAL ASPECTS     ACTUAL ASPECTS 
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 
- The term in office of central 
bank CEO  
- Background of CEO 
- Dismissal 
- CEO has other positions  
Policy formulation 
Objectives 
- Exchange rate regime and 
capital mobility 
- Bank supervision and 
responsibility for bank failure 
- Decision on the target of 
exchange rate and inflation 
for government’s budget 
- Central bank as a 
development bank and 
granting credit at subsidy rate 
 
- Actual deficits (surplus)/GDP 
- Financial market 
development (M2/GDP) 
- Terms of lending 
- Potential borrowers from 
central bank 
- Limits on central bank 
lending 
- Maturity loans 
- Interest rate of bonds versus 
market rate 
- Income tax on government 
bonds transaction in primary 
market 
Limitations on lending to the 
government 
Financial Independence 
- Determination of central 
bank budget 
- Profits/Losses 
- Central bank capital  
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 The third dimension of CBI is the objective of monetary policy. In practice, CBI 
can be affected if the central bank functions as a development bank, as it will be more 
concerned with stimulating economic growth and employment than with maintaining 
price stability. Therefore, in constructing our actual CBI index, we assign the lowest 
score to a central bank that is heavily involved in granting subsidized credits to the 
private sector. 
 The next aspect of CBI refers to limitations on lending to the government. In 
practice, the likelihood that a central bank will provide credit to the government will 
depend on the magnitude of fiscal deficits and the degree of financial development 
(Cukierman, 2007). The higher fiscal deficits are, the greater will be the likelihood that 
the central bank provides loans to the government. If financial markets are not well 
developed, the economy’s capacity to absorb government securities is limited. As pointed 
out by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the government may force the central bank to finance 
deficits if this maximum has been reached. Therefore, central bank lending to the 
government will be high if financial markets are less developed. We use the ratio of 
M2/GDP as an indicator of financial market development. The numerical scores for 
financial development are based on the quartile distribution of M2/GDP for all countries.5 
The final variable that we take up under this heading is taxes levied on government bonds 
transactions in the primary market. If the government levies taxes it will decrease the 
incentive of the central bank to buy government securities in the primary market. This 
issue arose in Indonesia when the Ministry of Finance levied income taxes on 
government bond transactions.6  
  Finally, we turn to financial independence. As suggested by Stella (2005), in 
order to be financially independent, a central bank requires a strong financial position. If 
a central bank does not have a strong financial position, it will be restricted to conduct 
monetary policies that will create losses but are needed to attain monetary objectives, 
such as open market operations and sterilization of foreign currency inflows (Dalton and 
                                                          
5
 Data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) data set.  
6
 This policy was in place from 2006 until 2008. In 2008, a new tax law was enacted that implied that Bank 
Indonesia should not pay this tax anymore.  
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Dziobek, 2005). To measure financial independence, we consider the actual 
responsibility for decisions regarding the central bank budget and the distribution of 
central bank profits. The final variable related to financial independence in practice is the 
difference between actual and required capital. If the central bank’s capital is higher than 
required, the central bank is financially independent to conduct monetary policy. On the 
other hand, if the central bank’s capital is lower than required and it needs assistance 
from the government to improve its capital, the central bank is not financially 
independent. The index of actual CBI is computed in the same way as the extended legal 
index. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides the detailed components of the actual index in 
comparison with the legal index.  
 
2.3 Legal Independence of Bank Indonesia 
2.3.1 Cukierman (1992) Index 
Four central bank laws have been in place between 1953, when Bank Indonesia was 
created, to the present time. The Act 11/1953 was created to nationalize the Javanese 
Bank, the former central bank before Indonesia became independent. The Act 11/1953 
has been revised twice in order to relax the maximum amount of credit that Bank 
Indonesia could provide to the government. The relaxation of maximum credit was 
motivated to finance its high budget deficits in the 1950s caused by military operations in 
some regions that wanted to be independent from Indonesia. Due to those revisions the 
legal CBI index of Bank Indonesia decreased. High fiscal deficits, hyperinflation, and 
low income per capita in 1960s were the reasons that a new law (Act 13/1968) was 
introduced under President Soeharto. This law has been in place for around 30 years. 
After the fall of Soeharto and the occurrence of a deep economic crisis, Bank Indonesia 
became an independent institution by the new Act 23/1999. The law was revised in 2004 
by parliament to improve coordination between monetary policy and fiscal and real sector 
policies. Table 2.1 shows the scores for the Cukierman (1992) index for legal 
independence of Bank Indonesia for the various laws in place. Table A.3 in the Appendix 
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provides further details for the scores for each component of the index under the various 
laws in place. 
 The legal independence of Bank Indonesia under Act 11/1953 (0.39) was higher 
than under Act 13/1968 (0.22). The new act reduced the independence of Bank Indonesia 
especially due to the relaxation of the provisions concerning credit to the government. 
Under Act 13/1968, there is no limit to provide credit to the government. Moreover, 
based on Act 13/1968, Bank Indonesia became a development bank.  
 Under Act 23/1999, the legal independence of Bank Indonesia increased 
significantly from 0.22 to 0.75. All components of the legal CBI index increased, except 
for the item on the interest rate on loans to the government on which the law did not 
provide details. Based on the new law, Bank Indonesia was strictly prohibited to provide 
credit to the government and the private sector. In addition, Bank Indonesia became more 
independent as the central bank governor is appointed by parliament and not by the 
government, while maintaining price stability became the only objective of Bank 
Indonesia (Alamsyah et al., 2001). However, as parliament considered Bank Indonesia as 
too independent, Act 23/1999 was replaced by Act 3/2004. Consequently, the legal 
independence of Bank Indonesia decreased to 0.63. Under Act 3/2004, Bank Indonesia is 
allowed to buy short-term government bonds in the primary market for monetary control 
operations. Moreover, Bank Indonesia may buy government securities on the primary 
market as part of the provision of the emergency financing facility. This implies that 
Bank Indonesia can provide credit to the government.  
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Table 2.1 Cukierman’s Index of Legal Independence for Bank Indonesia, 1953-2009 
Description of variable 
The  
Act 
11/1953 
The 
Act  
11/1955 
The 
Act 
84/1958 
The 
Act  
13/1968 
The 
Act 
23/1999 
The 
Act  
3/2004 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.71 0.71 
Term in office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
May CEO hold other offices in 
government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Policy formulation 0.27  0.27 0.27   0.27 0.75 0.75 
Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
Role in the government's budgetary 
process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
Limitation on lending to the 
government 0.46  0.50  0.46 0.09 0.81 0.57 
Advances (limitation on non-
securitized lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Limits on central bank lending defined 
in 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
Prohibition from buying/selling 
government securities in the primary 
market 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 Average Index 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.22 0.75 0.63 
Source: Act 11/ 1953; Act 11/1955; Act 84/1958; Act 13/1968; Act 23/1999; Act 3/2004 
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2.3.2 Our Index Compared with Other Similar Legal CBI Indicators 
This section compares our legal index of Bank Indonesia based on Cukierman (1992) 
with similar indicators as suggested by Cukierman et al. (1992), Polillo and Guillén 
(2005), and Ahsan et al. (2008). Polillo and Guillén (2005) employed Cukierman’s 
(1992) method in constructing their legal index of CBI for several countries. Ahsan et al. 
(2008) used a different method, but some components of their index are comparable to 
the components of the Cukierman (1992) index. We use the time periods as suggested by 
Cukierman (1992), i.e., 1950-59; 1960-71; 1972-79; and 1980-89. In addition, we use the 
periods 1990-98, 1999-2003, and 2004-now. Table 2.2 shows a detailed comparison of 
our version of Cukierman’s legal index of Bank Indonesia with those of the other studies.  
 It becomes clear that our legal index differs from the Cukierman et al. (1992) 
index. During the period of 1950-59, our legal index is higher. Some components, such as 
the final word in resolution of conflict; objectives; advance; and term of lending are 
assigned a higher score than in Cukierman et al. (1992). For instance, Act 11/1953 
explicitly stated that in case there is disagreement between the government and the 
governor of Bank Indonesia on policy decisions, the government has the final word 
subject to possible protest by central bank governor. It implies that the governor of Bank 
Indonesia still has the right to propose his opinion in formulating monetary policy. 
Hence, we assigned a score of 0.2 for this sub-component rather than zero as in 
Cukierman et al. (1992). Moreover, for the component “objective”, Cukierman et al. 
(1992) assigned a score of 0, which means that price stability is not considered as an 
objective for monetary policy. However, we assigned a score 0.4 for this component, as 
under Act 11/1953 Bank Indonesia is responsible for price stability and credit 
development.  
 In addition, there is a strange coding in the Cukierman index for the period 1960-
1971 during which there were two laws in place: the Act 84/1958 (revision of the Act 
11/1953) for the period 1960-1967 and the Act 13/1968 for the period 1968-1971. 
According to Cukierman’s method, whenever a change of law occurred twice within a 
decade, the classification was done in line with the legislation that was in effect during at 
least half of that decade. It means that during the period 1960-1971, the coding is based 
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on Act 84/1958. As mentioned above, Act 84/1958 is just a revision of Act 11/1955; the 
only change being the limit of lending. However, the Cukierman score for the component 
“objective” in period 1960-1971 increased from 0 in 1950-1959 to 0.4. This does not 
make much sense since there was no revision regarding this component in Act 84/1958.  
 The legal independence of Bank Indonesia significantly increased when the new 
Act 23/1999 was enacted. Our legal index during period 1999-2003 is 0.75. The index 
constructed by Polillo and Guillén (2005) is even higher (0.8). Unfortunately, we cannot 
make a detailed comparison for all components because Polillo and Guillén (2005) do not 
provide detailed information. In 2004, Act 23/1999 was replaced by Act 3/2004, which 
decreased independence due to a lower score for the component “limitation on lending”. 
Our scoring for the most recent law can be compared with some components that Ahsan 
et al. (2008) also included. For dismissal, these authors assigned a score 0.5 while we 
gave a score of 0.83. Under Act 3/2004, the Governor of Bank Indonesia shall not be 
discharged during his term in office, unless he resigns or if there is evidence, which 
proves that he has committed a crime, or is permanently prevented from serving his 
office. In our opinion, these provisions are not related to policy, hence, the score for 
dismissal is 0.83. Our score for the component “objective” is also different from the 
Ahsan et al. score. For this component, we assign a score of 0.6 since the Act states that 
the objective of the central bank is not only price stability but also financial stability.  
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Table 2.2 Our Cukierman-Based Legal Index Compared with Other Legal CBI Indicators for Bank Indonesia 
Description of variable 
Our 
Index 
Cukier
man's 
Index 
Our 
Index 
Cukier
man's 
Index 
Our 
Index 
Cukier
man's 
Index 
Our 
Index 
Cukier
man's 
Index 
Our 
Index 
Polillo&
Guillén 
Index 
Our 
Index 
Ahsan 
Index 
1950-
1959 
1950-
1959 
1960-
1971 
1960-
1971 
1972-
1979 
1972-
1979 
1980-
1998 
1980-
1998 
1999-
2003 
1999-
2003 
2004-
2009 
2004-
2009 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 
Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 - 0.50 0.50 
Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 - 0.50 0.50 
Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 - 0.83 0.50 
May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 
Policy formulation 
Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 
Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 
Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 
Objectives 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 - 0.60 0.80 
Limitation on lending to the government 
Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 - 
Securitized lending 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 - 0.67 - 
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 - 0.33 - 
Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 
Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 1.00 - 0.00 - 
Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 - 0.67 - 
Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 - 0.75 - 
Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 - 0.00 - 
government securities in the primary market? 
Average Index 0.39 0.24 0.39 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.75 0.80 0.63 - 
 Sources: Cukierman et al. (1992); Polillo and Guillén (2005); Ahsan et al. (2008)
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2.3.3 Bank Indonesia Compared to Central Banks in Other Developing Countries 
Table 2.3 shows the legal independence of various central banks in developing countries. 
In the first three decades, most central banks received a low score on the Cukierman 
index of legal independence (below 0.5). During 1972-1989, Bank Indonesia is less 
independent compared to most central banks in other developing countries, although the 
index of central banks in some countries (like Brazil, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, and 
Panama) is even lower. In the 1990s, various countries (like Argentina, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela) amended their central bank laws thereby increasing legal 
independence. After the new Act 23/1999 was introduced, the legal CBI index of Bank 
Indonesia increased significantly to 0.75, the second highest score. Only the central bank 
of Chile surpassed BI.  
 There is a group of countries with a constant level of central bank independence 
over the full of period. Those countries are Morocco, Nepal, Brazil, Pakistan, Thailand, 
China, Malaysia, and Nigeria. Several other countries experienced multiple index 
changes, such as Panama, Uruguay, India, Mexico, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Chile, Egypt, 
and Indonesia. In the second group of countries, CBI increased over time, reflecting the 
conventional wisdom that monetary policy will benefit from greater independence.  
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Table 2.3 Legal Independence of BI Compared to Other Central Banks 
The legal index for Indonesia is based on our index in Table 2.2.  
Sources: Cukierman et al. (1992); Polillo and Guillén (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Countries Cukierman's Index Polillo&Guillén Index 1950-1959 1960-1971 1972-1979 1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2000 
Argentina  - - 0.40 0.40 0.74 0.74 
Bolivia  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.63 
Botswana - - 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.45 
Brazil  - 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Chilie 0.26 0.26 0.46 0.46 0.77 0.77 
China 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Colombia - 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.44 
Costa Rica - 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.61 
Egypt  0.52 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.55 
Ethiopia - - 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.44 
Honduras  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.55 
India  0.25 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Indonesia* 0.39 0.39 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.75 
Kenya  - 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.50 
Malaysia  - 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Mexico  0.25 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.56 
Morocco - 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Nepal  0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Nigeria  - 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Pakistan  0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Panama  0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Peru  - 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.74 0.74 
Phillipines 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.48 
S.Africa 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.48 
Thailand  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 - - 
Uruguay  0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.54 
Venezuela  0.28 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.63 0.63 
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2.4 The Extended Index of Legal CBI for Bank Indonesia 
We extend Cukierman’s (1992) legal index by including financial independence proxied 
by responsibilities for (decisions on) the central bank’s budget, the allocation of the 
central bank’s profit, and the central bank’s losses. Table 2.4 presents the extended legal 
index. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides details for each component of the index. In 
this section we motivate our scores for financial independence. 
 Under Act 11/1953 and Act 13/1968, the central bank budget is proposed by the 
board of governors of Bank Indonesia and should be approved by the government. It 
implies that decisions on the central bank budget are taken by the central bank and the 
executive. Hence, we assign a score of 0.5 for the first component of financial 
independence. The score increased to the highest score 1, since Act 23/1999 stipulates 
that the central bank’s budget is formulated by the central bank’s governor without 
approval from the executive or legislative. After the Act 23/1999 was revised, the score 
for this component decreased since the new Act requires the legislative’s approval of the 
operational budget. As a result, we assigned a score of 0.5.  
 The second component of financial independence refers to the allocation of the 
central bank’s profits. Under Act 11/1953, it is up to BI to decide on the allocation of its 
profits and we therefore assigned the highest score. Under Act 13/1968, the allocation of 
the central bank’s profit is decided upon by the central bank and the government. 
Consequently, the score for this component decreased to 0.5. However, according to Act 
23/1999 and Act 3/2004, profits of BI should be transferred to the central bank’s reserves 
until the solvency requirement is fulfilled. The rest of the profits should be transferred to 
the government. Thus, we assigned the highest score for this component.  
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Table 2.4 The Extended Legal Independence Index for Bank Indonesia 
Description of variable Act No 11/1953 
Act No 
11/1955 
Act No 
84/1958 
Act No 
13/1968 
Act No  
23/1999 
Act No 
3/2004 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.71 0.71 
Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Policy formulation 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.75 0.75 
Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
Limitation on lending to the government 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.09 0.81 0.57 
Advances (limitation on non-securitized 
lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
Central bank prohibited from buying or 
selling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
government securities in the primary market? 
Financial Autonomy 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.67 
Determination of the central bank's 
budget 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 
Determination of  the allocation of bank 
profits 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Who is responsible for central bank 
losses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
Average Index  0.46 0.47 0.46 0.28 0.77 0.65 
Sources: The Act 11/ 1953; the Act 11/1955; the Act 84/1958; the Act 13/1968; the Act 23/1999; the Act 3/2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 2 
 
28 
 The final component of financial independence is responsibility for the central 
bank’s losses. Under Act 11/1953 and Act 13/1968, BI was responsible for its losses by 
using its own reserves without any assistance from the government, so that we assigned 
the highest score. In contrast, Act 23/1999 and Act 3/2004 foresee that if the central 
bank’s capital is lower than required, the government should recapitalize the bank by 
issuing bonds. If capital is higher than required, the central bank is responsible for its 
losses by using its reserves. Hence, we assigned a score of 0.5 for this component.  
 Including financial independence into the Cukierman’s (1992) legal index 
components affects the overall legal independence index of Bank Indonesia. Table 2.4 
shows that the extended legal index of Bank Indonesia is higher than the legal index 
outlined in the previous section. This is caused by the weight and scores assigned to 
financial independence components.  
 
2.5 The Actual Independence of Bank Indonesia  
Table 2.5 presents our indicator of the actual independence of Bank Indonesia. It 
becomes clear that actual independence of BI varies over time. The lowest level of actual 
independence occurred during the period 1959-1965 when three components of the index 
of actual independence (objective and limitation on lending) received a low score 
compared to other periods.  
 Between 1959 and 1965, there were three governors in office: Soetikno Slamet 
(1959-1960), Soemarno (1960-1963), and Jusuf Muda Dalam (1963-1966). The turnover 
of most central bank governors overlapped (within 0-1 month) with a change of the 
cabinet. The dismissal of Soemarno in 1963 was without a clear reason, while the 
dismissal of Jusuf Muda Dalam in 1966 was caused by his membership of the communist 
party. Therefore, the score for the component “background of the governor” is very low 
in this period. Furthermore, Bank Indonesia played an important role as a development 
bank providing (subsidized) credits to the private sector. Finally, large fiscal deficits 
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(exceeding 6 % of GDP) and a low level of financial development (M2/GDP was less 
than 7%) further reduced the actual independence of Bank Indonesia.  
 In contrast, the average score for the policy formulation components was 
relatively high in the period 1959-1965. The change from a flexible to a fixed exchange 
rate system and the delegation of banking supervision from Bank Indonesia to a new 
ministry increased the actual independence in policy formulation (Rahardjo, 1995).7 In 
1963, the government relaxed the regulation requiring exporters to report all of their 
foreign exchange revenues to Bank Indonesia, thereby reducing the control on capital 
flows.  
 The index of actual independence of Bank Indonesia increased during consecutive 
periods until 2003. During the period 1966-1982, known as the period of stabilization and 
rehabilitation, the components “background of the CEO” and “dismissal” contributed 
significantly to the increase of actual independence. The governor during the period 
1973-1983, Rachmat Saleh, was from Bank Indonesia. Moreover, all governors were in 
office until the end of their legal term in office, while balanced government budgets and 
the fast financial development increased the independence of Bank Indonesia in practice. 
 
                                                          
7
 A multiple exchange rate system was adopted in 1957 and the Governor of Bank Indonesia became 
member of the cabinet. In addition, banking supervision responsibility was delegated to a new ministry, the 
so-called the Ministry of Banking and Private Sectors Regulation (see also Bank Indonesia, 2005 and Bank 
Indonesia, 2006).  
 Chapter 2 
 
30 
Table 2.5 Actual Independence Index of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2009 
Description of variable 
Average Actual Index of Bank Indonesia 
1953-
1958 
1959-
1965 
1966-
1982 
1983-
1998 
1999-
2003 
2004-
2008 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.77 0.56 0.68 0.62 0.91 0.78 
Tenure of CEO 0.92 0.50 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Background of CEO 0.29 0.18 0.40 0.52 0.65 0.25 
Dismissal 0.86 0.69 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.89 
CEO holds other offices 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Policy formulation 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.25 
Exchange rate regime and capital mobility 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 
Banking supervision and funding for bank 
failure 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Decision on inflation and exchange rate target 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Objective: Function as a development bank& 
credit subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 1.00 1.00 
Limitation on lending to the government 0.44 0.33 0.52 0.64 0.60 0.56 
Actual deficits(surplus)/GDP 0.61 0.28 1.00 0.96 0.74 0.67 
Financial market development 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.61 0.80 0.75 
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.37 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Potential borrowers from the bank 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.03 0.50 0.50 
Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.03 0.50 0.50 
Maturity of loans 0.33 0.33 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Interest rates on loans 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 
Tax on Primary market transaction 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 
Financial Independence  0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.72 
Determination of central bank's budgets 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 
Profits/Losses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 
Actual capital of central bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average Index 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.68 0.78 0.65 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (2005); Bank Indonesia (2006); Bank Indonesia (1953-2008); International Financial 
Statistics (IFS); World Development Indicators (WDI); Rahardjo (1995) 
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 During 1983-1998, when the government liberalized policies, various components 
of the index of actual independence (notably objectives and limitation on lending to 
government) increased significantly. The cap on interest rate was abolished. The real 
interest rate was positive in this period. Moreover, in 1990 Bank Indonesia restricted its 
credits to the private sector, while fiscal balance was maintained and financial markets 
developed further, triggered by the deregulation policies conducted by the government in 
the 1980s. The deregulation in the banking sector aimed to attract both domestic and 
foreign investors and to mobilize domestic savings for financing economic development. 
During the economic crisis in 1997, 16 small insolvent banks were closed. Bank 
Indonesia provided emergency liquidity support to banks to prevent contagion. However, 
this led to the dismissal of governor Soedradjad Djiwandono, two months before 
completing his term, thereby reducing the actual independence of Bank Indonesia from 
political intervention.  
 The actual independence of Bank Indonesia reached the highest level during 
1999-2003, when the central bank was legally mandated as an independent institution. 
All the components of the index of actual independence increased during this period. The 
CEO component increased significantly as the turnover of central bank governors did not 
overlap with the change of the executive. Moreover, the governor during this period 
(Sjahril Sabirin) was from Bank Indonesia. Although there was some pressure from 
President Abdurrahman Wahid on Sjahril Sabirin to resign, the governor stayed until the 
end of his legal term in office arguing that under the new Act 23/1999, the governor of 
Bank Indonesia cannot be dismissed. In addition, even though Bank Indonesia remained 
responsible for banking supervision, the costs of the banking crisis burdened the 
government’s budget. For instance, in the banking crisis in 1998 liquidity support was 
provided by the government rather than Bank Indonesia. Moreover, in 2004 the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (DIA) was established to guarantee private savings in the banking 
sector (Siregar and James, 2006). Due to those institutional changes, Bank Indonesia 
faced less of a tradeoff between maintaining price stability and maintaining financial 
stability. Bank Indonesia could determine its budget solely without any interventions 
from government or parliament.  
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 However, actual independence of Bank Indonesia decreased during 2004-2008 
because of several factors. During this period, both governors (Burhanuddin Abdullah 
and Boediono) had a background as a former Economics minister. In addition, the 
dismissal of Governor Burhanuddin Abdullah due to corruption reduced the actual 
independence of BI. Related to policy formulation, government decided on the inflation 
and exchange rate assumptions underlying the government budget plans. Moreover, the 
elimination of the tax on the primary government bond market transactions of BI 
increased the attractiveness for the central bank to buy government bonds in the primary 
market. Finally, since 2004 BI could no longer determine its budget solely as approval by 
the legislative was required.  
 
2.6 Legal Versus Actual Independence of Bank Indonesia 
Figure 2.2 shows that actual and legal independence of Bank Indonesia diverged notably 
during the period 1968-1998. Under Act 13/1968, the legal independence dropped while 
actual independence increased. In fact, the index of actual independence was significantly 
higher than the legal index in this period. Several factors, like the improvement of the 
government’s fiscal position and the development of financial markets, decreased the 
pressure on Bank Indonesia to provide credit to the government, be it directly or 
indirectly. Also other factors, like the background of governors (mostly coming from 
Bank Indonesia) and the absence of dismissals, contributed to the divergence of the actual 
index from the legal index. Interestingly, these developments occurred under the 
authoritarian Soeharto regime. After 1999, when the central bank was mandated as an 
independent institution, the legal index increased significantly and converged to the 
actual index.  
 Looking at each group of components, the actual index of CEO is significantly 
lower than the legal index of CEO in 1963 and 1966, because the governor of Bank 
Indonesia at that time, Jusuf Muda Dalam, belongs to a political party and he was 
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dismissed because of his political affiliation. Moreover, the actual index of CEO 
background was volatile during the period 1953-1967, because the central bank governor 
turnover rate was very high. Due to the introduction of a flexible exchange rate regime 
during the economic crisis in 1998, the actual independence of Bank Indonesia dropped 
significantly. Because Bank Indonesia played a significant role as a development bank 
and granted credit at subsidized rates during 1953-1982, the actual index of objectives 
was at the lowest level. However, after the maximum interest rate policy was eliminated 
in 1983 and Bank Indonesia was prohibited to provide credit to the private sector in 1999, 
the actual index of objectives became higher than the legal index. In addition, the legal 
index of lending limits tended to converge to the actual index after Bank Indonesia was 
mandated as independent institution. The actual index of financial independence 
decreased significantly in 2007 and 2009, because Bank Indonesia experienced losses.8  
                                                          
8
 Based on the annual reports of Bank Indonesia, 1953-2009. 
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Figure 2.2 Legal Versus Actual Independence of Bank Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
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2.7 Inflation and Independence of Bank Indonesia  
In order to analyze whether the independence of Bank Indonesia is related to inflation, 
we estimate a time series model for transformed inflation using the indicators of legal and 
actual independence as regressors.9 We use the data from 1958 to 2009. Table 2.6 shows 
the estimation results. In column (1) we include the lagged values of our indicators of 
legal and actual independence. The results show that the index of actual independence 
has a negative and significant effect on inflation.  
 In the next step, we include the components of the actual independence index 
(CEO, policy formulation, objectives, limitation on lending, and financial) into the 
model. The results in column (2) show that only the coefficient of limitations on lending 
is significantly negative. In column (3) we include the difference between the actual and 
the legal index. The estimation results suggest that the difference between actual and 
legal index has a negative and significant effect on inflation. When we consider the 
difference between each component of the actual and legal CBI, it turns out that the 
difference between actual and legal limitations on lending is statistically significant with 
a negative sign (column 4).  
                                                          
9
 The transformed inflation is calculated as follow: )1/( pipi +=D , where pi  is the rate of inflation. We 
use the transformed inflation to reduce the influence of extreme observations.  
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Table 2.6 Inflation and Central Bank Independence, 1958-2009 
  Dependent Variable: Transformed Inflation 
Explanatory Variables  
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Intercept  1.032** 0.916** 0.288** 0.324** 
 
(0.163) (0.300) (0.045) (0.051) 
Legal Index (-1) 0.256 
   
 
(0.134) 
   
Actual Index (-1) -1.488** 
   
 
(0.260) 
   
CEO Actual Index (-1) 
 
-0.144 
  
  
(0.152) 
  
Policy Formulation Actual Index (-1) 
 
0.165 
  
  
(0.227) 
  
Objectives Actual Index (-1) 
 
0.020 
  
  
(0.081) 
  
Lending Actual Index (-1) 
 
-1.221** 
  
  
(0.257) 
  
Financial Actual Index (-1) 
 
-0.068 
  
  
(0.354) 
  Differences between Actual and Legal 
Index (-1)   -0.431**  
   
(0.154) 
 
Diff. CEO Index (-1) 
   
0.096 
    
(0.169) 
 Diff. Policy Formulation Index (-1) 
   
0.353 
    
(0.135) 
Diff. Objectives Index (-1) 
   
-0.046 
    
(0.090) 
Diff. Lending Index (-1) 
   
-0.351** 
    
(0.102) 
Diff. Financial Index (-1) 
   
-0.845 
    
(0.338) 
R-Squared 0.410 0.470 0.140 0.570 
Number of Observations  51 51 51 51 
** indicates significance at 1% level. The number in parentheses is the standard error.  
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2.8 Conclusions 
Indicators of central bank independence based on the interpretation of the central bank 
law in place may not capture actual independence. Moreover, legal independence 
measures tend to be static and cannot capture institutional and economic factors that 
affect the actual independence of the central bank. Therefore, this paper not only 
develops legal indicators of the independence for Bank Indonesia (BI) for the period 
1953-2009 by extending the legal CBI constructed by Cukierman (1992), but also 
introduces an index for the actual independence of BI, extending the approach suggested 
by Cukierman (2007).  
 In constructing the legal index we add financial independence of central bank to 
the index of Cukierman (1992). Financial independence is defined as the ability of the 
central bank to attain its objective(s) efficiently without financial assistance from the 
government. To measure actual independence, we consider institutional and economic 
factors that affect the independence of Bank Indonesia, such as the exchange rate regime 
and capital mobility; central bank as development bank; fiscal deficits; and the degree of 
financial market development. We also consider other factors that may affect actual 
independence, like the background of the governors and the reasons for their dismissal.  
 We find that before 1999 (during the Soeharto era), legal and actual independence 
of BI diverged substantially. The actual independence of Bank Indonesia is much higher 
than its legal independence during that period. A good background of the governors, no 
dismissals, the improvement of fiscal deficits, financial development, and the 
deregulation of economy are amongst the factors contributing to a high level of actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia. After Bank Indonesia was mandated as a legally 
independent institution by a new central bank law, legal independence of BI increased 
and converged to actual independence. All aspects of legal CBI increased significantly, 
especially the independence in monetary policy formulation and the absence of forced 
lending to the government.  
 Our results suggest that there is a significant and negative relationship between 
the index of actual independence and inflation. When we include the components of the 
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index of actual independence, only limitations on lending to government comes out 
significantly.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Labor Market Flexibility and the Impact of the 
Financial Crisis10  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The recent financial crisis, which originated in the US, has also hit the rest of the world. 
However, the impact of the crisis on economic activity varies widely across countries, 
reflecting differences in exposure and vulnerability to financial crises, heterogeneity in 
macroeconomic structures, and differences in policy responses (Berkmen et al., 2009). A 
few recent studies have examined the impact of the global financial crisis on output 
identifying factors that may explain cross-country differences in the impact of the 
financial crisis. For instance, Berkmen et al. (2009) find that countries with more 
leveraged domestic financial systems and more rapid growth in lending to the private 
sector tended to suffer more from the crisis, while countries exporting advanced 
manufacturing goods were more affected than those exporting food. Also countries with 
                                                          
10
 This Chapter is based upon Artha and De Haan (2011).  
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pegged exchange-rate regimes fared significantly worse than countries with a more 
flexible exchange rate regime.11 
 Up to now, there is no study examining the relationship between labor market 
flexibility and the impact of the financial crisis on output.12 This chapter examines for 56 
countries over the period of 2007 until the first quarter of 2010 whether cross-country 
differences in the impact of the financial crisis on the loss of output and the duration of 
the crisis are related to differences in labor market flexibility. We measure the output loss 
by the decrease of real GDP from peak to through. Likewise, the duration of the crisis is 
the length of the period between the peak and the through of real GDP. Employing a 
cross-country model that includes control variables such as trade and capital market 
integration, financial development, monetary and fiscal policy, institutional differences, 
and population growth, we find that lower hiring cost reduce the output loss, notably so 
in high-income countries. However, the duration of the crisis is longer in case of low 
dismissal cost, notably so in low-income countries. The latter finding is in line with the 
results of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) who argue that a reduction of 
firing cost does not increase firms’ marginal propensity to hire, but strongly affects their 
willingness to fire. This study also explores the impact of labor market flexibility on 
differences in the employment loss across countries due to the global financial crisis.  
 
3.2 Defining Labor Market Flexibility and Output Loss  
According to Solow (1997), a labor market is inflexible if the level of benefits is too high, 
if there are too many restrictions on the freedom of employers to fire and to hire, if the 
hours of work are too tightly regulated, if excessively generous compensation for 
overtime work is mandated, if trade unions have too much power to protect incumbent 
workers against competition, or if statutory health and safety regulations are too stringent. 
                                                          
11
 Other relevant studies are Berglöf et al. (2009), Naudé (2009) and Rose and Spiegel (2009). 
12
 The paper that comes closest to ours is Forteza and Rama (2006), who report that countries with 
relatively rigid labor markets experienced deeper recessions and slower recoveries. 
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In our empirical work, we will apply factor analysis on the indicators of labor market 
flexibility provided by Gwartney et al. (2009).13 These data come close to the concept of 
labor market flexibility as outlined by Solow (1997). Gwartney et al. (2009) measure 
labor market flexibility using six indicators: minimum wage (MW), mandated cost of 
hiring (MHC), mandated cost of worker dismissal (MDC), hiring and firing regulations 
(HFR), centralized collective bargaining (CCB), and conscription (CNS). The indicators 
range between 0 and 10, where a higher score indicates a more flexible labor market.14  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the labor market indicators and other 
variables used in the analysis (to be discussed below). Table 3.1 shows that the average 
scores of all labor market indicators are much lower than the maximum score. High-
income countries have higher scores for the minimum wage and dismissal cost indicators 
than the other countries. It implies that the minimum wage and dismissal cost of high-
income countries are lower than those of other countries. Meanwhile, the costs of hiring 
in high-income countries exceed those in the other countries in our sample. 
  
                                                          
13
 These data have been widely used as a proxy for market flexibility. See, for instance, Pitlik (2002; 2008) 
and Weede and Kämpf (2002). 
14
 The minimun wage is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business data for the ratio of mandated 
minimum wage to the average value added per worker. The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 rating 
was: (Vmax-Vi)/(Vmax-Vmin) multiplied by 10, where Vi represents the actual data for country i, Vmax is the 
maximum value, and Vmin is the minimum value in the sample. Mandated cost of hiring is based on the 
World Bank’s Doing Business data on the cost of all social security and payroll taxes and the cost of other 
mandated benefits including those for retirement, sickness, health care, maternity leave, family allowance, 
and paid vacations and holidays associated with hiring an employee. The same formula is applied as for 
minimum wages to calculate the rating. Mandated cost of dismissal is based on the World Bank’s Doing 
Business data on the cost of the advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due when 
dismissing a redundant worker. Again the same formula is used to come up with the ratings. Hiring and 
firing regulations is based on the Global Competitiveness Report’s (from the World Economic Forum) 
question: “The hiring and firing of workers is impeded by regulations (= 1) or flexibly determined by 
employers (= 7).” Centralized collective bargaining is based on the Global Competitiveness Report’s  
question: “Wages in your country are set by a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual 
company (= 7).” Data on the use and duration of military conscription were used to construct rating 
intervals for conscription. A rating of 10 was assigned to countries without military conscription. When 
conscription periods exceeded 18 months, countries were rated zero. Full details are available at: 
http://www.freetheworld.com/2009/reports/world/EFW2009_app.pdf. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Labor Market Indicators and Other Variables 
Used 
Variables  All Countries High-income Countries Others  
  Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. 
Crisis Variables 
         
Output Loss 0.13 0.08 0.52 0.11 0.08 0.40 0.17 0.02 0.52 
Duration 4.27 1.00 10.00 4.97 1.00 9.00 3.33 1.00 10.00 
Labor Market Indicators (10-point 
scale)          
Minimum Wage 6.86 0.50 10.00 7.31 4.80 10.00 6.26 0.50 10.00 
Hiring and Firing Regulations  4.59 1.80 8.30 4.42 1.80 8.30 4.82 2.20 7.30 
Centralized Collective Bargaining 6.44 2.60 8.70 6.22 2.60 8.70 6.73 3.60 8.30 
Mandated Cost of Hiring 4.16 0.00 10.00 3.74 0.00 9.70 4.72 0.60 10.00 
Mandated Cost of Worker 
Dismissal 6.53 0.00 10.00 7.49 1.20 10.00 5.25 0.00 9.60 
Conscription 6.75 0.00 10.00 6.22 2.60 8.70 6.50 0.00 10.00 
Trade  
         
Trade Barriers (10-point scale) 7.25 2.40 9.20 7.91 6.60 9.20 6.38 2.40 7.80 
Openness  0.99 0.26 4.29 1.08 0.26 4.29 0.89 0.38 2.00 
Financial Integration 
         
Capital Market Restrictions (10-
point scale) 6.00 3.30 8.60 6.41 4.30 8.60 5.47 3.30 8.40 
Financial Development 
         
Credit to GDP 0.90 0.10 3.10 1.15 0.22 3.10 0.58 0.10 1.74 
Log GDP per Capita 4.23 3.30 4.60 4.48 4.20 4.60 3.90 3.30 4.25 
Financial Vulnerability 
         
Credit Growth 0.06 -0.89 0.89 0.09 -0.89 0.89 0.02 -0.25 0.82 
Policy Framework 
         
Stability of Inflation (10-point 
scale) 9.17 6.80 9.90 9.48 8.50 9.90 8.75 6.80 9.70 
Change of Fiscal Deficits (% GDP)  0.03 -0.13 0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.13 0.11 
Exchange rate regime (1 = flexible) 0.57 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 
Institutions  
         
Governance -0.02 -1.90 1.44 0.66 -0.45 1.44 -0.92 -1.90 0.51 
Population Growth  0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
          
Number of Countries 56 56 56 32 32 32 24 24 24 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), Gwartney et al. (2009), World Development Indicators (WDI), 
Kaufmann et al. (2009).  
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Table 3.2 shows the correlation among the various indicators of labor market 
flexibility. Hiring and firing regulations (HFR) are significantly associated with 
centralized collective bargaining (CCB) and conscription (CNS), although with a different 
sign. In addition, minimum wages (MW) are closely related to the mandated cost of 
worker dismissal (MDC), while the correlation of the mandated cost of hiring (MHC) and 
the other labor market indicators is low.  
 
Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix of Indicators of Labor Market Flexibility 
Notes: * indicates that the variable is significant at 5% confidence level 
 
In order to evaluate to which extent the labor market indicators capture the same 
information, we apply factor analysis (FA) to the indicators of labor market flexibility in 
2007 for 56 countries (see the list of countries in Table B.1 in the Appendix).  
 
 
 
 
 MW HFR CCB MHC MDC CNS 
MW 1.0000      
HFR 0.1683 1.0000     
CCB -0.0291 0.5190* 1.0000    
MHC -0.1042 0.2557 0.1545 1.0000   
MDC 0.3165* 0.2244 0.0823 -0.1633 1.0000  
CNS 0.0041 -0.2880* 0.0154 0.0904 0.1343 1.0000 
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Specifically, the FA analysis can be represented as follows:  
εξ += Bx  (3.1) 
where x denotes a vector of observed variables (i.e., the indicators); B is the matrix of 
factor loadings;ξ  represents a vector of the latent variable labor market flexibility; and ε  
is a random error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the latent variables. The 
covariance matrix of the model is:  
Θ+Φ=∑ 'BB  (3.2) 
Where ∑ is the covariance matrix of x, Φ  is the covariance matrix ofξ , and Θ  is the 
covariance matrix of ε . This equation is estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) 
function 
)(log 1StrL −Σ+Σ=   (3.3) 
where S is the sample covariance matrix. To obtain the appropriate number of factors we 
use Catell’s scree test, which selects the number of factors based on eigenvalues higher 
than 1. As three factors have eigenvalues higher than 1, we use three factors.  
Having optimized the likelihood function, the factor loadings matrix is rotated by 
the Oblimin rotation method, so that it will be easier to interpret the findings. The 
Oblimin rotation method allows for correlation among the factors and minimizes the 
correlation of the columns of the factor loadings matrix. Table 3.3 shows the estimation 
results of the rotated factor solution. 
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Table 3.3 Rotated Factor Loading Matrix 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
Hiring and Firing Regulation 
(HFR) .925 .228 .212 
Centralized Collective 
Bargaining (CCB) .492 .070 .096 
Conscription (CNS) -.387 .137 .156 
Mandated Cost of Worker 
Dismissal (MDC) -.112 1.005 .000 
Minimum Wages (MW)  .083 .318 -.067 
Mandated Cost of Hiring (MHC)  .096 -.165 .984 
Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization  
 
Since the Oblimin rotation method minimizes the correlation between columns of 
the factor loadings matrix, each indicator has a high loading on one factor, while it has a 
low loading on the other factors. Table 3.3 shows that the first factor has high loadings on 
hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, and conscription. Those 
indicators are related to how the labor market is regulated; hence we label this factor 
“labor market regulation”. Meanwhile, the indicators of mandated cost of worker 
dismissal and minimum wage have high factor loadings for factor 2; this factor is 
therefore labeled as “dismissal cost”. The indicator of cost of hiring loads high on factor 
3, which is therefore labeled as “hiring cost”.15 Some studies argue that those labor 
market flexibility indicators have an impact on unemployment (see Bentolila and Bertola, 
1990; Bertola, 1990; and Feldmann, 2003).  
                                                          
15
 The final scores of each factor are calculated using a regression-based approach, which is a linear 
combination of all of the labor market flexibility indicators, weighted by the corresponding factor loading 
matrix. The final scores of each factor will be used for the estimations in the next section.  
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 The impact of the global financial crisis on output is measured as the percentage 
decrease of real GDP from peak to through during the first quarter of 2007 until the first 
quarter of 2010 (see Table B.1 in the Appendix for details). Our sample period is 
determined by data availability and the fact that the crisis in the US subprime mortgage 
sector started in August 2007 (see also Berglöf et al., 2009). The peak is defined as the 
point in time with the highest level of real GDP, while the through is the point in time 
with the lowest real GDP. Furthermore, we consider the duration of the crisis as the 
period from peak to through (see Table B.1 in the Appendix for details). As not all 
countries were out of the recession at the end of this period, the impact of the crisis on 
output loss and the duration of the crisis are underestimated.16  
 
3.3 Estimation Method  
To examine the effect of labor market flexibility on the decline in output following the 
financial crisis, we estimate the following cross-section model:  
iiii ZLY εγβα +++=   (3.4) 
In our first model, Y is the percentage change of real GDP from peak to through, L 
is our index of labor market flexibility, and Z is a vector of control variables such as trade 
linkages, financial integration, financial development, monetary and fiscal policy, 
institutional factors, and population growth. In our second model, Y represents the 
duration of the crisis.  
 The trade linkages are represented by two variables: regulatory trade barriers and 
openness. The regulatory trade barriers consist of non-tariff barriers and compliance cost 
of importing and exporting. The data come from Gwartney et al. (2009) and range from 0 
to 10, where a higher score indicates fewer trade barriers. Openness is measured by the 
ratio of exports and imports to GDP, taken from the World Bank´s World Development 
                                                          
16
 Some countries, such as Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovenia, still had a negative growth at the end of the sample period. 
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Indicators (WDI). It is expected that countries depending on trade will be more affected 
by the global financial crisis. Moreover, we consider the composition of trade (food, 
industrial, and fuel commodities) data on which is provided by the United Nations. 
Berkmen et al. (2009) report that countries exporting manufacturing products have been 
hit harder by the crisis than those exporting food.  
 Financial integration is proxied by international capital market controls. This 
indicator includes restrictions on foreign ownership of companies and the degree of 
capital controls. The data is provided by Gwartney et al. (2009). Similar to regulatory 
trade barriers, this variable ranges between 0 and 10. A higher score implies more 
integration. As the global financial crisis originated in the financial sector in developed 
countries, we hypothesize that countries with fewer financial restrictions will be hit 
harder by the global financial crisis.  
 Financial development is represented by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP. We 
expect that financially more advanced countries will be hit harder by the crisis (Rose and 
Spiegel, 2009). The data come from the World Development Indicators. In addition, we 
consider GDP per capita as indicator of economic development level.  
 Taylor (2009) argues that excessive credit growth contributed to the global 
financial crisis. We therefore include the cumulative growth of domestic credit during 
2003-2005 as explanatory variable. We expect that countries that experienced high credit 
growth prior to the crisis suffer stronger output losses. The data come from the World 
Development Indicators.  
 We also include proxies for the heterogeneity of monetary and fiscal policy 
frameworks across countries before the crisis. The monetary policy framework is 
represented by the volatility of inflation and a dummy for the exchange rate regime, 
while the fiscal policy framework is proxied by the change of the government budget 
balance to GDP. The latter variable also captures that various governments followed 
expansionary fiscal policies to reduce the impact of the financial crisis. We expect that 
countries with more stable inflation and with flexible exchange rates can handle external 
shocks more easily (Berkmen et al., 2009). The data for inflation stability come from 
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Gwartney et al. (2009) and run from 0 to 10. A higher value of this variable indicates 
more stable inflation. We use the IMF´s the facto exchange rate classification. The 
exchange rate regime is represented by a dummy variable that is one in case of a flexible 
exchange rate regime.17 Countries with more expansionary fiscal policies are expected to 
suffer less from the crisis. The fiscal stimulus is measured by the change of the fiscal 
balance per GDP from 2008 to 2009, which is provided by WDI.18  
The final aspect that may affect the severity of the crisis is the quality of 
governance that can be defined as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them. Kaufmann et al. (2009) provide 
data on six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. We apply factor analysis to these indicators of governance to come 
up with an appropriate measure for the quality of governance. Catell’s scree test suggests 
one factor for governance. All six indicators of governance have high loadings on this 
factor, which will therefore be used in the estimations. We expect that countries with 
good governance will be better able to manage the impact of the financial crisis. In 
addition, we also control for population growth.  
All labor market indicators and control variables used in the estimations refer to 
years before the crisis, except for the fiscal variable. Table B.2 in the Appendix lists all 
explanatory variables and provides their sources. Table 3.1 shows that high-income 
countries are more open to international trade and have fewer financial restrictions. In 
                                                          
17
 We divide the exchange rate regimes into two types: fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. A fixed 
exchange rate regime consists of exchange rate arrangements with separate legal tender; currency board 
arrangements, conventional fixed peg arrangements; pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands; 
crawling pegs; and exchange rate within crawling bands. Flexible exchange rate regimes include 
managed floating and independently floating.  
18
 There may be a reverse-causality problem using this indicator, but data on the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance were not available for all countries in our sample. 
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addition, financial markets of high-income countries are more developed, while these 
countries also had higher credit growth before the crisis. With respect to the policy 
framework, high-income countries have more stable inflation and more expansionary 
fiscal policies than the other counties in our sample. Likewise, the quality of governance 
of high-income countries is much better than that of the other countries.  
Table 3.4 shows the correlation matrix of the labor market indicators and the 
control variables. It turns out that our labor market flexibility indicators have a low 
correlation with most control variables. However, our governance indicator is highly 
correlated with some other control variables such as regulatory trade barriers, credit to 
GDP, and GDP per capita. 
 
3.4 Estimation Results  
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results for the impact of the financial crisis on output loss. 
In column (1), we include our labor market flexibility indicators and all control variables. 
We find that the indicators of labor market flexibility do not have a significant effect on 
output loss. However, after highly insignificant variables are excluded from the model, 
the coefficient of hiring cost becomes statistically significant with a negative sign (see 
column 2). The results do not change when we include the composition of export into the 
estimations (see columns 3, 4, and 5). The negative sign implies that lower hiring cost 
(i.e. more flexibility) leads to a smaller output loss. According to the magnitude of the 
coefficient, a one-point increase in the hiring cost score (lower hiring cost) reduces output 
loss by about 0.021 points. So if a country moved from the lowest (Spain) to the highest 
score of our indicator of hiring cost (New Zealand), its output loss would decline by 
0.076 points 
.  
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Table 3.4 Correlation Matrix 
  LMR DC HC RTB OP FI CR GCAP CRG INF EXC FB GOV 
 
POP 
LMR 1              
DC 0.11 1             
HC 0.01 0.00 1            
RTB -0.14 0.15 0.03 1           
OP 0.13 0.18 -0.04 0.22 1          
FI 0.01 0.28* 0.22 0.44* 0.22 1         
CR -0.12 0.15 0.39* 0.35* -0.14 0.05 1        
GCAP -0.23 0.34* -0.02 0.71* 0.13 0.38* 0.51* 1       
CRG 0.05 0.22 -0.14 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.15 1      
INF -0.31* 0.17 -0.02 0.37* -0.06 0.13 0.43* 0.47* 0.01 1     
EXC 0.27* 0.07 0.33* -0.19 -0.23 -0.15 0.04 -0.19 -0.32* -0.27* 1    
FB -0.18 0.11 -0.01 0.14 -0.05 0.18 0.14 0.40* -0.24 0.08 -0.14 1   
GOV -0.16 0.38* 0.21 0.74* 0.18 0.41* 0.59* 0.86* 0.18 0.47* -0.14 0.19 1  
POP 0.14 -0.32* 0.35* -0.14 0.16 -0.17 0.12 -0.11 -0.27* -0.04 -0.29* -0.29* 0.04 1 
Notes: LMR is labor market regulations; DC is dismissal cost; HC is hiring cost; RTB is regulation on trade barriers; OP is openness; FI is financial 
integration; CR is credit to GDP; GCAP is log GDP per capita; CRG is credit growth; INF is inflation stability; EXC is exchange rate regime; FB is 
change of fiscal balance to GDP; GOV is governance indicator; POP is population growth.*indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5% 
confidence level. 
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As to the control variables, our results suggest that regulatory trade barriers are 
statistically significant with a negative sign. It implies that fewer restrictions on 
international trade will lead to a lower output loss. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
stable for all model specifications. A coefficient of -0.061 means that a one-point 
increase in trade barriers score (i.e. fewer trade restrictions) reduce output loss by 0.061 
points. However, countries depending on trade are more vulnerable to external shocks. 
As the global financial crisis caused a sharp decline in international trade, countries in 
which the contribution of trade to GDP is high suffered more from the crisis. Our 
indicators of trade composition are not significant. This finding is in contrast with the 
results of Berkmen et al. (2009) who report that the share of food in total exports is 
associated with smaller output growth revisions, which they use as indicator of the output 
loss due to the financial crisis.  
As expected, capital market integration has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on output loss due to the financial crisis (see columns 2-5). The global financial 
crisis originated in the financial sector in high-income countries and subsequently hit 
countries having highly integrated financial markets with advanced economies. 
Moreover, countries that experienced rapid credit growth prior to the global crisis were 
hit hard. This result is in line with the findings of Berkmen et al. (2009) that high 
domestic credit growth caused a larger decline in output during the global financial crisis.  
Stability of inflation has a negative and significant effect on output loss. It implies 
that the countries in which the monetary authorities could keep inflation stable were less 
affected by the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the coefficients of the other policy framework 
indicators, i.e. the exchange rate regime dummy and the change of fiscal balance, are not 
statistically significant. The latter finding is in line with the conclusions of Taylor (2009) 
and Spilimbergo et al. (2009). According to Taylor (2009), the government transfers to 
families in the United States did not increase personal consumption expenditures due to 
the unpredictability of government policies. 
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Finally, our results show that countries with higher population growth 
experienced lower output losses. The magnitude of population growth’s coefficients is 
relatively high ranging from -5.240 to -5.779 (see columns 1-5). However, including 
population growth does not change the effect of hiring cost on output loss.  
We also examine the relationship between labor market flexibility and the 
duration of the crisis. Table 3.6 column (1) shows that the indicators of labor market 
flexibility do not have a significant impact on the duration of the crisis. However, after 
excluding highly insignificant variables, the coefficient of dismissal cost becomes 
significant with a positive sign (see column 2). This means that low dismissal costs (i.e. 
more flexibility) slow the recovery from the crisis. This finding is in line with the results 
of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) that a reduction of firing costs does 
not increase firms’ marginal propensity to hire, but strongly affects their willingness to 
fire. The results are robust when we include the composition of export as additional 
control variables (columns 3-5). The magnitude of the coefficient of dismissal cost 
implies that a one-point increase in the score of this variable (i.e. lower dismissal cost) 
increases the duration of the crisis by 0.554 quarters. So if a country moved from the 
lowest (Bolivia) to the highest score of our indicator of dismissal cost (Denmark), its 
recovery period would increase by 2.060 quarters.   
The control variables that are significant are trade barriers, openness, credit 
growth, stability of inflation, and the exchange rate regime. Countries with more 
restrictions on international trade tend to recover faster than those with fewer restrictions. 
As the crisis deepens, there is increasing pressure to raise trade barriers such as non-tariff 
protection to limit imports, or introduce various forms of export subsidies (see 
Spilimbergo et al., 2009). However, countries depending on trade will recover faster from 
the crisis. In addition, countries that had higher credit growth before the crisis take longer 
to recover. A more flexible exchange rate regime and more stable inflation help the 
countries to recover faster.  
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Table 3.5 Estimation Results for Output Loss 
Dependent Variable: Percentage change of GDP from the peak to bottom   
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Labor Market Regulation 0.004     
 (0.010)     
Dismissal Cost 0.002     
 (0.013)     
Hiring Cost -0.017 -0.021** -0.020* -0.023** -0.021** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Trade Barriers -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Openness 0.037** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Share of Food in Exports   -0.063   
   (0.101)   
Share of Industrial Goods in Exports    0.031  
    (0.054)  
Share of Fuel in Exports     0.011 
     (0.072) 
Financial Integration 0.013 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Financial Development  -0.026     
 (0.023)     
Log GDP per Capita -0.007     
 (0.067)     
Credit Growth 0.079* 0.077** 0.084** 0.075** 0.080* 
 (0.046) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) 
Stability of Inflation -0.062*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.070*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Exchange Rate Regime Dummy 0.007     
 (0.026)     
Change of Fiscal Deficit -0.155     
 (0.375)     
Governance  0.036 0.024 0.022 0.025* 0.024 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Population Growth -5.779*** -5.440*** -5.240*** -5.452*** -5.438*** 
 (1.727) (1.326) (1.373) (1.336) (1.340) 
Constant 1.123*** 1.120*** 1.117*** 1.086*** 1.112*** 
 (0.298) (0.159) (0.160) (0.171) (0.167) 
      
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.740 0.724 0.727 0.726 0.725 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 3.6 Estimation Results for Duration of the Crisis 
Dependent Variable: Duration     
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Labor Market Regulation -0.027     
 (0.278)     
Dismissal Cost 0.283 0.554** 0.554** 0.604** 0.554** 
 (0.354) (0.257) (0.260) (0.263) (0.260) 
Hiring Cost -0.047     
 (0.359)     
Trade Barriers 0.643* 0.894*** 0.894*** 0.921*** 0.893*** 
 (0.358) (0.220) (0.223) (0.223) (0.227) 
Openness -0.535 -0.857** -0.855** -0.820** -0.858** 
 (0.445) (0.379) (0.388) (0.382) (0.385) 
Share of Food in Exports   0.096   
   (2.626)   
Share of Industrial Goods in Exports    1.326  
    (1.416)  
Share of Fuel in Exports     -0.030 
     (1.926) 
Financial Integration 0.145     
 (0.213)     
Financial Development  0.699     
 (0.629)     
Log GDP per Capita -0.511     
 (1.838)     
Credit Growth 1.951 1.784* 1.773 1.706 1.777 
 (1.256) (1.033) (1.082) (1.038) (1.148) 
Stability of Inflation -1.295** -1.237*** -1.237*** -1.141*** -1.238*** 
 (0.486) (0.409) (0.413) (0.422) (0.419) 
Exchange Rate Regime Dummy -1.759** -2.106*** -2.110*** -2.123*** -2.107*** 
 (0.703) (0.558) (0.570) (0.559) (0.565) 
The Change of Fiscal Deficit 8.121     
 (10.223)     
Governance  0.177     
 (0.688)     
Population Growth -41.753     
 (47.061)     
Constant 13.583 11.079*** 11.072*** 9.487** 11.099*** 
 (8.125) (3.693) (3.736) (4.070) (3.945) 
      
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.572 0.525 0.525 0.533 0.525 
Standard errors in parentheses.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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3.5 Robustness Tests  
In order to check the robustness of estimation results, we employ two methods. First, we 
exclude the outliers from the estimations. Based on the residuals, Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
and Latvia were dropped. Second, we separate the sample into high-income countries and 
other countries. The estimation results are shown in Table 3.7.  
 Dropping outliers does not affect our main results. The coefficient of hiring cost is 
still statistically significant with a negative sign (see column 1). It indicates that lower 
hiring cost (more flexibility) leads to lower output losses. In addition, the dismissal costs 
remain a significant determinant of the duration of the crisis (see column 2). The 
countries that have low dismissal cost take longer to recover from the crisis.  
 When the observations are separated into high-income countries and other 
countries, it turns out that the results slightly change. Hiring cost significantly affect the 
output losses only in high-income countries, but not in the other countries (see columns 3 
and 5). Still, the magnitude of the coefficient of hiring costs is very similar for both sub-
samples; for non-high-income countries the coefficient is, however, estimated less 
precisely. Meanwhile, the duration of the crisis is affected significantly by the dismissal 
costs only in the non-high-income countries. The speed of recovery in high-income 
countries is affected by the other variables such as trade barriers, openness, credit growth, 
stability of inflation, and the exchange rate regime.  
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Table 3.7 Robustness Tests 
  Without Outliers   High-Income Countries   Other Countries  
 
Output 
Loss Duration  
Output 
Loss Duration  
Output 
Loss Duration 
VARIABLES (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                 
Labor Market Regulation         
         
Dismissal Cost  0.500**   0.111   0.795** 
  (0.240)   (0.351)   (0.352) 
Hiring Cost -0.021**   -0.018**   -0.017  
 (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.021)  
Trade Barriers -0.047*** 0.657***   1.386**  -0.071*** 0.827** 
 (0.008) (0.219)   (0.497)  (0.015) (0.294) 
Openness 0.034*** -0.593   -1.185**  0.051  
 (0.011) (0.362)   (0.441)  (0.043)  
Financial Integration 0.020***      0.020*  
 (0.006)      (0.011)  
Credit Growth 0.055* 2.284**  0.077** 3.080**  0.094  
 (0.030) (0.996)  (0.030) (1.158)  (0.093)  
Stability of Inflation -0.082*** -0.359  -0.113*** -1.703**  -0.066*** -1.297** 
 (0.014) (0.466)  (0.020) (0.816)  (0.023) (0.498) 
Exchange Rate Regime  
Dummy  -1.878***   -2.190***   -1.578* 
  (0.534)   (0.653)   (0.808) 
Population Growth -4.377***   -4.843***   -4.825*  
 (1.141)   (1.256)   (2.578)  
Constant 1.097*** 4.197  1.202*** 12.142  1.084*** 10.854** 
 (0.118) (4.050)  (0.191) (8.103)  (0.231) (4.754) 
         
Observations 53 53  32 32  24 24 
R-squared 0.796 0.528   0.718 0.605   0.775 0.481 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6 The Unemployment Impact of the Financial Crisis and Labor 
Market Flexibility 
Previous research has not examined cross-country differences in unemployment during 
the crisis. This section follows Artha and De Haan (2011) and analyzes whether cross-
country differences in the increase in unemployment are affected by differences in labor 
market flexibility.  
 We estimate equation 3.4 using the change of unemployment rate from peak to 
through during the first quarter of 2007 until the first quarter of 2010 as dependent 
variable. The peak is defined as the point in time with the lowest level of unemployment, 
while the through is the point in time with the highest level of unemployment. As not all 
countries were out of the recession at the end of this period, the impact of the crisis on the 
change in unemployment may be underestimated. We select control variables based on 
previous studies like Berkmen et al. (2009) and Artha and De Haan (2011). We employ 
the data of 50 countries (see Table B.3 in the Appendix for the list of countries).  
 Table 3.8 provides the estimation results of the effect of labor market flexibility 
indicators and the other control variables on the employment losses. We followed the 
general to specific approach to select the control variables to be included. In column (1), 
we include all observations (50 countries). It turns out that hiring cost is statistically 
significant with a negative sign. It implies that lower hiring cost (i.e. a more flexible labor 
market) is related to lower employment losses. According to the estimated coefficient, a 
one-point increase in the hiring cost score (lower hiring cost) reduces the employment 
loss during the crisis by about 0.008 points. Hence, if a country moved from the lowest 
(Spain) to the highest score of our indicator of hiring cost (New Zealand), its 
unemployment rate would decline by 0.029.  However, the other measures of labor 
market flexibility are not statistically significant. Some control variables, like credit 
growth and stability of inflation also have a significant effect on the employment loss. 
High credit growth prior to the crisis is associated with higher employment losses, while 
our results also suggest that countries with more stable inflation are less affected by the 
financial crisis.  
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Table 3.8 Estimation Results for Unemployment 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Labor Market Regulation -- -- -- 
    
Dismissal Cost -- -- -- 
    
Hiring Cost -0.008** -0.008* -- 
 (0.004) (0.005)  
Trade Barriers -- 0.020** -- 
  (0.009)  
Openness -- -0.017** -- 
  (0.006)  
Credit Growth 0.077*** 0.057*** 0.097*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) 
Stability of Inflation -0.011** -0.048*** -- 
 (0.005) (0.011)  
Governance -- -0.019** -- 
  (0.009)  
Constant 0.138*** 0.363*** 0.036*** 
 (0.051) (0.112) (0.005) 
    
Observations 50 32 18 
R-squared 0.52 0.68 0.68 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Column (1) shows the results for all 50 countries while columns (2) and (3) present the 
outcomes for industrial and developing countries, respectively. 
 
 In column (2) and column (3), we split the sample into industrial and developing 
countries, respectively. There are 18 developing countries and 32 industrial developed 
countries. For industrial countries, hiring cost is statistically significant with a negative 
sign. However, the other two labor market indicators are not statistically significant. The 
control variables, which are statistically significant are trade barriers, openness, credit 
growth, stability of inflation, and governance. According to our estimates, fewer 
restrictions on international trade will lead to higher unemployment due to the financial 
crisis. However, countries depending on international trade, which is represented by the 
contribution of export-import to GDP, experience lower employment losses. Countries 
with high domestic credit growth prior to global financial crisis suffered more. Stability 
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of inflation has a negative sign, indicating that countries in which the monetary 
authorities were able to stabilize inflation experienced lower employment losses. In 
addition, countries with good governance had lower employment losses during the 
financial crisis. For developing countries (column 3), all labor market flexibility 
indicators are not significant. Credit growth is the only variable which has a significant 
effect on the employment loss during the crisis.  
 
3.7 Conclusions  
This study examines the relationship between the impact of the global financial crisis and 
labor market flexibility. By employing cross-country regressions and including control 
variables such as trade integration, financial integration, financial development, financial 
vulnerability, policy framework, institutional differences, and population growth, we find 
that countries with low hiring cost suffered lower output loss due to the recent financial 
crisis. However, countries with lower dismissal cost recovered slower than countries with 
higher dismissal cost. The results are robust for exclusion of outliers. Also regulatory 
trade barriers, openness, credit growth, financial integration, inflation stability, and 
population growth are found to have a significant impact on output loss. With respect to 
the speed of recovery from the crisis, we find that apart from labor market flexibility, 
only trade barriers, credit growth, and exchange rate regimes are statistically significant. 
Our findings for the total sample suggest that there is a trade-off between the depth of the 
recession following the crisis and the duration of the recession. A more flexible labor 
market leads to a smaller output loss, but it also increases the time to recover from the 
crisis. The results vary somewhat across country groups. Our findings suggest that in 
high-income countries, more labor market flexibility decreases the output loss, but does 
not affect the duration of the crisis.  
 In addition, this chapter also explores the impact of labor market flexibility on 
differences in the employment loss across countries due to the global financial crisis. 
Employment loss is measured as the change of unemployment rate from peak to through 
during the first quarter of 2007 until the first quarter of 2010. By employing cross-
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country regressions and including control variables such as trade integration, financial 
integration, financial development, financial vulnerability, monetary and fiscal policy, 
institutional differences, and population growth, we find that countries with low hiring 
cost suffered lower employment losses due to the recent financial crisis. Although 
significant, the size of the impact is small. Our other measures of labor market flexibility 
(labor market regulation and dismissal costs) are not related to the employment loss 
during the crisis. The other control variables which are statistically significant in the full 
sample of 50 countries are credit growth and stability of inflation. When we split the 
sample into industrial and developing countries, we find that hiring cost is not statistically 
significant in developing countries. For these countries, credit growth before the crisis is 
the only variable that is significant.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central 
Bank Governors: New Evidence 
 
"Politicians are taking bolder actions to influence monetary policy, signaling 
that the global financial crisis may end up reining in the independence of 
many central banks." (Hilsenrath et al., 2010). 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Until recently, the independence of central banks increased both in industrial and 
emerging countries. However, according to several observers, the current global financial 
crisis threatens the independence of central banks (cf. Bordo, 2010). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that financial crises may affect central bank independence. For instance, the 
central bank governor in Argentina was dismissed in 2010 because he refused to use 
currency reserves to pay off foreign debt. Similarly, Mexico’s president appointed a new 
governor for the Bank of Mexico in 2009, after he clashed with the bank’s former 
governor who was reluctant to cut interest rates after the country was hit hard by the 
crisis. Hilsenrath et al. (2010) provide other examples.  
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 Up to now, there is hardly any research examining the relationship between 
financial crises and central bank independence.19 This chapter examines whether 
financial crises in general, and currency, debt, and banking crises in particular, affect the 
likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Following Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011), this chapter also analyses whether a new central bank governor is more likely to 
come from the ranks of the executive branch of the government (government ally) or not 
(non-government ally).  
Employing a conditional fixed effects logit model that is similar to that of Dreher 
et al. (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2010) for 101 countries during the period 1970-
2007, we find that banking crises and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood that 
a central bank governor will be replaced. This result holds no matter we use all turnovers 
or only irregular turnovers, i.e. replacements that occur before the legal term in office of 
the central bank governor had ended. Moreover, using a more limited data set about the 
nature of a turnover, we find that banking crises increase the likelihood that a non-
government ally will be appointed as new central bank governor.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines our 
methodology, while section 4.3 describes the data used. Section 4.4 presents the main 
estimation results, while section 4.5 offers a sensitivity analysis. Section 4.6 presents the 
outcomes for the nature of the central bank governor replacement and section 4.7 offers 
some concluding remarks.  
 
 
                                                          
19
 Klomp and De Haan (2010) do not investigate the impact of financial crises on the likelihood of a central 
bank governor turnover, while Dreher et al. (2010) only examine whether currency devaluations affect the 
likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. There are two lines of research on related issues. 
First, some studies suggest that central bank independence reduces financial instability and the incidence of 
banking crisis (see Klomp and De Haan, 2009 and Khan et al., forthcoming). Second, there is a substantive 
amount of research on the drivers of financial crises (see, for instance, Angkinand and Willett, 2011 and 
Licchetta, 2011). 
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4.2 Methodology 
In order to estimate the effect of financial crises on the probability that a central bank 
governor will be replaced, we employ a conditional fixed effects logit model. Variants of 
the following model are estimated:  
itiitititit Xelapsedcrisisgovchange εηβββα +++++= −−− 131211   (4.1)  
where govchange equals 1 if in year t at least one central bank governor turnover occurs 
and is 0 otherwise; crisis equals one if a there is a financial (banking, currency or debt) 
crisis in year t; elapsed is the share of the governor’s legal term in office that has elapsed; 
X is a vector of control variables; iη  is the country specific (fixed) effect and itε  is an 
i.i.d disturbance term. We include the share of the official time in office that has elapsed 
as it becomes more likely that a central bank governor will be replaced if a larger part of 
the legal term in office has elapsed (Dreher et al., 2010 and Klomp and De Haan, 2010). 
In the models as discussed in section 4.6, govchange is a dummy variable that is one 
when the new central bank governor is a non-government ally and zero otherwise.  
We follow Dreher et al. (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2010), but extend their 
work in different directions. First, we examine the effect of financial crises on the 
likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Second, we examine whether 
central bank independence and inflation-targeting mediate the effect of financial crises on 
a central bank governor turnover. Third, we estimate equation (4.1) by employing 
conditional logit models with clustered standard errors given the inertial nature of the 
variables involved. Finally, following Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we investigate whether the 
new governor who is appointed after the occurrence of a financial crisis is an ally of the 
government or not.  
As control variables, we include several economic and political variables that 
Dreher et al. (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2010) consider. In addition, we include 
legal independence of the central bank as well as a dummy that is one if the country 
concerned has an inflation-targeting regime. The lags of all explanatory variables are 
used in all estimations in order to avoid endogeneity problems. 
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As to the economic controls: Inflation is expected to have a positive effect on the 
probability of a central bank governor turnover because the central bank governor may be 
held responsible for high rates of inflation. Dreher et al. (2010) argue that more 
restrictions on international transactions increase the probability that a central bank 
governor will be replaced. Moreover, a higher degree of openness reduces the 
inflationary bias and therefore reduces the incentive to commit for the government. 
Finally, countries with a more developed financial sector are less likely to face a situation 
of fiscal dominance (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). 
As to the political controls: elections are predicted to have a positive impact on 
the probability that the central bank governor will be replaced. A newly elected 
government may prefer to appoint a new central bank governor who is more closely 
aligned to those in power. For similar reasons, political and regime instability, for which 
we use several proxies as explained in section 4.3, are expected to increase the likelihood 
that a new central bank governor will be appointed (Dreher et al., 2010). The ideological 
position of the party in government is included to test for possible partisan effects. 
Following Dreher et al. (2010), also several dimensions of the political system in place 
are considered, such as the presence of a system with many checks and balances, a bi-
cameral political system, and a federal political system. Countries with a political system 
with strong checks and balances have more independent central banks compared to those 
with weak or no checks and balances. Likewise, countries with a bi-cameral or a federal 
political system tend to have an independent central bank (see Bernhard, 1998) in which 
it may therefore be harder to replace a central bank governor.  
In addition to the variables considered in previous studies, we also include the 
legal independence of the central bank and the presence of an inflation-targeting regime. 
When a central bank is legally independent, it will be difficult for the government to 
replace the central bank governor. For similar reasons we include a dummy that is one if 
the central bank has an inflation-targeting strategy, and zero otherwise. Under an 
inflation-targeting regime, arguably only a poor inflation record can be ground for 
dismissal of the central bank governor.  
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Both central bank independence and the presence of an inflation-targeting regime 
may condition the impact of a financial crisis on the probability that a central bank 
governor will be replaced. The effect of a financial crisis on the likelihood of a turnover 
of the central bank governor is expected to be diminishing in central bank independence 
and the presence of an inflation-targeting regime. In order to test for this conditionality, 
we include two interaction terms: between financial crisis and legal independence of the 
central bank, and between financial crisis and the dummy for the presence of an inflation-
targeting regime.  
As Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) show, the statistical significance of 
an interaction effect cannot be tested with a simple t-test on the coefficient of the 
interaction term, but must be based on the estimated cross-partial derivative. Following 
the methodology suggested by Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010), we compute the 
estimated coefficient and standard error of the average marginal effect as well as the 
individual-specific estimate and standard error for each observation. Moreover, we also 
use a graphical device to interpret the marginal effect of interaction terms since it is much 
more informative than test statistics (see Greene, 2010).  
 
4.3 Data  
Information on central bank governor turnovers and their legal term in office is taken 
from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute website.20 The sample period is 1970-2007. We 
include 101 countries for which data on financial crises is available for that period (see 
Table C.1 in the Appendix for the list of countries included). In our sample, central bank 
governors remain in office on average for 3.49 years, while turnovers occur in 21.7% of 
the country-years. In section 4.6, we examine the nature of a central bank governor’s 
replacement for 40 countries during 1972-2006 using the data from Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011).21  
                                                          
20
 See http://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/indicators/data-central-bank-governors/ 
21
 We thank the authors for providing their data. 
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The summary statistics for all explanatory variables are presented in Table 4.1. 
Financial crises data come from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Financial crises are divided 
into 3 categories: banking, currency and debt crises. A banking crisis occurs if a 
country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and 
financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. A 
currency crisis occurs in case the currency depreciates by at least 30 percent, while a debt 
crisis is identified by sovereign debt default and restructuring. In our sample, there are 83 
banking crises, 130 currency crises and 37 debt crises. Years during which one or more 
of these crises happen are given score 1; otherwise the variable financial crisis is zero. In 
addition, we construct similar dummy variables for each type of financial crisis.  
As economic controls we include inflation, openness, trade restrictions, and 
financial development. Data on inflation come from the World Bank (2010). To reduce 
the influence of extreme observations, the inflation rate p is transformed as follows: 
(p/100)/(1-p/100)=pi . Openness is measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
drawn from the World Bank (2010). Trade restrictions is the weighted average of some 
variables such as hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade, and 
capital account restrictions drawn from the KOF index of globalization.22 The level of 
financial development is measured as the ratio of private credit to GDP. The data is 
provided by Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt (2009).  
We also include several political variables. Our elections variable is based on the 
number of the month (M) when presidential/parliamentary elections are held. In an 
election year, the variable election is measured as M/12 and in a pre-election year as (12-
M)/12. The information on elections comes from Beck et al. (2001). In addition, we 
include a dummy new government that is one if there is a new chief executive (source: 
Databanks International, 2010) and the variable percentage of veto players who drop 
(source: Beck et al., 2001). The latter is a proxy for instability within the political regime 
in place. We use three indicators of regime instability. First, following Dreher et al. 
                                                          
22
 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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(2010), regime instability is the first principal component of a number of regime 
instability indicators from Databanks International (2010): revolutions, purges, riots, 
strikes, assassinations, guerilla warfare, major crises, and the number of (successful) 
coups d’états. Second, change in democracy is a dummy that is one if the Polity index 
changes by more than three points (source: Marshall et al., 2010). Third, we use the 
number of (attempted) coups including unsuccessful coups (source: Marshall and 
Marshall, 2011).  
The dummy variable left government comes from updates of Beck et al. (2001); it 
is 1 if the main party in government is a left-wing party, otherwise it is zero. In addition, 
we include the variable checks and balances provided by Beck et al. (2001), a dummy 
variable autonomous regions indicating the existence of autonomous regions, and a 
dummy variable two assemblies indicating of the presence of two chambers in the 
national assembly (source: Beck et al., 2001).  
 Monetary policy arrangements are captured by two variables: central bank 
independence and a dummy for the presence of an inflation targeting strategy. Central 
bank independence is proxied by a legal independence index using data provided by 
Arnone et al. (2007) for the period 1980 and 2003. Since the index of Arnone et al. 
(2007) refers to two points in time only, we construct time series for the index using 
information about the timing of central bank reform provided by Acemoglu et al. (2008). 
Using the year in which central bank reform took place, we can determine when legal 
central bank independence has changed during the period 1980-2005. To extend the 
index to 2007, we checked whether central bank legislation has been changed between 
2005 and 2007 using the website of each central bank. The index has been extended for 
the period before 1980 by checking whether any central bank law reform took place 
between 1970 and 1980. For that purpose, we compare data on legal independence of 
Cukierman et al. (1992) and Polillo and Guillén (2005). If legal independence before and 
after 1989 is the same, we use Arnone’s value of the legal index for 1980 also for the 
period 1970-1980. The data for the adoption of inflation targeting is taken from 
Samaryna and De Haan (2011), Leyva (2008), and Roger (2009). 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables: All Countries    Industrial Countries   Developing Countries  
  Mean Min. Max.   Mean Min. Max.    Mean Min. Max.  
Term in office (years) 3.49 0.00 29.00  4.07 0.00 29.00  3.19 0.00 28.00 
Share of time elapsed 0.62 0.00 5.67  0.69 0.00 5.67  0.58 0.00 5.60 
Financial crisis            
Financial crisis 0.06 0.00 1.00  0.02 0.00 1.00  0.08 0.00 1.00 
Banking crisis  0.02 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.00 1.00  0.03 0.00 1.00 
Currency crisis 0.03 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.00 1.00  0.05 0.00 1.00 
Debt crisis 0.01 0.00 1.00  0.00 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.00 1.00 
Economic Factors            
Inflation 0.11 -0.28 0.99  0.07 -0.28 0.94  0.14 -0.13 0.99 
Openness 0.72 0.05 4.39  0.83 0.11 4.39  0.67 0.05 3.75 
Trade restrictions 52.69 5.39 97.69  76.72 32.00 97.69   40.33 5.39 85.60 
Financial development 0.45 0.01 2.70  0.74 0.07 2.70   0.27 0.01 1.66 
Political Factors            
Election 0.21 0.00 1.40  0.25 0.00 1.00  0.19 0.00 1.00 
New government 0.19 0.00 1.00  0.23 0.00 1.00  0.17 0.00 1.00 
Percentage of veto players 
who drop 0.13 0.00 1.00  0.13 0.00 1.00  0.13 0.00 1.00 
Regime instability 0.01 -0.52 10.92  -0.20 -0.52 5.14   0.11 -0.52 10.92 
Change in democracy  0.60 0.00 1.00  0.85 0.00 1.00  0.48 0.00 1.00 
Coups 0.06 0.00 3.00  0.01 0.00 3.00  0.08 0.00 3.00 
Left government  0.29 0.00 1.00  0.37 0.00 1.00  0.25 0.00 1.00 
Checks and balances 3.00 1.00 18.00  3.90 1.00 16.00  2.54 0.00 18.00 
Autonomous regions 0.14 0.00 1.00  0.24 0.00 1.00  0.08 0.00 1.00 
Two assemblies 0.54 0.00 1.00  0.89 0.00 1.00  0.36 0.00 1.00 
Monetary Policy 
Arrangements  
           
Central bank independence 0.46 0.09 1.00  0.53 0.09 1.00  0.43 0.09 0.94 
Inflation targeting 0.06 0.00 1.00  0.15 0.00 1.00  0.03 0.00 1.00 
Number of countries  101 101 101   34 34 34   67 67 67 
The nature of central bank 
governor replacement  
           
A government ally  0.01 0.00 1.00  0.00 0.00 1.00  0.02 0.00 1.00 
Non-government ally  0.18 0.00 1.00  0.15 0.00 1.00  0.22 0.00 1.00 
Number of countries  42 42 42   24 24 24   18 18 18 
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4.4 Estimation Results  
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results of equation (4.1). We start with a model with 
financial crises and the share of time elapsed as explanatory variables. In columns (2)-
(17), each variable as described in section 4.3 is added one at the time. In all regressions 
the coefficients of financial crisis and time elapsed are significant at the one percent level 
with the expected positive sign. 
 The other control variables which are statistically significant are inflation, 
elections, coups, trade restrictions, new government, regime instability, central bank 
independence, and inflation targeting. As expected, inflation has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. 
Elections, coups, new government, and regime instability also increase the likelihood of a 
central bank governor turnover, while trade restrictions reduce this likelihood. The 
presence of an independent central bank and an inflation-targeting regime reduce the 
likelihood that a new central bank governor will be appointed.  
When all explanatory variables are included simultaneously in the model (column 
18), the coefficients of several variables turn insignificant. We rerun the model several 
times, every time dropping the least significant variable until all remaining variables are 
significant. The result is shown in column (19) of Table 4.2. The coefficient of financial 
crises remains statistically significant with a positive sign.  
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Table 4.2 Effect of Financial Crises on the Likelihood that CB Governor will be Replaced (Conditional 
Logit Model) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Financial Crisis 0.711*** 0.390** 0.714*** 0.663*** 0.709*** 0.647*** 0.693*** 0.718*** 0.685*** 
 
(0.182) (0.187) (0.194) (0.198) (0.184) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181) (0.181) 
Share of term elapsed 0.548*** 0.688*** 0.546*** 0.621*** 0.633*** 0.566*** 0.629*** 0.652*** 0.632*** 
 
(0.166) (0.221) (0.185) (0.220) (0.183) (0.180) (0.183) (0.192) (0.182) 
Inflation 
 
1.375*** 
  
  
(0.338) 
   
Election 
  
0.687*** 
  
   
(0.177) 
  
Percentage of veto players who drop 
   
0.136 
  
    
(0.179) 
  
Coups 
   
0.332* 
 
    
(0.177) 
 
Capital control 
    
-0.010* 
 
     
(0.006) 
 
New government 
    
0.226** 
 
     
(0.111) 
 
Change in democracy 
    
0.037 
 
     
(0.166) 
 
Political Instability 
    
0.160*** 
     
(0.047) 
Number of Observation 3298 2922 2923 2614 3266 3183 3206 3099 3226 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Estimates of equation 4.1. Dependent variable: dummy that equals 1 if in year t at least one central bank governor turnover occurs and is 0 otherwise. *** 
indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level. The number in parentheses is the robust 
(adjusted) standard error. The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
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  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Financial Crisis 0.651*** 0.685*** 0.723*** 0.625*** 0.659*** 0.708*** 0.721*** 0.692*** 0.638*** 0.472** 
 
(0.208) (0.196) (0.183) (0.201) (0.195) (0.196) (0.193) (0.179) (0.240) (0.215) 
Share of term elapsed 0.663*** 0.616*** 0.630*** 0.600*** 0.616*** 0.614*** 0.875*** 0.548*** 1.172*** 1.055*** 
 
(0.222) (0.208) (0.179) (0.214) (0.208) (0.207) (0.150) (0.167) (0.186) (0.164) 
Inflation 
    
1.539*** 1.623*** 
     
(0.440) (0.428) 
Election 
    
0.782*** 0.742*** 
     
(0.205) (0.191) 
Percentage of veto players who drop 
  
-0.430* 
 
   
(0.242) 
 
Coups 
  
-0.080 
 
   
(0.235) 
 
Capital control 
  
-0.008 
 
   
(0.011) 
 
New government 
  
0.064 
 
   
(0.167) 
 
Change in democracy 
  
0.413 
 
   
(0.284) 
 
Political Instability 
  
0.039 
 
   
(0.084) 
 
Private credit 
-0.156 
  
-0.028 
 
 
(0.277) 
  
(0.448) 
 
Left Government 0.026 
  
0.237 
 
 
(0.124) 
  
(0.172) 
 
Openness 0.291 
  
0.146 
 
 
(0.329) 
  
(0.488) 
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Check and balances 
-0.060 
  
-0.074 
 
 
(0.042) 
  
(0.049) 
 
Autonomous regions 
-0.091 
  
0.128 
 
 
(0.163) 
  
(0.204) 
 
Two assemblies 
-0.246 
  
-0.476 
 
 
(0.267) 
  
(0.383) 
 
CBI 
 
-1.430*** 
 
-0.631 -0.886* 
  
(0.502) 
 
(0.620) (0.511) 
Inflation targeting 
  
-0.387* -0.079 
 
  
(0.200) (0.301) 
Number of Observation 2741 2810 3130 2710 2811 2816 2714 3298 1814 2305 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Estimates of equation 4.1. Dependent variable: dummy that equals 1 if in year t at least one central bank governor turnover occurs and is 0 otherwise. *** indicates 
significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level. The number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. 
The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
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Our results for the control variables that turn out to be significant are in line with those of 
previous studies (Dreher et al., 2010 and Klomp and De Haan, 2010). In particular, we 
find that the share of time elapsed is statistically significant with a positive sign, i.e. if a 
larger part of the legal term in office has elapsed, there is a higher likelihood that a 
central bank governor will be replaced. Inflation and elections have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover, while 
central bank independence has a negative relationship with the likelihood that a central 
bank governor will be replaced.  
In order to check for heterogeneity, the sample is separated into industrial and 
developing countries. Column (2) of Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for 
industrial countries. It turns out that in this sample financial crises significantly increase 
the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. The marginal effect (shown 
in squared brackets) suggests that a financial crisis increases the likelihood of a governor 
turnover by 16.9 percentage points in industrial countries. The other variables that are 
significant are the share of time in office that has elapsed and elections.  
The estimation results in column (3) show that in developing countries financial 
crises increase the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced by 9.2 
percentage points. Most other variables (the share of time elapsed, inflation, and 
elections) are also statistically significant, but the legal independence of the central bank 
does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover.  
To examine whether the effect of financial crises on the probability that a central 
bank governor will be replaced is conditioned by central bank independence, we include 
the interaction term of financial crisis and the legal independence index in column (4) of 
Table 4.3. It turns out that the interaction term is not statistically significant, while also 
the coefficient of financial crisis becomes insignificant. However, the marginal effect of 
financial crisis on the replacement of central bank governor is statistically significant. 
The occurrence of financial crisis increases the probability that a central bank governor 
will be replaced by 9.6 percentage points. 
Chapter 4 
 
74 
Table 4.3 Effect of Financial Crises on the Likelihood that CB Governor will 
be Replaced (Different Samples and Interaction Effects) 
*** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level. 
The number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The number in squared brackets is the marginal 
effect. Estimation results are for the full sample, except for columns (2) and (3) which refer to industrial and 
developing countries, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) include interaction terms. Column (1) corresponds to 
column (19) of Table 4.2. The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all of the regression coefficients in the 
model are equal to zero.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Financial crisis 0.472** 0.835** 0.395 0.466 0.397* 
 (0.215) (0.414) (0.251) (0.368) (0.207) 
 [0.100]** [0.169]** [0.092]* [0.096]** [0.078]** 
Share of time elapsed 1.055*** 0.930*** 1.141*** 1.055*** 0.699*** 
 (0.164) (0.304) (0.164) (0.164) (0.259) 
 [0.241]*** [0.217]*** [0.276]*** [0.225]** [0.147] 
Inflation 1.623*** 0.855 1.750*** 1.623*** 1.510*** 
 (0.428) (0.955) (0.457) (0.429) (0.383) 
 [0.370]*** [0.199] [0.423]*** [0.345]*** [0.317]*** 
Election 0.742*** 0.476** 0.894*** 0.742*** 0.682*** 
 (0.191) (0.230) (0.254) (0.191) (0.180) 
 [0.169]*** [0.111]** [0.216]*** [0.158] [0.143] 
Central bank independence  -0.886* -0.614 
-1.676 -0.887*  
 (0.511) (0.505) (1.177) (0.522)  
 [-0.202] [-0.143] [-0.405] [-0.189]  
Financial crisis x Central 
bank independence     0.013  
    
(0.780) 
 
      
Inflation targeting   
  
-0.201 
     
(0.218) 
     
[-0.044] 
Financial Crisis x Inflation 
targeting     -0.044 
     
(1.056) 
      
Number of observations 2305 921 1384 2305 2624 
Number of countries 101 34 67 101 101 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors:  
New Evidence 
75 
Following Greene (2010), we interpret the interaction effects by plotting the 
marginal effect of financial crisis and the degree of legal independence of central bank. 
Figure 4.1 shows the effect of financial crises on the likelihood that the central bank 
governor will be replaced (vertical axis), conditional on the degree of central bank 
independence (horizontal axis).  
 
Figure 4.1 The Effect of Financial Crises on the Likelihood of a Central Bank 
Governor Change Conditional on Central Bank Independence 
  
Note: The dotted lines indicate the 95% significance interval. When the both lines of the 
significance interval are below or above zero, the marginal effect of financial crisis is significant). 
 
It follows from Figure 4.1 that the marginal effect of a financial crisis on the 
probability of a central bank governor replacement is positive and significant when the 
legal index of central bank independence is between 0.2 and 0.6. When the central bank 
is highly independent (index is higher than 0.6), the effect of a financial crisis on the 
probability that the central bank governor will be replaced becomes insignificant. Since 
the interaction term in equation (4) is not statistically significant, the marginal effect of 
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financial crises tends to be flat over the legal independence index (shown by the solid 
line).  
In column (5) of Table 4.3, we include the interaction term of financial crisis and 
inflation targeting. The results show that the interaction term is not statistically 
significant. However, the marginal effect of a financial crisis on the likelihood of a 
central bank governor will be replaced is still statistically significant.  
Next, we decompose financial crises into banking crises, currency crises, and debt 
crises (see Table 4.4). The results in column (1) suggest that banking crises and debt 
crises affect the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover, in contrast to currency 
crises. The latter result is in line with the findings of Dreher et al. (2010). Other variables 
which turn out to be significant are the share of time in office elapsed, inflation, elections, 
and central bank independence. In column (2) we exclude currency crisis.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.4 we split the sample into industrial countries 
and developing countries. In industrial countries, a banking crisis does not significantly 
affect the probability that the central bank governor will be replaced. However, according 
to the marginal effect, the occurrence of a banking crisis increases the likelihood of a 
governor turnover by 19.7 percentage points. We do not include the debt crisis dummy 
into the model of industrial countries because these countries had no debt crisis during 
the period 1970-2007. In developing countries the occurrence of both a banking crisis and 
a debt crisis significantly increase the likelihood that the central bank governor will be 
replaced. A banking crisis increases the likelihood that a central bank governor will be 
replaced by 18.5 percentage points, while a debt crisis increases this likelihood by 15.7 
percentage points.  
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Table 4.4 Effect of Banking, Debt, and Currency Crises on the Likelihood that CB 
Governor will be Replaced (Different Samples and Interaction Effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Banking crisis 0.887*** 0.887*** 1.020 0.862*** 0.915 0.861*** 
 (0.299) (0.300) (0.670) (0.337) (0.708) (0.303) 
 [0.171]*** [0.171]*** [0.197]* [0.185]*** [0.167]*** [0.165]*** 
Debt crisis 0.638* 0.639*  0.713* 0.639* -1.028 
 (0.380) (0.372)  (0.385) (0.369) (1.386) 
 [0.129]* [0.130]**  [0.157]** [0.125]* [0.132] 
Currency crisis 0.002      
 (0.261)      
 [0.000]      
Share of time 
elapsed 1.057*** 1.057*** 0.940*** 1.145*** 1.057*** 1.058*** 
 (0.165) (0.165) (0.302) (0.167) (0.165) (0.166) 
 [0.241]*** [0.241]*** [0.219]*** [0.277]*** [0.225] [0.226]* 
Inflation 1.703*** 1.704*** 1.081 1.792*** 1.703*** 1.701*** 
 (0.426) (0.434) (0.865) (0.474) (0.438) (0.442) 
 [0.389]*** [0.389]*** [0.252] [0.434]*** [0.362]*** [0.363]*** 
Election 0.743*** 0.743*** 0.448 0.903*** 0.743*** 0.731*** 
 (0.192) (0.192) 0.240 (0.256) (0.192) (0.194) 
 [0.170]*** [0.169]*** [0.104]* [0.219]*** [0.158] [0.156] 
Central bank 
independence -0.910* -0.910* -0.627* -1.737 -0.908* -0.960* 
 (0.511) (0.511) (0.497) (1.154) (0.516) (0.521) 
 [-0.208] [-0.208] [-0.146] [-0.420] [-0.193] [-0.198]* 
Banking crisis x 
Central bank 
independence  
    
-0.060 
(1.194)  
Debt crisis x 
Central bank 
independence  
     
3.714 
(2.888) 
 
Number of 
observations 
2305 2305 921 1384 2305 2305 
Number of 
countries 101 101 34 67 101 101 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level. The 
number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The number in the squared brackets is the marginal effect. 
All estimation results are for the full sample, except columns (3) and (4) which refer to industrial and developing 
countries, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) include interaction terms. The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all 
of the regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
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In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.4 we include interaction terms for banking 
crises and central bank independence, and debt crises and central bank independence, 
respectively. The interaction term for banking crises and central bank independence is not 
statistically significant, but the marginal effect of banking crises on the replacement of a 
governor is still statistically significant. In contrast, both the interaction terms and the 
marginal effect of the debt crisis are not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 4.2 The Effect of Banking Crises on the Likelihood of a Central Bank 
Governor Change Conditional on Central Bank Independence 
  
Note: The dotted lines indicate the 95% significance interval. When both lines of the significance 
interval are below or above zero, the marginal effect of financial crisis is significant). 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the marginal effect of a banking crisis on the likelihood of a 
governor replacement over the range of the legal central bank independence index. The 
marginal effect of a banking crisis on the likelihood of a governor replacement is 
statistically significant when the legal CBI index is lower than 0.8. Because the 
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interaction term in column (5) of Table 4.4 is not statistically significant, the marginal 
effect of financial crises tends to be flat over the legal independence index (shown by the 
solid line).  
 
4.5 Robustness Tests  
So far, we have considered all changes of central bank governors. It may, however, be 
argued that a distinction should be made between regular and irregular changes, where 
the latter is defined as a turnover that take place before the legal term in office of the 
central bank governor has ended. As a robustness test we therefore use only irregular 
changes as the dependent variable in Table 4.5. We still find that financial crises 
significantly affect the likelihood of a central bank governor replacement. Also other 
variables, such as the share of time elapsed, inflation, elections, and central bank 
independence, remain significant.  
When we split the countries into industrial and developing countries, the effect of 
a financial crisis on the irregular replacement of central bank governor is significant in 
industrial countries (see column (2) of Table 4.5), but not in developing countries 
(column 3). However, the marginal effect of financial crises on a central bank governor 
replacement is statistically significant both in industrial and developing countries. The 
other factors that are significant in the model estimated for the sample of developing 
countries are share of time elapsed, inflation, and elections.  
When we consider specific types of financial crises, banking crises and debt crises 
are significantly affecting the probability of a central bank governor replacement (see 
column (1) of Table 4.6). The marginal effects indicates that a banking crisis increases 
the likelihood that the governor will be replaced before his term ends by 18.4 percentage 
points, while a debt crisis increases this likelihood by 15.2 percentage points.  
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Table 4.5 Robustness Test Using Irregular Replacements of a Central Bank 
Governor 
*** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% 
level. The number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The number in the squared brackets is 
the marginal effect.  Estimation results in columns (1) are for the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) refer to 
industrial and developing countries, respectively. The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all of the 
regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
 
 
A significant effect of banking crisis on the likelihood of irregular central bank 
replacement is robust for both developing and developed countries (see columns (2) and 
(3) of Table 4.6). The other variables such as inflation and elections are also significantly 
determining the probability of a governor replacement in developing countries, but not in 
industrial countries.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Financial crisis 0.436** 0.799* 0.366 
 (0.207) (0.436) (0.235) 
 [0.099]** [0.177]** [0.087]* 
Share of time elapsed 0.858*** 0.680*** 0.980*** 
 (0.139) (0.226) (0.145) 
 [0.205]*** [0.166]*** [0.240]*** 
Inflation 1.619*** 1.171 1.711*** 
 (0.462) (1.147) (0.493) 
 [0.387]*** [0.286] [0.419]*** 
Election 0.778*** 0.562* 0.884*** 
 (0.211) (0.311) (0.265) 
 [0.186]*** [0.137]* [0.217]*** 
Central bank independence -1.073* -0.834 -1.648 
 (0.607) (0.594) (1.423) 
 [-0.257] [-0.204] 
  [-0.404] 
    
Number of observations 2223 844 1379 
Number of countries 101 34 67 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Finally, we have examined whether there is a systematic difference between 
countries where the central bank is in charge of banking supervision and countries where 
some other institutions is charged with this responsibility.23 The data on banking 
supervision come from the World Bank (2008) and Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) 
from 1998 to 2007 and refer to 57 countries. We find that the probability that a central 
bank governor will be replaced is not statistically different between countries where a 
central bank is responsible for banking supervision and the countries where another 
institution is responsible for banking supervision (results available on request).  
 
 
                                                          
23
 Several studies (including Peek et al., 1999; Di Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999; and Masciandaro, 2007) 
examine the advantage and disadvantage of having the central bank in charge of banking supervision. 
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Table 4.6 Robustness Test Using Irregular Replacement of a Central Bank 
Governor and Different Types of Financial Crises 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Banking crisis 0.878*** 1.230* 0.795** 
 (0.309) (0.706) (0.342) 
 [0.184]*** [0.250]** [0.178]*** 
Debt crisis 0.706*  0.812* 
 (0.395)  (0.409) 
 [0.152]** 
 
[0.181]** 
Share of time elapsed 0.862*** 0.690*** 0.987*** 
 (0.141) (0.226) (0.148) 
 [0.207]*** [0.169]*** [0.242]*** 
Inflation 1.683*** 1.361 1.743*** 
 (0.460) (1.148) (0.492) 
 [0.403]*** [0.333] [0.428]*** 
Election 0.781*** 0.527 0.893*** 
 (0.214) (0.321) (0.271) 
 [0.187]*** [0.129]* [0.219]*** 
Central bank independence  
-1.109* -0.854 -1.729 
 (0.605) (0.594) (1.385) 
 [-0.266]* [-0.209] [-0.425] 
    
Number of observations 2223 844 1379 
Number of countries 101 34 67 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates 
significance at 10% level. The number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The 
number in the squared brackets is the marginal effect.  Estimation results in columns (1) are for the 
full sample. Columns (2) and (3) refer to industrial and developing countries, respectively. The null 
hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all of the regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
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4.6 The Nature of a Central Bank Governor Replacement  
Our results suggest that the occurrence of a financial crisis, notably a banking or debt 
crisis, increases the likelihood that the central bank governor will be replaced. Following 
Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we finally differentiate between new governors drawn from the 
ranks of the executive branch of the government (government ally) and new governors 
who come from outside the executive branch (non-government ally). We investigate 
whether financial crises increase the probability of appointing a non-government ally, 
considering all turnovers and irregular turnovers only. Our hypothesis is that in order to 
increase credibility, it may be more attractive for a government to appoint a non-ally as 
central bank governor after a financial crisis has occurred.  
 Table 4.7 presents the estimation results for a conditional logit model with 
clustered robust standard errors. Column (1) shows that financial crises increase the 
probability that a non-government ally will be chosen as a central bank governor. Also 
inflation significantly increases the probability that a non-government ally will be 
appointed as a new central bank governor. The results for the samples of industrial and 
developing countries (shown in column (2) and (3), respectively) suggest that financial 
crises are statistically significant for developing countries only. However, the marginal 
effects of a financial crisis on the probability that a non-government ally will be 
appointed are significant both in industrial and developing countries.  
Decomposing financial crises into bank crises, debt crises, and currency crises, we 
find that only banking crises significantly affect the probability that a non-government 
ally will be appointed as a central bank governor (see column (4) of Table 4.7). Similar 
results are found for the sample of industrial and developing countries (see columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 4.7).  
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Table 4.7 Financial Crises and the Nature of Central Bank Governor 
Replacement(Dependent variable: Non-Government Ally Appointed as New 
Governor) 
*** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level. The 
number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The number in the squared brackets is the marginal effect.  
Estimation results in columns (1) and (4) are for the full sample. Columns (2) and (5) refer to industrial countries, 
respectively. Columns (3) and (6) refer to developing countries. The null hypothesis of the Prob > chi2 is that all of the 
regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial crisis 0.981*** 1.097 0.939** 
   
 (0.358) (0.743) (0.402)  
  
 [0.186]*** [0.221]* [0.144]*  
  
Banking crisis    1.613*** 1.399* 1.688*** 
    (0.387) (0.816) (0.449) 
    [0.261]*** [0.267]** [0.199]* 
Debt crisis    0.238 
 0.430 
    (0.517) 
 (0.491) 
    [0.052] 
 [0.071] 
Currency crisis    0.063 0.859 -0.169 
    (0.482) (1.130) (0.507) 
    [0.014] [0.184] [-0.032] 
Share of time elapsed 0.823*** 0.781** 0.898*** 0.809*** 0.776** 0.854*** 
 (0.238) (0.327) (0.325) (0.227) (0.321) (0.325) 
 [0.186]*** [0.188]** [0.168]** [0.184]*** [0.188]** [0.158]** 
Inflation 1.778*** 3.302*** 1.804* 2.004*** 3.191*** 2.160** 
 (0.670) (0.847) (0.938) (0.677) (0.839) (0.959) 
 [0.402]*** [0.793]*** [0.338]*** [0.456]*** [0.772]*** [0.399]*** 
Election 0.423 0.351 0.480 0.419 0.334 0.517 
 (0.307) (0.285) (0.553) (0.312) (0.287) (0.567) 
 [0.096] [0.084] [0.090] [0.095] [0.081] [0.095] 
Central bank 
independence -0.538 -1.034 0.278 -0.596 -1.086 0.292 
 (0.733) (0.855) (1.325) (0.726) (0.857) (1.273) 
 [-0.122] [-0.248] [0.052] [-0.136] [-0.263] [0.054] 
       
Number of 
observations 961 531 430 961 531 430 
Number of countries 40 22 18 40 22 18 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Finally, we investigate the effect of a financial crisis on the possibility that a non-
government ally will be appointed after an irregular replacement of the central bank 
governor. The results are shown in Table 4.8. As there are insufficient observations for 
irregular changes in the sample of industrial countries, we refrain from estimating this 
model for industrial countries. The estimation results for the full sample (column 1) 
suggest that financial crises increase the probability that a non-government ally will be 
appointed after an irregular replacement of the central bank governor. The same result 
holds for the sample of developing countries (column 2). When we consider specific 
types of financial crises, it turns out that banking crises significantly increasing the 
probability that a non-government ally will be appointed as new governor after the crisis. 
However, debt and currency crises are not found to be significant (column 3). The same 
result holds for the sample of developing countries (column 4).  
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Table 4.8 Financial Crises and the Nature of Central Bank Governor 
Replacement (Irregular Replacement with a Non-Government Ally as a Dependent 
Variable) 
 
***indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 
10% level. The number in parentheses is the robust (adjusted) standard error. The number in the 
squared brackets is the marginal effect.  Estimation results in columns (1) and (3) are for the full 
sample, while  columns (2) and (4) refer to developing countries. The null hypothesis of the Prob > 
chi2 is that all of the regression coefficients in the model are equal to zero. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial crisis 1.078** 1.077** 
  
 (0.446) (0.508)  
 
 [0.262]** [0.166]  
 
Banking crisis   1.796*** 1.844*** 
   (0.532) (0.611) 
   [0.412]*** [0.234] 
Debt crisis   0.483 0.779 
   (0.589) (0.614) 
   [0.118] [0.128] 
Currency crisis   -0.059 
-0.240 
   (0.415) (0.416) 
   [-0.014] [-0.050] 
Share of time elapsed -1.133** -0.676 -1.282*** 
-0.883 
 (0.469) (0.570) (0.479) (0.612) 
 [-0.275]*** [-0.130] [-0.302]*** [-0.176] 
Inflation 1.898** 2.486** 2.122*** 2.904*** 
 (0.752) (1.069) (0.780) (1.110) 
 [0.461]** [0.479]*** [0.500]** [0.579]*** 
Election 1.002** 0.952 1.045** 1.070 
 (0.496) (0.771) (0.505) (0.783) 
 [0.243]* [0.184] [0.246]* [0.213] 
Central bank independence -0.672 1.280 -0.888 1.161 
 (1.243) (1.740) (1.266) (1.681) 
 [-0.163] [0.247] [-0.209] [0.231] 
     
Number of observations 680 368 680 368 
Number of countries 40 18 40 18 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
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4.7 Conclusions  
This chapter examines the effect of financial crises on the likelihood that a central bank 
governor will be replaced. Employing a conditional fixed effects logit model with 
clustered robust standard errors and using a model that is similar to that of Dreher et al. 
(2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2010) for 101 countries during the period 1970-2007, 
we find that financial crises make a central bank governor turnover more likely. When we 
decompose crises into banking, currency, and debt crises, we find that banking and debt 
crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover, in contrast 
to currency crises. There is some evidence that central bank independence mediates the 
effect of financial crises on the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced. 
Above some threshold level of independence, the effect of a financial (banking) crisis on 
the probability that the central bank governor will be replaced becomes insignificant. Our 
main findings are robust when we only consider irregular central bank governor 
turnovers, i.e. replacements before the term in office of the governor has ended. Banking 
and debt crises have a significant effect on the probability of an irregular replacement of 
a central bank governor, particularly in developing countries.  
 Finally, we analyze whether, after a financial crisis, a new central bank governor 
is more likely to come from the ranks of the executive branch of the government 
(government ally) or not (non-government ally). Using the data from Vuletin and Zhu 
(2011) for a much smaller sample than in the rest of the chapter, we find that financial 
crises increase the probability that a non-government ally will be chosen as a central bank 
governor. Decomposing financial crises into bank crises, debt crises, and currency crises, 
we find that only banking crises significantly affect the probability that a non-government 
ally will be appointed as a central bank governor.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Do Fiscal Deficits and Debt Crises Cause Inflation 
in Developing Countries? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Several studies have examined the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation. Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) argue that under fiscal dominance and a limited absorptive capacity of 
financial markets, persistent fiscal deficits lead to inflation. However, empirical studies 
yield mixed results on the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation. Some studies report a non-
significant effect of fiscal deficits on money growth both in industrialized countries 
(Protopapadakis and Siegel, 1987; Barnhart and Darrat, 1988) and in developing 
countries (De Haan and Zelhorst, 1990; Zoli, 2005). Several studies, such as De Haan and 
Zelhorst (1990), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1994), Metin (1998), Fischer et al. 
(2002), and Loungani and Swagel (2003), report only a significant effect of fiscal deficits 
on inflation in high-inflation countries. Also a more recent study by Catão and Terrones 
(2005) finds only a significant effect of fiscal deficits on inflation in high-inflation 
countries. So previous studies suggest that the effect of budget deficits on inflation is not 
uniform across countries.  
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A related issue that has received less attention in the literature is the effect of debt 
crises on inflation. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) document that since World War II, 
inflation and debt default have gone hand-in-hand. Hence, it is interesting to examine not 
only the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation but also the effect of debt crises on inflation. 
Davig et al. (2011) and Davig and Leeper (2011) explain that if the economy faces a 
‘fiscal limit’, i.e. a point beyond which tax collections can no longer rise and government 
expenditures cannot be further reduced, an unsustainable debt path will lead to inflation. 
It occurs when households expect that in the future monetary policy will shift from 
targeting inflation to stabilizing debt.  
This chapter aims to explore the effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on 
inflation in developing countries taking dynamics and parameter heterogeneity into 
account. The main reason to focus on developing countries is that the likelihood of 
monetary financing is higher in developing countries than in advanced countries. First, 
developing countries often have limited access to foreign debt, lack a well-developed 
domestic capital market, and have a limited tax capacity. Second, in several developing 
countries the central banks are still largely controlled by the government, which makes a 
fiscal dominance regime (Sargent and Wallace, 19981) more likely. Third, according to 
data provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008), all debt crises during the years 1970 – 
2007 occurred in developing countries.  
Most pooled estimators (like fixed and random effects, IV or GMM) presume that 
the data is suitable to be pooled. However, in panel models with large N and T the 
assumption of homogeneity of the slope coefficients is quite often rejected. Estimators 
that impose cross-country constraints dominate heterogeneous estimators in terms of 
efficiency if the restrictions are valid. If they are false, however, the restricted estimators 
are inconsistent. In particular, imposing invalid parameter homogeneity in dynamic 
models typically leads to downward-biased estimates of the speed of adjustment (Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995). We therefore employ the mean group (MG) and pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimators (see also Catão and Terrones, 2005, and Klomp and De Haan, 2011). 
Both methods can capture dynamics and parameter heterogeneity (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
The MG estimator assumes that the short-run and the long-run coefficients are different 
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across countries, whereas the PMG estimator allows the intercepts, the short-run 
coefficients, and the error variance to differ across countries, but in the long run the 
coefficients are restricted to be the same.  
The paper that comes closest to ours is Catão and Terrones (2005).24 These 
authors also apply the MG and PMG estimators for a sample covering 107 countries over 
the period 1960–2001. However, they do not take the effect of debt crises on inflation 
into account. Moreover, we add more explanatory variables which previous studies 
suggest to be related to inflation such as political instability (Aisen and Veiga, 2008), 
food production (Domaç and Yücel, 2005), government ideology (Alesina and Sachs, 
1988) and the level of financial development (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). We also 
examine whether the long-run effect of fiscal deficits and debt crisis on inflation is 
conditional on inflation, financial development, government ideology, and political 
instability by including interaction terms in the estimations. 
Our sample contains data for 46 developing countries over the period 1975-2007. 
The sample size is determined by the availability of data on debt crises drawn from 
Laeven and Valencia (2008). We find that the effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on 
inflation is homogenous across countries; both fiscal deficits and debt crises have a 
positive and significant effect on inflation. Their effects are stronger when inflation 
increases. Likewise, the impact of debt crises on inflation is stronger in countries that are 
politically unstable. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses 
previous studies, while section 5.3 describes the methodology and the data used. Section 
5.4 presents the estimation results and the final section offers some concluding 
comments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Another related study is Aghion et al. (2000). These authors examine the optimal monetary policy 
response to a financial crisis, specifically a currency crisis, but do not consider debt crises. 
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5.2 Literature review  
Sargent and Wallace (1981) assume a monetarist economy in which the monetary base is 
closely related to the price level, and the monetary authority can raise seignorage, i.e. 
revenue from money creation. When fiscal policy dominates monetary policy, i.e. a 
regime of fiscal dominance, the fiscal authority independently sets its budget, announcing 
all current and future deficits, and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be 
raised through bond sales and seignorage. In this condition, monetary policy is forced to 
finance fiscal deficits by money creation once the public is no longer willing or able to 
absorb more government debt. When the fiscal authority continuously runs deficits and 
the absorptive capacity for government bonds is limited, fiscal deficits will lead to higher 
money growth and inflation. Catão and Terrones (2005) note that in this type of models 
the deficit-inflation relationship is dynamic since governments allocate seigniorage 
intertemporally by borrowing.  
 Apart from the inflationary effects due to monetary financing of fiscal deficits, 
some other arguments have suggested as to why deficits may be inflationary. First, the 
fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) posits that fiscal deficits have a direct effect on the 
price level. When the government adjusts the present value of future budget surpluses, 
the price level will increase to lower the real value of debt (see Leeper 1991; Woodford, 
1995). In addition, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) argue that fiscal deficits may have an 
effect on inflation through the wealth effect of government debt that leads to an increase 
in the demand for goods and services, which in turn may trigger inflation.  
Empirical studies about the impact of fiscal deficits on money growth and 
inflation yield rather mixed results. Some studies, like Levy (1981), McMillin and Beard 
(1982), and Hoffman and Hubert (1983), which use data for the US, report a strong and 
positive relationship between fiscal deficits and money growth. Moreover, 
Domaç and Yücel (2005) find that lax fiscal policy increases the probability of inflation 
in emerging market economies. On the other hand, Protopapadakis and Siegel (1987), 
who examine the effect of debt on money and inflation for 10 major advanced countries, 
do not find a strong relationship between debt growth and inflation. In addition, Barnhart 
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and Darrat (1988) and Giannoros and Koulluri (1986), who also use data for advanced 
countries, conclude that there is no significant relationship between fiscal deficits and 
inflation.  
Several studies explore the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation by considering 
parameter heterogeneity across countries. De Haan and Zelhorst (1990) find that fiscal 
deficits do not affect inflation in 17 developing countries except during high inflation 
periods. Likewise, Fischer et al. (2002) find only a significant and positive effect of fiscal 
deficits on inflation in high-inflation countries and high-inflation periods. In addition, 
Catão and Terrones (2005) find that fiscal deficits only affect inflation in high-inflation 
countries, using a sample of 107 countries over the period 1960-2001. The most recent 
study that we are aware of by Kwon et al. (2009) shows that debt growth is inflationary in 
highly indebted developing countries.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study which explicitly examines the 
effect of debt crises on inflation empirically. Following Laeven and Valencia (2008), a 
debt crisis is identified by sovereign debt default and restructuring. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) show that debt crises often come with inflation crises. In addition, several recent 
theoretical papers, like Davig et al. (2011) and Davig and Leeper (2011), explore the 
relationship between government debt crises and inflation. According to these authors, 
every economy faces a time-varying “fiscal limit” that depends on a country’s economic 
and political arrangements and shocks that hit the economy. If government debt is 
unsustainable, it will lead to inflation in the long run.  
 
5.3 Model and data 
5.3.1 Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the relationship between fiscal deficits and 
inflation is dynamic. Moreover, it is likely that there is parameter heterogeneity across 
countries. Neglecting parameter heterogeneity may lead to inconsistent estimates and 
potentially misleading inference even for panels with large N and T (see Pesaran and 
Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999). Hence, to capture dynamics and parameter 
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heterogeneity, an auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model will be estimated. The 
ARDL(p,q) is represented by the following equation: 
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Where ti,inf  is the inflation rate of country i at time t; iµ  denotes the fixed effects; and 
tiz ,  is a (k x 1) vector of explanatory variables including the budget balance, our proxy 
for debt crises, and control variables such as oil price, exchange rate regime, openness, 
food production, government ideology, political instability, and financial development; 
ji ,λ  is a vector for the coefficients of lagged inflation; li ,δ  are the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. All right-hand side variables enter the equation with a lag to 
mitigate a potential endogeneity bias.  
Equation (5.1) can be re-parameterized as follows:  
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To find the long-run relationship between the explanatory variables and inflation, 
equation (5.2) can be written as follows: 
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The long-run impact of the fiscal balance, debt crises, and the other explanatory 
variables on inflation is represented by iii φβθ /−= . The error-correcting speed of 
 95 
Do Fiscal Deficits and Debt Crises Cause Inflation in Developing Countries? 
adjustment term of inflation towards its equilibrium following a given change in 
explanatory variables is denoted by iφ , which captures the dynamics.  
As shown by Pesaran et al. (1999), two approaches can be applied to estimate 
equation (5.3). The first method is mean group (MG) estimation, which estimates 
equation (5.3) for each country separately and assumes that the intercepts, slope 
coefficients, and error variance differ across countries. Therefore, the common 
coefficients φ  and θ  are produced by averaging each country’s coefficients iφ  and iθ . 
The MG assumes that the short-run and the long-run effect of fiscal deficits and debt 
crises on inflation are heterogenous across countries. However, when the heterogeneity of 
the long-run coefficient θ  is violated, MG will produce inefficient estimation. 
The second method, the Pool Mean Group (PMG) estimation, combines pooling 
and averaging. PMG allows the intercept, short-run coefficients, and error variances to 
differ across countries. However, under PMG the long-run coefficients iθ  are constrained 
to be the same across individual countries. The PMG estimates will be consistent and 
efficient when the long-run homogeneity restriction holds. This homogeneity can be 
tested for using a Hausman test with the null hypothesis that the long-run coefficients are 
homogenous. As the parameters in equation (5.3) are non-linear, the maximum likelihood 
method is used to estimate the parameters.  
In addition to the control variables used by Catão and Terrones (2005), such as oil 
price, the exchange rate regime, and openness, food production is included to capture the 
effect of supply shocks on inflation. The inclusion of food production is important 
because food has a relatively large share in the consumer price index (CPI) in developing 
countries. Domaç and Yücel (2005) find that the increase of food production reduces 
inflation. We also add political instability, as this variable has been found to have a 
significant effect on inflation (see, for instance, Aisen and Veiga, 2008). Also the 
ideological position of the party in government is included as an explanatory variable. 
Left wing parties tend to be less averse to inflation than right wing parties (see Alesina 
and Sachs, 1988). Finally, the level of financial development is also considered as 
explanatory variable. Based on Sargent and Wallace (1981), it is expected that in 
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countries with well-developed financial market the likelihood of monetary financing of 
fiscal deficits is lower.  
The oil price is expected to have a positive effect on inflation through supply-side 
shocks (see Catão and Terrones, 2005). Countries that have agreed to peg their 
currencies, especially when those agreements involve many countries, may face political 
costs of excessive inflation (Campillo and Miron, 1997). Therefore, countries with a 
fixed exchange rate system are expected to have lower inflation than those with a flexible 
exchange rate system. Romer (1993) argues that in a more open economy, the time-
inconsistency problem of monetary policy will be less than in a closed economy and that 
therefore inflation will be lower. 
We also include interaction terms in equation (5.3) to examine whether the effect 
of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation is conditional on the level of inflation, 
financial development, government ideology, and political instability. Fiscal deficits and 
debt crises are expected to have a significant and positive effect on inflation in the long 
run. However, the effect of both variables on inflation may be different depending on the 
level of inflation, financial development, government ideology, and political instability. 
Some previous studies, like Fischer et al. (2002) and Catão and Terrones (2005), suggest 
that fiscal deficits have a larger effect on inflation in high-inflation countries. In addition, 
based on Sargent and Wallace (1981), the effect of fiscal deficits on inflation is expected 
to depend on the level of financial development. Countries with a well-developed 
financial system have a high absorptive capacity for government bonds so that fiscal 
deficits and debt crises are arguably less inflationary. Likewise, the impact of budget 
deficits on inflation may be conditioned by the ideological position of the party in 
government and the level of political instability. 
 
5.3.2 Data 
We use data for 46 developing countries over the period 1975-2007 for which data on 
debt crisis is available (see Table D.1 in the Appendix for the list of countries included). 
Data on debt crises come from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Data on governments’ fiscal 
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balance are drawn from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The first panel 
in Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Inflation is 
measured by the percentage change of CPI. Data on inflation come from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and IFS. Following Catão and Terrones 
(2005), the inflation rate is transformed by the formula log(1+inflation) to reduce the 
influence of extreme observations. There are two groups of countries based on their 
performance of inflation: high-inflation countries consist of those in the upper quartile of 
the inflation distribution (with average inflation higher than 18%); and medium-low 
inflation countries with average inflation lower than 18 percent). 
Openness is measured by the share of export plus import in GDP. The data are 
provided by the WDI. On average, the degree of economic openness in developing 
countries is relatively high (63%). Table 5.1 shows that openness tends to increase over 
time. The medium and low inflation countries are more open than the high inflation 
countries. Moreover, countries that have well-developed financial markets are more open 
than countries with less developed financial markets.  
Financial development is represented by the ratio between M2 and GDP. M2 
comprises the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the 
central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central government. The data come from IFS and WDI. The sample 
is split in two with respect to financial development as well: countries with a low level of 
financial development (with average M2/GDP less than 36%) and countries with a high 
level of financial development (with average M2/GDP higher than 36%). For the fill 
sample, the ratio of M2 to GDP tends to increase over time. 
The dummy variable left government comes from updates of Beck et al. (2001); it 
is 1 if the main party in government is a left wing party, otherwise it is zero. 
The oil price is measured by the product of WTI (West Texas Intermediate) Spot 
Price of crude oil in dollars and the exchange rate of domestic currency to US dollar.25 
For the estimation, we take the percentage change of the oil price. The oil price can be 
                                                          
25
 The data can be downloaded at: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm. 
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used as the proxy of supply side inflation. Another supply side driver of inflation is the 
percentage change of food production that comes from WDI.  
The exchange rate regime is proxied by the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) index 
which ranges from 1 to 6. A higher score of the index indicates that the country has a 
more flexible exchange rate regime. Table 5.1 shows that high inflation countries have a 
more flexible exchange rate regime than medium and low inflation countries.  
Finally, following Dreher et al. (2010) political instability is proxied by the first 
principal component of a number of regime instability indicators from Databanks 
International (2010): revolutions, purges, riots, strikes, assassinations, guerilla warfare, 
major crises, and the number of (successful) coups d’états. A higher value of this variable 
indicates that the political situation is less stable.  Countries that have political instability 
score above the average are categorized as unstable, while the other countries are 
categorized as stable. 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics 
  Inflation  Deficits Debt Crisis  
Opennes
s 
M2/GDP Oil Prices 
Exchange 
Rate 
Regime  
Political 
Instability 
Food 
Production  
All Countries 
         
1975-1985 0.527 -0.047 0.047 0.554 0.306 0.679 2.476 0.014 0.029 
1986-1996 1.361 -0.026 0.004 0.607 0.346 1.098 2.798 0.124 0.031 
1997-2007 0.089 -0.021 0.008 0.711 0.419 0.221 2.330 -0.138 0.029 
High Inflation 
Countries          
1975-1985 1.320 -0.050 0.080 0.388 0.282 1.456 3.492 0.123 0.026 
1986-1996 3.567 -0.027 0.005 0.438 0.267 2.821 3.690 0.109 0.033 
1997-2007 0.123 -0.018 0.011 0.517 0.280 0.269 2.797 0.050 0.033 
Medium-Low 
Inflation Countries           
1975-1985 0.106 -0.046 0.028 0.646 0.320 0.224 1.881 -0.051 0.032 
1986-1996 0.109 -0.026 0.003 0.705 0.392 0.094 2.276 0.132 0.030 
1997-2007 0.069 -0.023 0.006 0.824 0.500 0.192 2.056 -0.250 0.027 
Well Developed 
Financial Market          
1975-1985 0.152 -0.062 0.038 0.651 0.385 0.284 2.043 0.060 0.032 
1986-1996 1.473 -0.029 0.010 0.728 0.488 0.883 2.344 0.052 0.037 
1997-2007 0.060 -0.024 0.005 0.868 0.631 0.193 2.086 -0.336 0.028 
Less Developed 
Financial Market          
1975-1985 0.807 -0.036 0.054 0.483 0.249 0.958 2.781 -0.024 0.028 
1986-1996 1.280 -0.024 0.000 0.522 0.246 1.249 3.118 0.183 0.027 
1997-2007 0.109 -0.019 0.010 0.600 0.269 0.240 2.502 0.024 0.030 
Left Wing 
Government           
1975-1985 1.451 -0.074 0.063 0.537 0.329 1.747 2.759 -0.045 0.023 
1986-1996 3.646 -0.042 0.000 0.534 0.340 2.554 3.151 0.128 0.031 
1997-2007 0.111 -0.016 0.020 0.587 0.350 0.191 2.590 -0.259 0.026 
Non Left Wing 
Government          
1975-1985 0.277 -0.039 0.043 0.546 0.312 0.411 2.341 0.034 0.031 
1986-1996 0.830 -0.022 0.006 0.615 0.366 0.801 2.734 0.122 0.033 
1997-2007 0.078 -0.020 0.006 0.747 0.464 0.228 2.279 -0.102 0.030 
Politically Unstable  
         
1975-1985 1.328 -0.055 0.064 0.443 0.292 1.577 2.816 1.204 0.030 
1986-1996 2.711 -0.033 0.006 0.508 0.328 2.095 2.939 1.028 0.024 
1997-2007 0.114 -0.030 0.018 0.575 0.380 0.239 2.540 1.042 0.025 
Politically Stable  
         
1975-1985 0.214 -0.044 0.041 0.598 0.311 0.333 2.345 -0.547 0.029 
1986-1996 0.594 -0.023 0.003 0.663 0.356 0.547 2.720 -0.509 0.035 
1997-2007 0.081 -0.018 0.005 0.750 0.430 0.215 2.270 -0.545 0.031 
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5.4 Estimation results  
In this section we examine the effect of fiscal deficit and debt crises on inflation 
controlling for the variables outlined in the previous section. We present the estimation 
results of equation (5.3) by employing MG and PMG estimates for 46 developing 
countries during the period 1975-2007. In addition, we include the interaction terms of 
fiscal deficits and debt crises with the level of inflation, financial development, the 
ideological position of the government, and political instability.  
The Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) is employed to choose the optimal 
number of lags for each variable for each country regression. Based on SBC, the ARDL 
with p=1 and q=1 is preferred for almost all of countries. Next, the Hausman test is used 
to test for the long-run homogeneity of the coefficients of all explanatory variables. The 
null of the Hausman test is that the long-run coefficients are homogeneous. If the 
Hausman test indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected, it means that the MG 
estimator is preferred to the PMG estimator. The MG assumes that the effect of fiscal 
deficits and debt crises on inflation is heterogenous across countries both in the short and 
long run. On the other hand, if the null cannot be rejected the PMG estimator is preferred. 
It means that the long-run effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation is 
homogenous across countries.  
In columns (1) of Table 5.2, we start by the model using the control variables 
suggested by Catão and Terrones (2005). The h-statistic cannot reject the homogeneity of 
the long-run coefficients at the 5 significance percent level so that the PMG estimator is 
preferred. According to the PMG estimates, the coefficient of the fiscal balance is 
negative indicating that a higher fiscal surplus (deficit) leads to lower (higher) inflation in 
the long run. Meanwhile, the proxy for debt crises has a positive sign indicating that a 
debt crisis increases inflation in the long run. The oil price also has a statistically 
significant impact on inflation. In contrast, the coefficient of openness is not statistically 
significant. Since the openness variable is not statistically significant, we delete this 
variable in column (2). The exchange rate regime has a significant and positive effect on 
inflation, i.e. countries with a more flexible exchange rate have higher inflation.  
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In the next columns, we include the other control variables such as food 
production, political instability, left wing government, and financial development. When 
we include food production in the model, the Hausman test shows that the PMG 
estimator is still preferred. In this model, the coefficient of food production is significant 
with a negative sign, indicating that higher food production leads to lower inflation 
(column (3) of Table 5.2).  
When we include both food production and political instability into the model, it 
turns out that also political instability has a significant and positive effect on inflation 
indicating that the countries with more unstable political regimes tend to have higher 
inflation. Finally, when we include the other control variables, i.e. left wing government 
and financial development, all other variables, including the fiscal balance and debt 
crises, remain significant. Whereas the partisan variable is not significant, financial 
development turns out to be significant with a negative sign (column 6).  
The estimated error correction (EC) coefficient is less than 0.5 which implies that 
the adjustment of inflation to a given change in fiscal balance and the occurrence of a 
debt crisis have an average half-life of just over one year.  
In conclusion, we find that fiscal deficits and debt crises are increasing inflation in 
the long run. The long-run effect of these variables on inflation is homogenous across 
countries. Other variables that have a significant effect on inflation are oil price inflation, 
the exchange rate regime, food production, political instability, and the level of financial 
development.  
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Table 5.2 PMG Estimation Results of Equation (5.3) 
(Dependent Variable: Inflation; Using Fiscal Balance as Share of GDP as 
Explanatory Variable) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard error is shown in parentheses and the p-value is in brackets. 
The h-statistic refers to the Hausman test on the long-run homogeneity restriction. 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Long-run 
coefficients       
Fiscal 
Balance/GDP -0.251*** -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.179*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
Debt Crisis 0.059*** 0.034*** 0.027** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Oil Price Inflation 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.0533*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Trade Openness -0.007      
 (0.007)      
Exchange rate 
regime 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Food Production   -0.070*** -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.056*** 
   (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) 
Political Instability    0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Dummy Left     0.000 0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
M2/GDP      -0.025*** 
      (0.007) 
EC coefficient -0.395*** -0.407*** -0.395*** -0.393*** -0.387*** -0.401*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
 
h-statistic 1.040 1.600 2.11 2.27 3.29 4.77 
 [0.959] [0.808] [0.834] [0.893] [0.857] [0.782] 
No. Observations 1449 1459 1459 1272 1268 1268 
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According to the theoretical model of Catão and Terrones (2005), the rate of 
inflation is proportional to the ratio of the government deficit to the average stock of 
“narrow” money instead of the deficit to GDP ratio. We therefore replace the fiscal 
balance to GDP ratio by the fiscal balance to M1 ratio as explanatory variable. The 
estimations results are presented in Table 5.3.  
Based on the Hausman test, the PMG estimator is preferred to the MG estimator. 
It turns out that the fiscal balance is statistically significant with a negative sign. It means 
that fiscal deficits lead to inflation. This result is robust when we include all explanatory 
variables. Moreover, debt crises also significantly increase inflation in the long run.  
Next, we examine whether the long-run effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on 
inflation is conditional on other variables. Hence, we include interaction terms of the 
fiscal balance and debt crises variables with inflation, financial development, the 
presence of a left wing government, and political instability.  
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Table 5.3 PMG Estimation Results of Equation (5.3) (Dependent Variable: 
Inflation: Using Fiscal Balance as Share of M1 as Explanatory Variable) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard error is shown in parentheses and the p-value is in brackets. 
The h-statistic refers to the Hausman test on the long-run homogeneity restriction. 
 
 
Column (1) of Table 5.4 repeats the PMG estimates of Table 5.2 including all 
explanatory variables. Next, in column (2) we include the interaction term between fiscal 
balance and inflation. The interaction term is statistically significant with a negative sign. 
Table 5.5 shows the total marginal effect of the fiscal balance on inflation between 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Long-run 
coefficients       
Fiscal Balance/M1 -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Debt Crisis 0.037*** 0.031** 0.080*** 0.093*** 0.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) 
Oil Price Inflation 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Exchange rate regime 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Food Production  -0.079*** -0.058** -0.064*** -0.066*** 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) 
Political Instability   0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy Left    0.001 0.000 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
M2/GDP     -0.032*** 
     (0.007) 
EC coefficient  -0.399*** -0.388*** -0.380*** -0.370*** -0.392*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) 
h-statistic  [0.930] [2.180] [2.980] [2.410] [2.470] 
 0.921 0.824 0.811 0.934 0.963 
      
No. Observations  1459 1459 1272 1268 1268 
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interquantile ranges of inflation. It is clear that the impact of a fiscal deficit on inflation 
becomes stronger when the level of inflation increases. This result is in line with the 
findings of previous studies, like Fischer et al. (2002). 
In column (3) of Table 5.4 we include the interaction terms between debt crises 
and inflation. The interaction term is statistically significant with a positive sign. The 
marginal effect of debt crises conditional on inflation as shown in Table 5.5 suggests that 
the effect of debt crises on inflation become stronger when inflation increases. 
When we include the interaction terms of the fiscal balance and debt crises with 
financial development and the dummy reflecting the presence of a left wing government, 
the interaction terms are not statistically significant (see columns (4)-(7) of Table 5.4). 
Finally, the interaction term of debt crises and political instability is statistically 
significant (column 9). The effect of debt crises on inflation becomes stronger when 
political instability increases (see Table 5.5 for the marginal effect). However, the 
interaction term of fiscal balance and political instability (shown in column (8) of Table 
5.4) is not statistically significant.  
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Table 5.4 Estimation Results of Equation (5.3) with Interaction Terms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Long-run 
coefficients           
Fiscal Balance/GDP -0.179*** 0.211*** -0.186*** -0.060 -0.174*** -0.178*** -0.179*** -0.163*** -0.166*** 
 (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.066) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.030) 
Debt Crisis 0.065*** 0.092*** 0.008 0.070*** 0.101*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.040*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Oil Price Inflation 0.055*** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Exchange rate regime 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Food Production -0.056*** -0.047** -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.056*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Political Instability 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Dummy Left 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.0001939 0.000 -0.001 -0.0004835 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M2/GDP -0.025*** -0.004 -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
Fiscal Balance x 
inflation  -7.526***        
  (0.619)        
Debt Crisis x 
inflation   0.686**       
   (0.308)       
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Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard error is shown in parentheses and the p-value is in brackets. The h-statistic refers to the Hausman test on the 
long-run homogeneity restriction.  
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Balance x 
M2/GDP    -0.232      
    (0.128)      
          
Debt Crisis x 
M2/GDP     -0.048     
     (0.032)     
Fiscal Balance x 
Dummy Left      -0.018    
      (0.055)    
Debt Crisis x 
Dummy Left       0.001   
       (0.051)   
Fiscal Balance x 
Political Instability        0.020  
        (0.049)  
Debt Crisis x 
Political Instability         0.088*** 
         (0.025) 
EC coefficient  -0.401*** -0.301*** -0.410*** -0.391*** -0.399*** -0.396*** -0.401*** -0.393*** -0.403*** 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) 
h-statistic  4.770 12.930  3.700 5.670 3.8 4.82 4.900 4.16 
 [0.782] [0.166]  [0.930] [0.773] [0.924] [0.777] [0.843] [0.901] 
          
No. Observations  1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 
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Table 5.5 Marginal Effects of Interaction Effects 
 
 
 
Note: The numbers in the table represents the marginal effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation between the three inter-
quantile ranges (Q=25, Q=50, and Q=75) of variables inflation, political instability, and M2/GDP. Since the interaction term of fiscal 
deficits with political instability is not statistically significant, the marginal effect tends to be constant over quantiles. Likewise, the 
marginal effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation across quantile ranges of M2/GDP is quite constant. 
 
 
  Inflation Political Instability  M2/GDP 
  Q=25 Q=50 Q=75 Q=25 Q=50 Q=75 Q=25 Q=50 Q=75 
Fiscal Deficit  0.000 -0.36 -0.768 -0.176 -0.174 -0.164 -0.098 -0.121 -0.143 
 
         
Debt crisis  0.027 0.06 0.097 -0.019 -0.008 0.035 -0.240 -0.245 -0.249 
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5.5 Conclusions  
This study examines the effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation in developing 
countries. To cover dynamics and parameter heterogeneity across countries, the Mean 
Group (MG) and the Pool Mean Group (PMG) estimators are employed. Based on the 
estimation results, we conclude that fiscal deficits and debt crises have a significant 
positive effect on inflation in the long run. These effects are homogenous across 
countries. The results are robust when we include either fiscal balance as share of GDP or 
as share of M1—as suggested by Catão and Terrones (2005)—as explanatory variable. 
We also find that the long run effects of fiscal deficits and debt crises on inflation are 
conditional on the level of inflation and (for debt crises) on political instability. The 
higher the rate of inflation, the larger will be the effect of fiscal deficits and debt crises on 
inflation. Likewise, the effect of a debt crisis on inflation becomes stronger when 
political instability increases 
. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
 
6.1 General Conclusions  
Four research questions have been addressed in this dissertation. First, how have the 
legal and actual independence of Bank Indonesia (BI) developed since its creation to the 
present time? Second, what role does labor market flexibility play when it comes to the 
impact of the most recent financial crisis on output and unemployment? Third, what is 
the effect of financial crises on the replacement of a central bank governor? Fourth, do 
fiscal deficits and debt crises cause inflation in developing countries? 
In order to answer the first question, we proxy the legal and actual independence 
of Bank Indonesia for the period 1953-2009 by extending the legal CBI index of 
Cukierman (1992) and expanding the actual CBI index of Cukierman (2007). In 
constructing the legal index, we add financial independence of central bank to the index 
of Cukierman (1992). To measure actual independence, we consider institutional and 
economic factors that affect the independence of Bank Indonesia, such as financial 
market development, the size of government deficits, the exchange rate regime, and the 
function of the central bank as a development bank. Moreover, we consider the 
background of central bank governors, the turnover of governors, and the reasons for 
their dismissal.  
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We find that before Bank Indonesia was mandated as an independent institution in 
1999, the legal and actual independence of BI diverged substantially. The actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia is much higher than its legal independence during that 
period. Several factors, like the background of governors (mostly coming from Bank 
Indonesia) and the absence of dismissals before the end of the legal term in office, 
contributed to the divergence of the actual index from the legal index. The improvement 
of the government’s fiscal position, the development of financial markets, and the 
deregulation of the economy are amongst the factors contributing to a high level of actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia. After Bank Indonesia was mandated as a legally 
independent institution by a new central bank law, the legal independence of BI increased 
significantly, especially the independence in monetary policy formulation and the 
absence of forced lending to the government. When we estimate the relationship between 
inflation and CBI in Indonesia, the results suggest that the actual independence has a 
significant and negative effect on inflation. If actual independence is decomposed into its 
components, only the component capturing limitations on lending to government comes 
out significantly.  
As to the second question, by employing cross-country regressions we find that 
countries with low hiring cost suffered lower output losses due to the current financial 
crisis. However, countries with lower dismissal cost recovered slower than countries with 
higher dismissal cost. Regulatory trade barriers, openness, credit growth, financial 
integration, inflation stability, and population growth are also found to have a significant 
effect on output losses. Fewer restrictions on international trade lead to lower output 
losses. However, countries depending on trade are more vulnerable to external shocks. 
Countries that have highly integrated financial markets and experienced rapid credit 
growth prior to the global crisis were hit hard. Moreover, countries in which the monetary 
authorities could keep inflation stable and with higher population growth experienced 
lower output losses. With respect to the speed of recovery from the crisis, we find that 
apart from labor market flexibility, only trade barriers, credit growth, and exchange rate 
regimes are statistically significant. When the impact of the crisis on unemployment is 
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explored, we find that in industrial countries lower hiring cost are related to lower 
employment losses due to the financial crisis, but the size of the effect is rather small.  
To address our third research question, i.e. the effect of financial crises on central 
bank independence, we consider both regular and irregular replacements of central bank 
governors as indicators of central bank independence. By employing a conditional fixed 
effects logit model with clustered robust standard errors, we find that financial crises 
increase the probability of a central bank governor replacement. When crises are 
decomposed into banking, currency, and debt crises, the results show that only banking 
and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. 
The other variables increasing the probability that the central bank governor will be 
replaced are the share of time in the office elapsed, inflation, and elections, notably in 
developing countries. There is some evidence that central bank independence mediates 
the effect of financial crises on the replacement of a central bank governor. Above some 
threshold level of legal independence, the effect of a financial (banking) crisis on the 
probability that the central bank governor will be replaced becomes insignificant. 
Employing the data from Vuletin and Zhu (2011), we find that financial crises 
(particularly banking crises) increase the likelihood that a non-government ally will be 
appointed as central bank governor.  
Finally, the last paper of this dissertation aims to answer the question: do fiscal 
deficits and debt crises cause inflation in developing countries? By employing the Mean 
Group (MG) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation methods, we conclude that 
fiscal deficits and debt crises have a significant positive effect on inflation in the long 
run. The effects are homogenous in the long run across countries. A higher oil price, a 
more flexible exchange rate, and more political instability also cause higher inflation. In 
contrast, a higher food production and more advanced financial development lead to 
lower inflation. We also find that the long-run effects of fiscal deficits and debt crises on 
inflation are conditional on the level of inflation and (for debt crises) on political 
instability. The higher the rate of inflation, the larger will be the effect of fiscal deficits 
and debt crises on inflation. Likewise, the effect of a debt crisis on inflation becomes 
stronger when political instability increases. 
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6.2 Limitations of the Study 
This dissertation has some limitations. Firstly, in the study on legal and actual 
independence of Bank Indonesia, we did not relate the constructed indexes to other 
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates and financial stability. An independent 
central bank that is free from political pressure may behave more predictably, promoting 
economic stability, and reducing risk premia in real interest rates (Alesina and Summers, 
1993). Greater independence from external pressure also implies that central banks are 
less politically constrained in acting to prevent financial distress (Klomp and de Haan, 
2008). We leave this for future research. In addition, the proposed method used to 
construct the legal and actual CBI for Bank Indonesia can be applied to other central 
banks. Also this would be an interesting issue for future research.  
For the second paper on the labor market flexibility and the impact of the 
financial crisis, we use cross-country regressions. As not all countries were out of the 
recession at the end of the sample period, the impact of the crisis on output loss and the 
duration of the crisis are underestimated. Hence, an idea for future research is to capture 
the movement of output and unemployment during the crisis over time across countries 
by applying panel data.  
The data of financial crises used in the last two papers do not cover the current 
financial crisis in most developed countries. Particularly for debt crises, during the years 
1970-2007, all debt crises occurred in developing countries and not in industrial 
countries. Therefore, to capture the current financial crisis which hit industrial countries, 
we can expand the data of financial crises. So far, most studies examining the recent 
financial crisis are theoretical or descriptive.  
 
6.3 Policy Implications  
The findings of this dissertation suggest some policy implications. Based on the first 
paper, the actual independence of Bank Indonesia diverged from its legal independence 
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before it was mandated as an independent central bank by the law. The actual 
independence, particularly limitations on lending to government, significantly affect 
inflation, in contrast to legal independence. Hence, it implies that besides the reform of 
the central bank law, actual independence should be given much attention, notably 
institutional and economic factors which affect central bank independence in practice, 
such as the size of government deficits and financial market development. 
 The occurrence of financial crises threatens the independence of central banks. 
Our results show that financial crises, particularly banking crises and debt crises, increase 
the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced. This result is in line with 
evidence that the central bank governors of Argentina and Mexico were dismissed when 
they did not want to cooperate with their respective governments during the recent 
financial crisis. The political pressure on a central bank during a financial crisis may limit 
the central bank’s abilities to attain targeted inflation. For instance, several central banks 
engage in policies that have fiscal dimensions, such as credit easing policies and the 
purchase of long-term treasury securities. Our findings suggest that unsustainable fiscal 
policies and debt crises cause inflation in the long run. Therefore, coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies in the current financial crisis needs to be transparent so that 
it is clear that actions by the central bank are consistent with its mandate (Walsh, 2011). 
Moreover, to reduce the pressure on inflation, fiscal policy has to become sustainable.  
 Finally, the impact of the current financial crisis on output and unemployment is 
related to the flexibility of the labor market. Countries with low hiring cost suffered 
lower output losses and unemployment due to the recent financial crisis. However, 
countries with lower dismissal cost recovered slower than countries with higher dismissal 
cost. Our findings imply that there is a trade-off between the depth of the crisis and the 
duration of the crisis. Hence, when deciding on how flexible labor markets should be, 
policy makers should take this trade-off into account. 
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Table A1. The Legal Index of Cukierman (1992) and Our Extended Legal Index 
Cukierman Index  The Extended Index  
Variable 
number Description of variable Weight 
Numerical 
coding 
Variable 
number Description of variable Weight 
Numerical 
coding 
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.20   1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   
    Term of office 0.25       Term of office 0.25   
    Over 8 years  1     Over 8 years  1 
    6 to 8 years  0.75     6 to 8 years  0.75 
    5 years  0.5     5 years  0.5 
    4 years  0.25     4 years  0.25 
    Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer  0     Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer  0 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25       Who appoints CEO 0.25   
    Board of central bank  1     Board of central bank  1 
    A council of the central bank board, executive  0.75     A council of the central bank board, executive  0.75 
    branch, and legislative branch        branch, and legislative branch    
    Legislature  0.5     Legislature  0.5 
    Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)  0.25     Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)  0.25 
    One or two members of the executive branch  0     One or two members of the executive branch  0 
    Dismissal 0.25       Dismissal 0.25   
    No provision for dismissal  1     No provision for dismissal  1 
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    Only for reasons not related to policy  0.83     Only for reasons not related to policy  0.83 
    At the discretion of central bank board  0.67     At the discretion of central bank board  0.67 
    At legislature's discretion  0.5     At legislature's discretion  0.5 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature  0.33     Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature  0.33 
    At executive's discretion  0.17     At executive's discretion  0.17 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by executive  0     Unconditional dismissal possible by executive  0 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25       May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25   
    No  1     No  1 
    Only with permission of the executive branch  0.5     Only with permission of the executive branch  0.5 
    No rule against CEO holding another office  0     No rule against CEO holding another office  0 
                
2 Policy formulation 0.15   2 Policy formulation 0.16   
    Who formulates monetary policy 0.25       Who formulates monetary policy 0.25   
    Bank alone  1     Bank alone  1 
    Bank participates, but has little influence  0.67     Bank participates, but has little influence  0.67 
    Bank only advises government  0.33     Bank only advises government  0.33 
    Bank has no say  0     Bank has no say  0 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5       Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5   
    The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as   1     The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as   1 
    its objectives        its objectives    
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    Government, only policy issues not clearly defined  0.8     Government, only policy issues not clearly defined  0.8 
    as the bank's goals or in case of conflict        as the bank's goals or in case of conflict    
    within bank        within bank    
    A council of the central bank, executive branch,  0.6     A council of the central bank, executive branch,  0.6 
    and legislative branch        and legislative branch    
    The legislature, on policy issues  0.4     The legislature, on policy issues  0.4 
    The executive branch on policy issues, subject to  0.2     The executive branch on policy issues, subject to  0.2 
    due process and possible protest by the bank        due process and possible protest by the bank    
    The executive branch has unconditional priority  0     The executive branch has unconditional priority  0 
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25       Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25   
    Central bank active  1     Central bank active  1 
    Central bank has no influence  0     Central bank has no influence  0 
3 Objectives 0.15   3 Objectives 0.05   
   Price stability is the major or only objective in  1    Price stability is the major or only objective in  1 
    the charter, and the central bank has the final         the charter, and the central bank has the final     
    word in case of conflict with other government        word in case of conflict with other government    
    objectives        Objectives    
   Price stability is the only objective  0.8    Price stability is the only objective  0.8 
   Price stability is one goal, with other compatible  0.6    Price stability is one goal, with other compatible  0.6 
    objectives, such as a stable banking system        objectives, such as a stable banking system    
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   Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting  0.4    Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting  0.4 
    objectives, such as full employment        objectives, such as full employment    
   No objectives stated in the bank charter  0.2    No objectives stated in the bank charter  0.2 
      0     Stated objectives do not include price stability   0 
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.50   4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.42   
    Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.3       Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.3   
    No advances permitted  1     No advances permitted  1 
    Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,  0.67     Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,  0.67 
    up to 15 % of government revenue)        up to 15 % of government revenue)    
    Advances permitted, and the limits are loose  0.33     Advances permitted, and the limits are loose  0.33 
    (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)        (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)    
    No legal limits on lending  0     No legal limits on lending  0 
    Securitized lending 0.2       Securitized lending 0.2   
    Not permitted  1     Not permitted  1 
    Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15   0.67     Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15   0.67 
    % of government revenue)        % of government revenue)    
    Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15  0.33     Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15  0.33 
    % of government revenue)        % of government revenue)    
    No legal limits on lending  0     No legal limits on lending  0 
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2       Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2   
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    Controlled by the bank  1     Controlled by the bank  1 
    Specified by the bank charter  0.67     Specified by the bank charter  0.67 
    Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33     Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33 
    Decided by the executive branch alone  0     Decided by the executive branch alone  0 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1       Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1   
    Only the central government  1     Only the central government  1 
    All levels of government (state as well as central)  0.67     All levels of government (state as well as central)  0.67 
    Those mentioned above and public enterprises  0.33     Those mentioned above and public enterprises  0.33 
    Public and private sector  0     Public and private sector  0 
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05       Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05   
    Currency amounts  1     Currency amounts  1 
    Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67     Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67 
    Shares of government revenue  0.33     Shares of government revenue  0.33 
    Share of government expenditures  0     Share of government expenditures  0 
    Maturity of loans 0.05       Maturity of loans 0.05   
    Within 6 months  1     Within 6 months  1 
    Within 1 year  0.67     Within 1 year  0.67 
    More than 1 year  0.33     More than 1 year  0.33 
    No mention of maturity in the law  0     No mention of maturity in the law  0 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.05       Interest rates on loans must be 0.05   
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    Above minimum rates  1     Above minimum rates  1 
    At market rates  0.75     At market rates  0.75 
    Below maximum rates  0.5     Below maximum rates  0.5 
    Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25     Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25 
    No interest on government borrowing from the  0     No interest on government borrowing from the  0 
    central bank        Central bank    
    Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05       Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05   
    Government securities in the primary market?        Government securities in the primary market?    
    Yes  1     Yes  1 
    No   0     No   0 
       5 Financial Independence 0.16   
          Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33   
          Mostly central bank  1 
          Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches  0.5 
          Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
              
          Determination of  the allocation of bank profits 0.33   
          Mostly by bank or fixed by law  1 
          Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches  0.5 
          Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
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          Who is responsible for central bank losses 0.33   
          Central Bank is fully responsible   1 
          
At certain capital limit, government should capitalize 
the central bank  0.5 
          Government  0 
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Table A.2. The Index of Legal Independence vs. the Index of Actual Independence 
Legal Index  Actual Index 
Vari
able 
num
ber Description of variable 
Weig
ht 
Numeric
al coding 
Vari
able 
num
ber Description of variable 
Weig
ht 
Numeric
al coding 
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.21   
    Term of office 0.25       Overlap with Government's change  0.25   
    Over 8 years   1     10 months or more   1 
    6 to 8 years   0.75     7-9 months   0.75 
    5 years   0.5     4-6 months   0.5 
    4 years   0.25     2-3 months   0.25 
    Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer   0     0-1 month   0 
    Who appoints CEO 0.25       Background of CEO 0.25   
    Board of central bank   1     Independent expert   1 
    A council of the central bank board, executive   0.75     Central bank staff   0.75 
    branch, and legislative branch         Mix between ex- government and central bank staff    0.5 
    Legislature   0.5     Government staff   0.25 
    Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers)   0.25     Politician   0 
    One or two members of the executive branch   0           
    Dismissal 0.25       Dismissal 0.25   
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    No provision for dismissal   1     No dismissal   1 
    Only for reasons not related to policy   0.83     Resignation and permanently prevented   0.83 
    At the discretion of central bank board   0.67     
Poor performance (for instance inflation target is not 
attained)   0.67 
    At legislature's discretion   0.5     Crime and corruption   0.5 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature   0.33     Related to policy causing central bank loss   0.33 
    At executive's discretion   0.17     Political participation   0.17 
    Unconditional dismissal possible by executive   0     Without a clear reason   0 
    May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.25       CEO holds other office? 0.25   
    No   1     No other position   1 
    Only with permission of the executive branch   0.5      Private sector position   0.5 
    No rule against CEO holding another office   0      Government &Political Position   0 
2 Policy formulation 0.16   2 Policy formulation 0.16   
    Who formulates monetary policy 0.25       Exchange rate regime & capital mobility 0.25   
    Bank alone   1     Fixed exchange rate, perfect capital mobility  1 
    Bank participates, but has little influence   0.67     Fixed exchange rate, imperfect capital mobility  0.67 
    Bank only advises government   0.33     Flexible exchange rate, imperfect capital mobility  0.33 
    Bank has no say   0     Flexible exchange rate, perfect capital mobility  0 
    Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.5       
Banking supervision and sources of funding for 
bank failure 0.5   
    The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as    1     
Central bank not as banking supervision and not 
responsible for the cost of bank failure  1 
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    its objectives         
Central bank as a bank supervision and 
government/independent institution is responsible for 
the cost of bank failure  0.5 
    Government, only policy issues not clearly defined   0.8     
Central bank as a bank supervision and responsible for 
the cost of bank failure  0 
    as the bank's goals or in case of conflict              
    within bank              
    A council of the central bank, executive branch,   0.6          
    and legislative branch              
    The legislature, on policy issues   0.4          
    The executive branch on policy issues, subject to   0.2          
    due process and possible protest by the bank              
    The executive branch has unconditional priority   0          
    Role in the government's budgetary process 0.25       
Decision on the target of exchange rate and 
inflation for government's budget 0.25   
    Central bank active   1     Independently by central bank  1 
    Central bank has no influence   0     Jointly with government  0.5 
             By government only  0 
3 Objectives 0.05   3 Objectives 0.05   
   Price stability is the major or only objective in   1     
Function as a development bank, granting credit at 
subsidy rates?    
    the charter, and the central bank has the final          No  1 
    word in case of conflict with other government         To some extent  0.66 
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    objectives         Yes  0.33 
   Price stability is the only objective   0.8     
The central bank heavily involved in granting 
subsidized credits  0 
   Price stability is one goal, with other compatible   0.6           
    objectives, such as a stable banking system               
   Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting   0.4           
    objectives, such as full employment               
   No objectives stated in the bank charter   0.2           
    Stated objectives do not include price stability   0             
4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.42   4 Limitation on lending to the government 0.5   
    Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.3       Actual deficits (surplus)/GDP 0.3   
    No advances permitted   1     Surplus  1 
    Advances permitted, but with strict limit (e.g.,   0.67     0<deficits=<3%  0.67 
    up to 15 % of government revenue)         3%<deficits=<6%  0.33 
    Advances permitted, and the limits are loose   0.33     Deficits>6%  0 
    (e.g., over 15 % of government revenue)              
    No legal limits on lending   0          
    Securitized lending 0.2       Financial market development (M2/GDP) 0.2   
    Not permitted   1     M2/GDP>52%  1 
    Permitted, but with strict limit (e.g., up to 15    0.67     52%>=M2/GDP>32%  0.75 
    % of government revenue)         32%>=M2/GDP>20%  0.5 
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    Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15   0.33     20%>=M2/GDP>7%  0.25 
    % of government revenue)         7%>=M2/GDP  0 
    No legal limits on lending   0          
    Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2       Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.2   
    Controlled by the bank   1     Controlled by the bank  1 
    Specified by the bank charter   0.67     Follow the law  0.67 
    Agreed between the central bank and executive   0.33     Agreed between the central bank and executive  0.33 
    Decided by the executive branch alone   0     Decided by the executive branch alone  0 
    Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1       Potential borrowers from the bank 0.1   
    Only the central government   1     100% claim on government  1 
    All levels of government (state as well as central)   0.67     
Claim on government> claim on private (include 
bank)  0.5 
    Those mentioned above and public enterprises   0.33     
Claim on government < claim on private (include 
bank)  0 
    Public and private sector   0          
    Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05       Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.05   
    Currency amounts   1     Currency amounts  1 
    Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital   0.67     Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital  0.67 
    Shares of government revenue   0.33     Shares of government revenue  0.33 
    Share of government expenditures   0     Share of government expenditures  0 
    Maturity of loans 0.05       Maturity of loans 0.05   
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    Within 6 months   1     Within 6 months  1 
    Within 1 year   0.67     Within 1 year  0.67 
    More than 1 year   0.33     More than 1 year  0.33 
    No mention of maturity in the law   0     Longer period by extension  0 
    Interest rates on loans must be 0.05       Interest rate of loans vs market rate 0.05   
    Above minimum rates   1     Interest on loans>market rate  1 
    At market rates   0.75     Interest on loans=market rate  0.75 
    Below maximum rates   0.5     Interest on loans<market rate  0.5 
    Interest rate is not mentioned   0.25     Interest rate is not mentioned  0.25 
    No interest on government borrowing from the   0     No interest on government borrowing from the  0 
    central bank         central bank    
    Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.05       Are there taxes for primary market transactions? 0.05   
    Government securities in the primary market?         Yes  1 
    Yes   1     No  0 
      No   0           
 5 Financial Independence 0.16    5 Financial Independence 0.16   
    Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33       Determination of the central bank's budget 0.33   
    Mostly central bank   1     Mostly central bank  1 
    
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches   0.5     Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches  0.5 
    Mostly executive or legislative branches   0     Mostly executive or legislative branches  0 
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    Determination of  the allocation of bank profits 0.33       Profit/Loss 0.33   
    Mostly by bank or fixed by law   1     Profit  1 
    
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative 
branches   0.5     Loss  0 
    Mostly executive or legislative branches   0          
    Who is responsible for central bank losses 0.33       
How far the actual capital is deviated from the 
limit 0.33   
    Central Bank is fully responsible    1     Higher than limit  1 
    
At certain capital limit, government should 
capitalize the central bank   0.5     Less than limit  0 
    Government   0          
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Table A3. Details about Bank Indonesia’s Legal Index 
No Description of variable Act No 11/1953 
Act No 
11/1955 
Act No 
84/1958 
Act No 
13/1968 
Act No  
23/1999 
Act No 
3/2004 
1 Chief executive officer (CEO)             
  1 a Term of office 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
Term of office is 5 years  
Based on Act 13/1953 article 27(3): Governor and Directors shall be appointed by government on proposal of Ministry council (the 
so-called Dewan Moneter) for maximum 5 years.  
Based on Act 13/1968 article 15(3a): Governor and Directors shall be appointed by government on proposal of Ministry council (the 
so-called Dewan Moneter) for maximum 5 years, afterwards may be reappointed.  
Based on Act 23/1999 article 41(5): The member of the Board of Governors shall be appointed for 5 year term of office and may be 
reappointed for the same office at the maximum of one subsequent term of office. 
The Act 3/2004 article 41(5) is the same as the Act 23/1999 article 41(5) 
  2 b Who appoints CEO 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 
 
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 41(1): The Governor and the Senior Deputy Governor shall be nominated and 
appointed by the President upon the approval of Legislature. We interpret the final decision is on the hand of Legislature. Hence, the 
score is increased from 0.25 (based on Act 13/1953 and Act 13/1968) to 0.5 (based on Act 23/1999) 
  3 c Dismissal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.83 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 27(6): As a proposal of Dewan Moneter, governor can be dismissed by government. We assigned the 
lowest score since the law did not state clearly about the provision of dismissal.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 article 17(1,2): Governor can be dismissed before the period ends because of dead, activities causing losses, 
particular reason causing a bad performance, resignation. Hence, the score is increased because the law stated in detail about the 
provision for dismissal.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 article 48:  Any member of the Board of Governors shall not be discharged during his/her term of office, 
unless it is conducted upon a resignation of such member, or upon any evidence which proves that such member have committed a 
crime, or permanently prevented from serving his/her office. We do not assign it the highest score 1 but 0.83 because the law still 
stated the provisions of dismissal, which are not related to policy.  
  4 d May CEO hold other offices in government? 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 30 (2a): Governor is prohibited from having other positions unless with government’s permission. It 
is given score, 0.5.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 article 18 (2,3): Governor is prohibited from having other position directly or indirectly unless with 
government’s permission. It is also assigned score, 0.5.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 article 47(1): The member of the Board of Governors shall, individually or collectively, be 
prohibited from having any direct or indirect interests on any enterprises; holding any other position concurrently in other entities, 
except his/her tasks require him/her to hold such position; holding a position in the management of and or being a member of a 
political party. Owing to strictly prohibited from holding other positions, hence it is assigned the highest score. 
2 Policy formulation             
  1 a Who formulates monetary policy? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 article 24(3,4) and the Act 13/1968 article 9, 13: Dewan Moneter is responsible for formulating monetary 
policy. In case, there are conflicts in making decision, the government has a final word subject to possible protest by the governor.  It 
can be interpreted that governor participates in policy formulation but has little influence. Hence, the score is 0.67 
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Based on the Act 23/ 1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 9(1): other parties shall not interfere with the implementation of the tasks of 
Bank Indonesia. It implies that policy formulation is on the hand of central bank alone 
  2 b Who has final word in resolution of conflict? 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 
 
For the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968, the reasons are the same as point (a) above 
Based on the Act 23/ 1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 43(3): The decision making of the meeting of the Board of Governors shall be 
taken through a deliberation to reach an agreement. If such agreement cannot be reached, the Governor shall determine the final 
decision. Therefore, the highest score is assigned.  
  3 c Role in the government's budgetary process 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Both the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968 stated that central bank is government’s cashier. For that reason, central bank has no 
influence.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 54: Bank Indonesia shall provide an opinion and consideration to the Government 
concerning the State Budget and other policies related to the tasks and authority of Bank Indonesia. Yet, central bank has no influence. 
3 Objectives 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 and the Act 13/1968 article 7: The main tasks of Bank Indonesia are to maintain a stability of inflation and 
to create employment. Both objectives are possibly conflicting. Consequently, we assign score, 0.4.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 article 7, 8:  The objective of Bank Indonesia is to maintain price stability. Moreover, 
Bank Indonesia also has a task to preserve financial stability by regulating and supervising banking sector. Thus, the score is 
increasing to 0.6.  
4 Limitation on lending to the government             
 
 
      
  1 a Advances (limitation on non-securitized lending) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 Article 19(1 and 2): Central Bank has to strengthen government’s budget by providing advances. The limit 
is 30% of government revenue. We assign score 0.67 since central bank is permitted to give advances and the limit is strict.  
Because of the necessities to finance a large budget deficit, in 1955, the maximum limit of credit to the government was revised by the 
Act 11/1955. This law stated that the maximum credit is up to the debt of government to Bank Indonesia reached 7.1 billion rupiah at 
the end of year 1955. The Act 11/1955 was revised again in 1958 by the Act 84/1958. Based on this law, the maximum credit to the 
government is 30 % of government revenue unless in the certain condition this limit is allowed maximum 50 % of government 
revenue. Even the maximum credit to the government increases, but the Act 11/1955 and its revisions stated a strict limitation on 
credits from bank Indonesia to the government. Therefore, the score given to this sub-component is 0.67. 
The Act 13/1968 did not state the limit of credit to the government. In Article 35 (1) just mentioned that the credit to government is 
based the requirement of budget. It indicates that there is no constraint for central bank to give credit for government. Hence, we 
assign the lowest score.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 and the Act 3/2004 Article 56(1): Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government. As a 
result, we assigned the highest score.  
  2 b Securitized lending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 
 
Based on the Act 13/1953 Article 18(4) and the Act 13/1968 Article 36, Bank Indonesia was allowed to buy government bonds 
without limitation. Therefore, the lowest score is assigned.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities. It implies central bank is 
independent. 
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia is prohibited from buying government securities on the primary market for its 
own account, except in the case of short-term government securities needed by Bank Indonesia for monetary control operations. It 
means that Bank Indonesia is permitted to buy government securities in primary market but with a strict limitation, which are only for 
the short-term government securities and for the emergency financing. Therefore, we assign score 0.67 for the securitized lending.  
  3 c Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 19: The lending to government at certain amount is not charged interest. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, amount of credit is limited 30% of government’s revenue. Therefore, it implies that term of central bank’s lending to 
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government is specified by the law. The score for this sub-component is 0.67 
Based on the Act 13/1968 Article 35(3): The interest rate on lending is 3% a year, but it can be negotiated by the government and 
Bank Indonesia. It means that the interest rate is stated by the law but still negotiable. Hence, the score of this sub-component 
decreases to 0.33 
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 56(1): Bank Indonesia shall not provide any credit to the Government. We interpret that term of 
lending is controlled by central bank. Hence, the score is 1.  
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Bank Indonesia is allowed to buy a short term government securities in primary market. 
However, in Article 55(1) states that in the case Government intends to issue government securities, the Government shall hold prior 
consultations with Bank Indonesia. It implies that the term of lending is negotiable between central bank and government. Therefore, 
we assign score 0.33.  
  4 d Potential borrowers from the bank 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 15(1): Central government is prohibited to provide credit to other parties. On the other hand, in 
Article 19 states that central bank should strengthen government’s budget by giving advance on demand. It implies that the potential 
borrower of central bank is only the government.  
Based on the Act 13/1968 Article 32(2): Bank Indonesia has a task as a development bank which provides a liquidity credit to public 
and private sectors. For this reason we assign score zero.  
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 11(1): Bank Indonesia may extend credit or financing based on Syariah Principle to a 
Bank for a maximum period of 90 (ninety) days to overcome its short term financial difficulty (mismatch). The main problem is 
whether private and public sector mentioned in the questionnaire by Cukierman (1992) includes banking sector. We decided to include 
the banking sectors as a public and private sector category. Hence, the potential borrower based on this Act is public and private 
sector, which is given score zero. The same score also assigned for this sub-component based on the Law No. 3/2004.  
  5 e Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 
As already mentioned above, based on the Act 11/1953, there is a maximum limit of central bank credit to the government in term of 
%age of government revenue. Therefore, we assign score 0.33.  
However, the maximum amount of credit is revised by the Law No. 11/1955 in term of currency amount rather than percentage of 
government revenue. By this revision, this sub-component was given the highest score 1.  
The score is back to 0.33 since the Law No. 84/1958 stated the limit of central bank credit in term of percentage of government 
revenue.  
The Act 13/1968 did not state the limit on central bank’s lending. Yet, it is mentioned that the lending is based on budget requirement. 
At that time, we use balance budget system, hence we decided to assign the lowest score.   
The Act 23/1999 stated that central bank is not allowed to give credits to government. It implies that the limit is on currency with 
amount is zero. Therefore, we assign the highest score.  
The Act 3/2004 does not mention about the limit, therefore we assign score zero.  
  6 f Maturity of loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
 
For the sub-component maturity of loan, we assigned score zero for the Law No. 11/1953, the Law No. 13/1968, and the Law No. 
23/1999 since these laws did not state the maturity of lending. However, because the Law No 3/2004 allowed Bank Indonesia to buy 
the short-run government securities, we interpret the maximum maturity of loans is 1 year. Hence, this sub-component was assigned 
score 0.67.  
  7 g Interest rates on loans must be 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.75 
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 19: The lending to government at certain amount (up to 50 million rupiahs) is not charged interest. It 
implies, the amount of credits higher than the limit will be charged interest, yet not mentioned. Hence, we give score 0.25 for this sub-
component.  
Meanwhile, the Law No. 13/1968 mentioned that the interest on central bank loans is 3% per year but it can be changed by Dewan 
Moneter conditionally. It indicates that Dewan Moneter will charge interest rate lower than market rate. By this interpretation, we 
assign score 0.5 for this sub-component.  
The score of this sub-component decreases to 0.25, since the Law No. 23/1999 did not stated about interest rate of loans. Nevertheless, 
based on the newest Law No. 3/2004, Bank Indonesia is permitted to buy the short-run government securities in primary market. It can 
be interpreted that the interest rate should be paid by the government follows market interest rate. Therefore, the score of this 
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component increases to 0.75. 
  8 h Central bank prohibited from buying or selling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
  
    Government securities in the primary market?             
 
Based on the Act 11/1953 Article 13(4): Central bank is allowed to buy and sell securities in primary market. Hence, the score is zero 
Based on the Act 11/1968 Article 36(2): Central Bank can buy government’s bonds. The score is also zero. 
Based on the Act 23/1999 Article 55(4): Central Bank shall not purchase for itself the state debt securities. Therefore, we assign score 
1.  
Based on the Act 3/2004 Article 55(4): Central Bank may buy government securities on the primary market as part of the provision of 
the emergency financing facility. We assign the lowest score, zero.  
Average Index 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.22 0.75 0.63 
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Table B.1. Countries in Our Sample and Data Used  
No.  Countries  Peak Through Duration Output loss  
1 Argentina 2008: II 2009:I 3 0.099 
2 Australia 2008:III 2008:IV 1 0.008 
3 Austria 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.087 
4 Belgium 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.093 
5 Bolivia 2008:II 2009:I 3 0.122 
6 Botswana 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.281 
7 Bulgaria 2008:III 2010:I 6 0.313 
8 Canada 2007:IV 2009:II 6 0.034 
9 Chile 2008:II 2009:III 5 0.072 
10 Colombia 2008:III 2008:IV 1 0.015 
11 Costa Rica 2008:I 2009:I 4 0.045 
12 Czech Republic 2008:II 2009:I 3 0.098 
13 Denmark 2007:IV 2010:I 9 0.104 
14 Estonia 2007:IV 2010:I 9 0.256 
15 Finland 2007:IV 2010:I 9 0.162 
16 France 2008:I 2009:I 4 0.039 
17 Georgia 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.214 
18 Germany 2008:I 2009:I 4 0.067 
19 Greece 2008:III 2010:I 6 0.144 
20 Hungary 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.191 
21 Iceland 2008:III 2010:I 6 0.149 
22 India 2008:IV 2009:I 1 0.062 
23 Indonesia 2008:III 2008:IV 1 0.036 
24 Israel 2008:III 2008:IV 1 0.031 
25 Italy 2008:I 2009:II 5 0.068 
26 Jamaica 2007:II 2009:IV 10 0.051 
27 Japan 2008:I 2009:I 4 0.086 
28 Korea, Rep. 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.125 
29 Kyrgyz Republic 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.524 
30 Latvia 2007:IV 2010:I 9 0.396 
31 Lithuania 2008:III 2010:I 6 0.280 
32 Luxembourg 2007:IV 2009:II 6 0.084 
33 Malaysia 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.109 
34 Mauritius 2008:IV 2009:I 1 0.116 
35 Mexico 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.118 
36 Mongolia 2007:IV 2008:I 1 0.350 
37 Morocco 2008:II 2008:IV 2 0.019 
38 Netherlands 2008:I 2009:II 5 0.050 
39 New Zealand 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.024 
40 Norway 2008:IV 2009:II 2 0.090 
41 Peru 2008:II 2009:I 3 0.096 
42 Poland 2008:IV 2009:I 1 0.127 
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43 Portugal 2007:IV 2009:I 5 0.091 
44 Romania 2008:IV 2010:I 5 0.431 
45 Russian Federation 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.256 
46 Singapore 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.096 
47 Slovak Republic 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.193 
48 Slovenia 2008:II 2010:I 7 0.157 
49 South Africa 2008:III 2009:II 3 0.028 
50 Spain 2008:I 2009:IV 7 0.046 
51 Sweden 2007:IV 2009:III 7 0.176 
52 Switzerland 2008:II 2009:II 4 0.024 
53 Thailand 2008:I 2009:II 5 0.099 
54 Turkey 2008:III 2009:I 2 0.253 
55 United Kingdom 2008:I 2009:III 6 0.062 
56 United States 2008:II 2009:II 4 0.038 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the IMF’s International Financial Statistic 
(IFS) 
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Table B.2. List of Explanatory Variables 
Variables Definition Sources 
Labor Market Flexibility   
Minimum wage The ratio of mandated minimum wage to the 
average value added per worker (2007) 
 
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
Hiring and firing regulation Whether the hiring and firing workers is 
impeded by regulations or flexibly determined 
by employers (2007) 
 
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
Centralized collective bargaining Whether wages are set by a centralized 
bargaining process or up to each individual 
company (2007) 
 
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
Mandated cost of hiring Includes the cost of all social security and 
payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated 
benefits including those for retirement, sickness, 
health care, maternity leave, family allowance, 
and paid vacations and holidays associated with 
hiring an employee (2007) 
 
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal Includes the cost of the requirements for 
advance notice, severance payments, and 
penalties due when dismissing a redundant 
worker (2007) 
 
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
Conscription Duration of military conscription (2007) Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
 
Trade Integration   
Regulatory Trade Barriers Consists of Non-tariff trade barriers and 
compliance cost of importing and exporting 
(2007)  
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
 
  
 
Exports and Imports relative to GDP Total export plus imports of goods and services 
to GDP (2007) 
WDI (2009) 
Share of food commodities in total 
exports 
Ratio between food exports and total exports 
(2007) 
UN Comtrade 
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Share of industrial commodities in 
total exports 
Ratio between industrial commodity exports and 
total exports (2007) 
UN Comtrade 
Share of fuel in total exports Ratio between exports in fuel and total exports 
(2007) 
UN Comtrade 
   
Financial Integration   
International capital market controls Includes foreign ownership/investment 
restriction and capital controls (2007).  
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
 
 
  
Domestic Financial Development   
Credit/GDP Domestic credit to GDP (2005) WDI (2007) 
 
Vulnerability   
The Growth of Domestic Credit  Cumulative growth of domestic credit (2003-
2005) 
WDI (2007) 
   
Quality of Institution   
Governance indicators  There are six components of governance: voice 
and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of 
corruption (2007) 
The 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI) 
   
Policy Framework   
Standard deviation of inflation Standard deviation of the inflation rate over the 
last five years (2007).  
Gwartney et 
al. (2009) 
 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
dummy 
The exchange rate regime on the basis of degree 
of flexibility and the existence of formal or 
informal commitments to exchange rate paths 
(2006) 
IMF (2007) 
Fiscal stimulus  The change of fiscal balance per GDP from 
2008 to 2009  
WDI (2009) 
Population growth  The percentage change of population (2007) IFS (2010) 
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Table B.3. Countries and Employment Loss 
 Country Peak Through Employment Loss 
       (In Percentage) 
1. Argentina Sept09 Dec08 0.018 
2. Australia Mar10 Sept08 0.018 
3. Austria Mar10 Sept08 0.034 
4. Belgium Mar10 June08 0.016 
5. Bolivia Dec09 Mar09 0.04 
6. Bulgaria Mar10 Dec08 0.052 
7. Canada Mar10 Dec07 0.032 
8. Chile Sept09 Mar07 0.039 
9. Colombia Mar10 Dec07 0.025 
10. Costa Rica June09 Sept07 0.05 
11. Czech Republic Mar10 Jun08 0.047 
12. Denmark Mar10 Sept08 0.042 
13. Estonia Mar10 June08 0.158 
14. Finland Mar10 Sept08 0.037 
15. France Dec09 Mar08 0.025 
16. Germany Mar10 Dec08 0.014 
17. Greece Mar10 June08 0.045 
18. Hungary Mar10 Sept07 0.042 
19. Iceland Mar10 Dec07 0.084 
20. Israel Sept09 June08 0.021 
21. Italy Mar10 Sept07 0.034 
22. Jamaica Dec09 Dec07 0.022 
23. Japan Sept09 Sept07 0.017 
24. Korea, Rep. Mar10 Dec07 0.017 
25. Latvia Mar10 Dec07 0.151 
26. Lithuania Mar10 Sept07 0.153 
27. Luxembourg Mar10 Sept07 0.022 
28. Malaysia Mar09 Sept07 0.01 
29. Mauritius Mar10 Dec08 0.022 
30. Mexico Mar10 June07 0.044 
31. Morocco Mar10 June09 0.02 
32. Netherlands Mar10 Dec08 0.024 
33. New Zealand Dec09 Sept07 0.035 
34. Norway Mar10 Mar08 0.011 
35. Peru Mar10 Dec09 0.024 
36. Poland Mar10 Sept08 0.039 
37. Portugal Mar10 June08 0.033 
38. Romania Mar10 June08 0.045 
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39. Russian Federation Mar09 Sept08 0.035 
40. Singapore Sept09 Sept07 0.016 
41. Slovak Republic Mar10 June08 0.055 
42. Slovenia Mar10 Sept08 0.042 
43. South Africa Mar10 Sept07 0.042 
44. Spain Mar10 June07 0.12 
45. Sweden Mar10 Sept07 0.037 
46. Switzerland Mar10 June08 0.02 
47. Thailand Mar09 Dec07 0.01 
48. Turkey Mar09 June08 0.063 
49. United Kingdom Mar10 Dec07 0.03 
50. United States Mar10 June07 0.06 
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Table C.1. List of Countries for Estimation in Chapter 4 
No. Countries No.  Countries No. Countries 
1 Albania 35 France 69 Mongolia 
2 Argentina 36 Georgia 70 Morocco 
3 Armenia 37 Germany 71 Nepal 
4 Australia 38 Ghana 72 Netherlands 
5 Austria 39 Greece 73 New Zealand 
6 Bangladesh 40 Guatemala 74 Nicaragua 
7 Barbados 41 Guyana 75 Nigeria 
8 Belarus 42 Haiti 76 Norway 
9 Belgium 43 Honduras 77 Pakistan 
10 Belize 44 Hungary 78 Papua New Guinea 
11 Bhutan 45 Iceland 79 Paraguay 
12 Bolivia 46 India 80 Peru 
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina 47 Indonesia 81 Philippines 
14 Botswana 48 Iran, Islamic Rep. 82 Poland 
15 Brazil 49 Ireland 83 Portugal 
16 Bulgaria 50 Israel 84 Russian Federation 
17 Burundi 51 Italy 85 Singapore 
18 Canada 52 Jamaica 86 Slovak Republic 
19 Cape Verde 53 Japan 87 South Africa 
20 Chile 54 Jordan 88 Spain 
21 China 55 Kazakhstan 89 Sri Lanka 
22 Colombia 56 Kenya 90 Sweden 
23 Costa Rica 57 Korea, Rep. 91 Switzerland 
24 Croatia 58 Kuwait 92 Tanzania 
25 Czech Republic 59 Latvia 93 Thailand 
26 Denmark 60 Lebanon 94 Turkey 
27 Dominican Republic 61 Lesotho 95 Uganda 
28 Ecuador 62 Lithuania 96 United Kingdom 
29 Egypt, Arab Rep. 63 Luxembourg 97 United States 
30 El Salvador 64 Malawi 98 Uruguay 
31 Estonia 65 Malaysia 99 Venezuela, RB 
32 Ethiopia 66 Maldives 100 Zambia 
33 Fiji 67 Mauritius 101 Zimbabwe 
34 Finland 68 Mexico     
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Table D.1. List of Countries for Estimation in Chapter 5  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
 
Countries No. Countries 
1 Argentina 24 Malaysia 
2 Barbados 25 Mauritius 
3 Bolivia 26 Morocco 
4 Botswana 27 Nepal 
5 Brazil 28 Nicaragua 
6 Burkina Faso 29 Nigeria 
7 Burundi 30 Pakistan 
8 Chile 31 Panama 
9 Colombia 32 Papua New Guinea 
10 Costa Rica 33 Paraguay 
11 Dominican Rep 34 Peru 
12 Ecuador 35 Philippines 
13 Egypt 36 Romania 
14 El Salvador 37 Rwanda 
15 Guatemala 38 Sierra Leone 
16 Haiti 39 South Africa 
17 Honduras 40 Sri Lanka 
18 India 41 Tanzania 
19 Indonesia 42 Thailand 
20 Iran 43 Tunisia 
21 Jordan 44 Uganda 
22 Kenya 45 Venezuela 
23 Mexico 46 Zambia 
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Samenvatting  
 
 
De huidige economische crisis, gestart in de VS, heeft zich als een olievlek over de rest 
van de wereld verspreid. De impact van de crisis op de economie verschilt echter sterk 
van land tot land als gevolg van uiteenlopende gevoeligheid en kwetsbaarheid voor 
financiële crises, heterogeniteit in de macro-economische structuur en verschillende 
beleidsreacties (Berkmen et al., 2009). Hoewel diverse verklaringen zijn gegeven voor de 
uiteenlopende gevolgen van de crisis tussen landen, is de mogelijke rol van flexibiliteit 
op de arbeidsmarkt tot dusverre onderbelicht gebleven.  
Een ander thema dat recent aandacht heeft gekregen is de interactie tussen 
monetair en begrotingsbeleid tijdens de crisis, en de implicaties hiervan voor de 
onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank. Anekdotisch bewijs suggereert dat de 
onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank door een financiële crisis onder druk kan komen 
te staan. De Argentijnse centrale bank president werd bijvoorbeeld in 2010 ontslagen, 
omdat hij weigerde muntreserves te verkopen om buitenlandse schulden mee af te 
betalen. De president van Mexico verving de centrale bank president omdat deze 
terughoudend was om de rente te verlagen nadat het land door de crisis was getroffen. 
Daarnaast hebben vele centrale banken de afgelopen jaren beleid gevoerd met een 
duidelijke begrotingspolitieke dimensie, zoals kredietverstrekking aan de private sector, 
bailouts van financiële instellingen en kwantitatieve verruiming. Volgens Sargent en 
Wallace (1981), Davig et al. (2011) en Davig en Leeper (2011) kan een centrale bank, 
zelfs als deze operationeel onafhankelijk is van de overheid, gedwongen worden zijn 
inflatiedoel te laten schieten om door geldcreatie de overheidsschuld te stabiliseren.  
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Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de impact van financiële crises op de 
onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank, productie en inflatie. Ten eerste ontwikkelen we 
een de jure en een de facto index voor de onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank van 
Indonesië, Bank Indonesia (BI). De eerste onderzoeksvraag die we stellen is hoe de 
juridische en werkelijke onafhankelijkheid van BI zich hebben ontwikkeld vanaf diens 
oprichting tot nu. Ten tweede onderzoeken we de impact van de huidige financiële crisis 
op productie en werkloosheid door de rol van arbeidsmarktflexibiliteit te beschouwen. 
Ten derde onderzoeken we het effect van financiële crises op de onafhankelijkheid van 
centrale banken. De onderzoeksvraag luidt welke invloed financiële crises hebben op de 
kans dat de president van een centrale bank wordt vervangen. Tot slot onderzoeken we 
wat diverse commentatoren zich tijdens de huidige financiële crisis hebben afgevraagd, 
namelijk: “Leiden overheidstekorten en schuldencrises tot inflatie?” 
Om de onafhankelijkheid van BI te meten over de periode 1953-2009 breiden we 
zowel de de jure index van Cukierman (1992) als de de facto index van Cukierman 
(2007) uit. Bij het opstellen van de de jure index voegen we de financiële 
onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank toe aan de index van Cukierman (1992). Voor de 
de facto index gebruiken we institutionele en economische factoren die de 
onafhankelijkheid van BI beïnvloeden, zoals de ontwikkeling van financiële markten, de 
omvang van overheidstekorten, het wisselkoersbeleid en de taak van de centrale bank als 
ontwikkelingsbank. Bovendien gebruiken we informatie over de achtergrond van de 
directieleden van de centrale bank, de vervanging van directieleden en de reden voor hun 
ontslag. Onze bevinding is dat er substantiële verschillen waren tussen de de jure en de 
defacto onafhankelijkheid van BI voor 1999. De werkelijke onafhankelijkheid van BI is 
vele malen groter dan in die periode juridisch was vastgelegd. Nadat Bank Indonesia 
middels een nieuwe wet het mandaat had gekregen van een onafhankelijke centrale bank, 
zijn de juridische en werkelijke onafhankelijkheid geconvergeerd door een toename in de 
de jure onafhankelijkheid. Bovendien vinden we dat de werkelijke onafhankelijkheid van 
BI significant negatief samenhangt met inflatie in Indonesië.  
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Ten aanzien van het tweede onderzoeksthema vinden we, met behulp van cross-
sectie regressies, dat landen met lage aanstellingskosten een geringere productiedaling 
tijdens de huidige financiële crisis kenden dan landen met hoge aanstellingskosten. 
Daarentegen hebben landen met lage ontslagkosten zich langzamer herstelt van de crisis 
dan landen met hoge ontslagkosten. Ook handelsbarrières, openheid, groei van kredieten, 
financiële integratie, de stabiliteit van inflatie en bevolkingsgroei zijn van significante 
invloed op de productiedaling tijdens de crisis. Het herstel na de crisis wordt naast 
arbeidsmarktflexibiliteit beïnvloed door handelsbarrières, groei van kredieten en 
wisselkoersbeleid. De impact van de crisis op de werkloosheid in geïndustrialiseerde 
landen is geringer bij lagere aanstellingskosten, hoewel het effect betrekkelijk klein is.  
Om het effect van financiële crises op de onafhankelijkheid van centrale banken 
te onderzoeken, gebruiken we zowel reguliere als irreguliere vervangingen van centrale 
bank presidenten als maatstaf voor de onafhankelijkheid van de centrale bank. Met 
behulp van een conditional fixed effects logit model met clusterrobuuste standaardfouten 
vinden we dat financiële crises de waarschijnlijkheid vergroten dat de centrale bank 
president wordt vervangen. Als we crises onderscheiden naar banken-, valuta- en 
schuldencrises, laten de resultaten zien dat alleen banken- en schuldencrises de kans 
vergroten dat de centrale bank president wordt vervangen. Op basis van de data van 
Vuletin en Zhu (2011) vinden we dat financiële crises (met name banken crises) de kans 
doen toenemen dat een niet-bondgenoot van de regering aangesteld zal worden als 
nieuwe bankpresident.  
Ten slotte concluderen we op basis van de Mean Group (MG) en Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) schattingsmethoden dat begrotingstekorten en schuldencrises op lange 
termijn een significant positief effect hebben op inflatie. De effecten zijn op lange termijn 
homogeen tussen landen. Ook vinden we dat de lange termijn effecten van 
overheidstekorten en schuldencrises op inflatie afhangen van de hoogte van inflatie en 
(voor schuldencrises) van politieke instabiliteit. Hoe hoger de inflatie, des te hoger zal het 
effect van overheidstekorten en schuldencrises zijn op de inflatie. Evenzo wordt het 
effect van een schuldencrisis op inflatie sterker naarmate de politieke instabiliteit 
toeneemt.   
